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Certain constitutional guarantees generally restrict the actions of 
governmental entities, not private entities.1  Situations arise, however, 
when private entities take on the governmental mantle and thus are 
properly treated as the government.  In such situations, the Constitution 
generally limits the actions of those private entities.  Anything but clear is 
the dividing line between those situations in which private actors are 
simply private actors and those situations in which private actors are treated 
as governmental actors.2  This area of law has been described as a disaster 
                                                          
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, . . . nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Executives’ Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989) (“The [Fourth] Amendment guarantees the 
privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by 
officers of the Government . . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or 
seizure, even an arbitrary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative . . . .”); San 
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542 & n.21 (1987) 
(emphasizing that the Fifth Amendment applies to governmental actors); ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 385 (1997) (introducing 
the state action doctrine).  One exception is the Thirteenth Amendment, which regulates 
private conduct.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude . . . shall exist in the United States . . . .”); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 
500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) (“With a few exceptions, such as the provisions of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, constitutional guarantees of individual liberty and equal protection do not 
apply to the actions of private entities.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 387-88 (detailing that 
Congress may pass laws that “require that private conduct meet the same standards that the 
Constitution requires of the government”). 
 2. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 388 (noting that “[b]ecause the government is 
involved in so much private conduct, seemingly arbitrary lines have to be drawn as to what 
constitutes state action”). 
CLEVELAND OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:17:23 PM 
2005] NYSE AS STATE ACTOR? 3 
area3 and the justices appear willing to acknowledge the attendant 
uncertainty.4 
Courts struggle with the issue for a number of reasons.  On the one hand, 
the constitutional text, our history, and policy rationales support the 
conclusion that private actors are immune from the strictures of the 
Constitution.5  On the other hand, should private actors that take on the role 
of the government, with the knowledge and endorsement of the 
government, be immune from the constitutional strictures applicable to the 
government? 
Hoping to benefit from protections afforded by the Constitution, parties 
disciplined by self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”)—such as the New 
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”)—have sought to have the actions of those 
entities attributed to the government.  Initially, courts accepted those 
claims, but as the “state action” doctrine evolved, such claims generally 
have proved unsuccessful.  However, joint investigations—investigations 
involving both the government and SROs—may provide circumstances in 
which governmental influence is sufficient such that private actions may be 
attributed to the government. 
Part I.A discusses early court decisions that attributed the actions of 
private SROs to the government due to their accountability to the 
government and its pervasive regulations.  Part I.B describes the evolution 
of the “state action” doctrine and current bases for attributing private 
actions to the government.  Part I.C references recent decisions in which 
courts generally have not attributed the actions of SROs to the government.  
Part II addresses the reasons why any rational SRO (independent of federal 
regulation, coercion, or significant encouragement) would create, police, 
                                                          
 3. See, e.g., id. (asserting that “because the government always can regulate private 
behavior, it is difficult to articulate principles as to when the failure to do so is a 
constitutional violation”); Charles Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, Foreword:  
“State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 
70, 95 (1967); Alan R. Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment; State 
Action, Federalism and Congress, 59 MO. L. REV. 499, 500 (1994) (seeking to resolve the 
“quagmire” of the state action doctrine, whose problems are “far deeper” than mere lack of 
coherence). 
 4. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 
295 (2001) (“What [private actions are] fairly attributable [to the government] is a matter of 
normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity.”); Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995) (describing that deciding when a court may deem a private 
action an act of the state as “difficult terrain”); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 
U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur cases deciding when private action 
might be deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency.”); Jackson v. 
Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (recognizing that the issue of whether conduct 
is private or that of the state “admits of no easy answer”). 
 5. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 389 (stating that the Constitution’s text seems to 
restrictively apply to the government).  But see Akil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757 (1994) (claiming that as a “matter of text, history, 
and plain old common sense,” modern Fourth Amendment case law is “an embarrassment”). 
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and enforce private rules that address the two principal goals of federal 
securities regulation—disclosure and the prevention of fraud.  Because 
evidence suggests that decision-making processes are not perfectly rational, 
Part III sets forth certain cognitive biases that may impact the decisions of 
SROs and their enforcement officials, and suggests that such biases may 
lessen any coercive influence stemming from accountability to the 
government.  Because of the increasing frequency of joint investigations 
involving the government and SROs, Part IV examines joint investigations 
and references situations in which attribution of private actions to the 
government may be appropriate. 
I.  STATE ACTION AND SROS 
When parties have challenged the actions of an SRO on constitutional 
grounds, their arguments have concentrated on illegal seizures in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment and violations of the Fifth Amendment in the 
form of compelled testimony or denials of due process.  Early court 
decisions concluded that the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange 
(“AMEX”), and the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) 
should be treated as governmental actors.  The law and jurisprudence, 
however, evolved.  Since recent evolution of the state action doctrine, 
courts have reversed course and now routinely conclude that the actions of 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASD should not be attributed to the government. 
A.  Early Decisions Regarding SROs and State Action 
Courts that concluded that the NYSE, AMEX, and NASD should be 
treated as governmental actors based such conclusions either upon the 
nature and degree of federal regulation of national securities exchanges and 
registered securities associations, or on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.6  Below is a brief description of 
that federal regulation and a brief sampling of those decisions. 
1.  Federal regulation 
Congress erected a regulatory scheme for national securities exchanges 
and associations of brokers and dealers.  The congressional scheme sets 
forth requirements regarding the registration processes, the rule-making 
processes, and the disciplinary processes of such exchanges and 
associations. 
a.  Registration 
Congress effectively required the registration of exchanges by 
                                                          
 6. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
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prohibiting brokers and dealers from trading securities on unregistered 
exchanges.7  By filing an application with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”), an exchange may be registered as 
a “national securities exchange.”8  Congress prohibited the Commission 
from approving such an application unless the exchange, among other 
things, agreed to enforce compliance with the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (“Exchange Act” or “‘34 Act”), its rules and regulations, and the rules 
of such exchange.9  Moreover, Congress required that such exchange’s 
rules be designed to, among other things, prevent fraud and generally 
protect investors and the public interest.10  To assist in achieving these 
goals, Congress required that the rules of a national securities exchange 
provide for the discipline of any member that violates those laws or rules.11 
Following its registration as a national securities exchange,12 the 
exchange must deny membership to any entity that is not a registered 
broker or dealer13 or any person that is not, or is not associated with, a 
registered broker or dealer.14  Although the Commission does not approve 
                                                          
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 78e (2000). 
 8. Id. § 78f(b)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 240.6a-1 (2005) (directing usage of Form 1 for the 
registration application for national securities exchanges).  Nine exchanges are registered as 
“national securities exchanges”—AMEX, Boston Stock Exchange, Chicago Board Options 
Exchange, Chicago Stock Exchange, International Securities Exchange, National Stock 
Exchange (formerly the Cincinnati Stock Exchange), NYSE, Pacific Exchange, and the 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange.  See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, National 
Securities Exchanges (Aug. 16, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/answers/exchanges.htm.  The 
Commission exempted from registration requirements the Arizona Stock Exchange and virt-
x plc (formerly Tradepoint) due to their limited trading volume.  15 U.S.C. § 78e(2). 
 9. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(1); see also id. § 78o-3(b)(2) (governing registered securities 
associations, such as the NASD). 
 10. See id. § 78f(b)(5); see also id. § 78o-3(b)(6) (describing the legislative intent of 
laws governing registered securities associations). 
 11. See id. § 78f(b)(6); see also id. § 78o-3(b)(6) (governing registered securities 
associations); id. § 78f(b)(6) (authorizing expulsion, suspension, limitations, fine, censure, 
or any other fitting sanction). 
 12. See id. § 78s(a)(1) (describing that upon the filing of an application for registration 
as a national securities exchange or registered securities association, the SEC “shall publish 
notice of such filing and afford interested parties an opportunity to submit written data, 
views, and arguments concerning such application”).  Within a specified time period, the 
SEC must either grant the application or initiate proceedings to determine whether the 
application should be denied.  Id.  If the SEC determines that a national securities exchange 
or registered securities association ceases to do business in the capacity specified in its 
application for registration, the SEC must cancel such registration.  See id. § 78s(a)(3). 
 13. From a practical perspective, Congress requires brokers and dealers to register with 
the SEC.  Such is the case because Congress prohibits any broker or dealer to effect, or 
attempt to effect, a transaction of any security by means of interstate commerce unless such 
broker or dealer is registered in accord with the ‘34 Act.  See id. § 78o(a); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.15b7-1 (2005).  By a rule promulgated by the SEC, brokers and dealers register by 
filing Form BD with the NASD.  15 U.S.C. § 78o(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b1-1.  Even if a 
broker or dealer is not a member of a national securities exchange, the SEC may require any 
such broker or dealer that regularly effects transactions on such an exchange to comply with 
rules of the exchange to maintain fair and orderly markets, to ensure equal regulation or as 
appropriate to protect investors and the public.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(f). 
 14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(1).  Such exchange may deny membership to any registered 
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the admission of a member to an exchange,15 the Commission may deny 
membership to protect the public.16  Additionally, the Commission may 
review an exchange’s decision regarding an application for membership.17 
b.  Rules 
Each SRO, including any national securities exchange and any registered 
securities associations,18 must file with the Commission any proposed rule 
or any proposed change in, addition to, or deletion from the rules of such 
SRO.19  Congress required the Commission, with respect to an SRO’s 
proposed rule or amendment, to comply with a notice-and-comment 
procedure.20  Congress, with limited  
exceptions,21 prohibits any proposed rule or amendment from becoming 
effective without the Commission’s approval.22 
Despite congressional authorization empowering SROs to propose new 
rules,23 Congress empowered the Commission to abrogate, add to, and 
delete the rules of an SRO as necessary or appropriate to ensure the fair 
                                                          
broker or dealer or any natural person associated with a registered broker or dealer, if, for 
example, such broker or dealer does not meet the requisite standard of financial 
responsibility or such natural person associated with such broker or dealer does not meet the 
requisite standards of training, experience, and competence.  See id. § 78f(c)(2), (3). 
 15. See, e.g., David A. Lipton, The SEC or the Exchanges:  Who Should Do What and 
When?  A Proposal to Allocate Regulatory Responsibilities for Securities Markets, 16 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 527, 538 n.42 (1983). 
 16. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(2). 
 17. See id. § 78s(d)(1); id. § 78s(f) (stating the procedural requirements of such review). 
 18. See id. § 78c(a)(26) (“The term ‘self-regulatory organization’ means any national 
securities exchange [or] registered securities association . . . .”). 
 19. See id. § 78s(b)(1). 
 20. See id. 
 21. See, e.g., id. § 78s(b)(3)(A) (“[A] proposed rule change may take effect upon filing 
with the Commission if designated by the self-regulatory organization as (i) constituting a 
stated policy, practice, or interpretation with respect to the meaning, administration, or 
enforcement of an existing rule of the self-regulatory organization, (ii) establishing or 
changing a due, fee, or other charge imposed by the self-regulatory organization, or (iii) 
concerned solely with the administration of the self-regulatory organization or other matters 
which the Commission . . . may specify . . . .”); id. § 78s(b)(3)(B) (“[A] proposed rule 
change may be put into effect summarily if it appears to the Commission that such action is 
necessary for the protection of investors, the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, or the 
safeguarding of securities or funds.”). 
 22. See id. § 78s(b)(1).  Within a specified period of time, the SEC shall either approve 
the proposed rule or rule change or initiate proceedings to determine whether the proposed 
rule change should be disapproved.  Id. § 78s(b)(2).  Although Congress empowered the 
SEC with discretion, such discretion is not unbridled as the SEC must approve a proposed 
rule change if consistent with the requirements of the ‘34 Act and the related rules.  Id. 
 23. See S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 13 (1934) (“[T]he initiative and responsibility for 
promulgating regulations pertaining to the administration of their ordinary affairs remain 
with the exchanges themselves.  It is only where they fail adequately to provide protection 
to investors that the Commission is authorized to step in and compel them to do so.”).  The 
intention was “one of ‘letting the exchanges take the leadership with Government playing a 
residual role.’”  Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 352 (1963) (quoting Justice 
Douglas in his prior role as Chairman of the SEC). 
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administration of the SRO, to conform its rules to the requirements of the 
Exchange Act and the applicable regulations.24 
c.  Disciplinary proceedings by an SRO 
Congress also required that any SRO have rules providing for the 
discipline of its members and associated persons for violations of the 
Exchange Act, the related federal rules, or the rules of such SRO.25  
Congress requires that the SRO (1) provide notice of a disciplinary 
proceeding against a member or person associated with a member as well 
as an opportunity to defend against such charges26 and (2) support any 
disciplinary sanction by setting forth the violation, the specific provision or 
rule that was violated, and reasons for imposing the sanction.27  If any SRO 
imposes a final disciplinary sanction, Congress requires the SRO to notify 
promptly the Commission.28  Moreover, Congress empowered the 
                                                          
 24. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (requiring the Commission to comply with notice-and-
comment procedures).  Congress also required that any amendment to the rules of an SRO 
made by the Commission be considered part of the rules of such SRO, not of the 
Commission.  However, Congress does not offer the final word.  In Lebron, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
If Amtrak is, by its very nature, what the Constitution regards as the Government, 
congressional pronouncement that it is not such can no more relieve it of its First 
Amendment restrictions than a similar pronouncement could exempt the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation from the Fourth Amendment.  The Constitution constrains 
government action by whatever instruments or in whatever modes that action may 
be taken. . . . That the Congress chose to call [the entity in question] a corporation 
does not alter its characteristics so as to make it something other than what it 
actually is. 
Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
 25. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(6) (governing a national securities exchange’s rules for 
members and associated persons who are in violation of the provisions of the statute); id. § 
78o-3(b)(7) (governing registered securities associations).  Such rules must provide a “fair 
procedure” for the disciplining of members and persons associated with members.  See id. § 
78f(b)(7) (governing national securities exchanges); id. § 78o-3(b)(8) (governing registered 
securities associations); see also Silver, 373 U.S. at 352 (describing the development of the 
“federally mandated duty of self-policing by exchanges”). 
 26. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d)(1); id. § 78o-3(h)(1).  But see id. § 78f(d)(3) (setting forth 
the circumstances under which a national securities exchange may summarily discipline a 
member or person associated with a member); id. § 78o-3(h)(3) (dictating the same 
circumstances for a registered securities association). 
 27. See id. § 78f(d)(1); id. § 78o-3(h)(1).  Somewhat similar procedures apply to 
proceedings by an SRO in determining whether a person shall be denied membership, 
barred from becoming associated with a member, or prohibiting or limiting access to 
services of the SRO.  See id. § 78f(d)(2); id. § 78o-3(h)(2).  Under certain limited 
circumstances, an SRO may summarily discipline a member or person associated with a 
member.  See id. § 78f(d)(3); id. § 78o-3(h)(3).  Nonetheless, Congress required that, in 
certain circumstances, a person aggrieved by summary action be afforded a hearing.  See id. 
§ 78f(d)(3); id. § 78o-3(h)(3).  Moreover, Congress empowered the SEC to stay any 
summary action on its own motion or upon application of any such aggrieved person if the 
SEC determines that such stay is consistent with the public interest and the protection of 
investors.  See id. § 78f(d)(3); id. § 78o-3(h)(3). 
 28. See id. § 78s(d)(1) (mandating “the appropriate regulatory agency” to receive notice 
of any final disciplinary sanction and to review, among other things, an SRO’s decision to 
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Commission to review such disciplinary action,29 with those disciplined 
entitled to notice and a hearing.30  After review,31  the Commission may 
then affirm, modify, or set aside the sanction or remand to the SRO for 
further proceedings.32 
d.  Federal discipline of SROs 
Congress empowered the Commission to discipline an SRO for any 
lapses in fulfilling federally imposed obligations.  The Commission—
consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors—may 
relieve an SRO of any responsibility under the Exchange Act to enforce 
compliance with any of its provisions or the related regulations.33  
Moreover, Congress empowered the Commission to suspend or revoke the 
registration of such SRO, or to censure or impose limitations upon the 
activities, functions, and operations of such SRO.34   
2.  Early court decisions 
In the 1970 decision of Harwell v. Growth Programs, Inc.,35 the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Texas concluded that the actions 
of the SRO should be attributed to the government.36  In reaching its 
conclusion, the court focused on the federal statutory regime.  The court 
noted Congress authorized the establishment of a regulatory association 
                                                          
deny membership or prohibit or limit access to the SRO’s services). 
 29. See id. § 78s(d)(2). 
 30. See id. § 78s(e)(1) (noting that the hearing “may consist solely of consideration of 
the record before the self-regulatory organization and opportunity for the presentation of 
supporting reasons to affirm, modify, or set aside the sanction . . . .”). 
 31. See id. § 78s(e)(1)(A) (requiring that the Commission, in order to confirm an SRO’s 
sanctions upon review:  (1) make findings on whether such member or associated person 
engaged in the acts or omissions as found by the SRO; (2) determine whether such acts or 
omissions constitute violations of the ‘34 Act, the accordant rules and regulations 
promulgated, or the rules of the SRO; and (3) confirm that such provisions were applied in a 
manner consistent with the purposes of the Exchange Act). 
 32. See id. § 78s(e)(1); see also id. § 78y(a)(1) (“A person aggrieved by a final order of 
the Commission . . . may obtain review of the order in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the circuit in which he resides . . . by filing in such court . . . a written petition requesting 
that the order be modified or set aside in whole or in part.”). 
A person adversely affected by a rule of the Commission promulgated pursuant to 
[15 U.S.C. § 78f], . . . [15 U.S.C. § 78o-3], . . . or [15 U.S.C. § 78s] of this title may 
obtain review of this rule in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in 
which he resides . . . by filing in such court . . . a written petition requesting that the 
rule be set aside. 
Id. § 78y(b)(1). 
 33. See id. § 78s(g)(2). 
 34. See id. § 78s(h)(1) (authorizing the Commission to impose sanctions against an 
SRO after finding that the SRO violated or was unable to comply with any provision of the 
Exchange Act, the Exchange Act’s rules or regulations, or the SRO’s own rules). 
 35. 315 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Tex. 1970). 
 36. See id. at 1187-88 (regarding the NASD as more than an ordinary non-profit 
corporation, but rather a mechanism of regulation authorized by the Exchange Act). 
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over brokers and dealers to prevent unjust and inequitable trading in 
securities.37  The SRO, according to the findings of the court, was 
“effectively a Congressionally-created regulatory organization governing 
conduct in the over-the-counter securities market.”38  Moreover, the court 
referenced Congress’s bestowment on the Commission of “broad powers of 
review over virtually every phase of the association’s activity,” including 
rule-making.39  To the court, it was “quite clear that [Congress] empowered 
the [SRO] to act—subject to pervasive supervision by the SEC—as a quasi-
governmental agency charged with the responsibility of promoting, and 
enforcing, ‘just and equitable principles of trade’ . . . .”40  The court 
emphasized that the SRO issued a rules interpretation only after 
consultation with the SEC and its express approval.41  The court held that, 
based upon such consultation and approval, the “SEC was so deeply 
involved in the formulation of the interpretation, . . . [the SRO]’s 
rulemaking action . . . must be considered a ‘valid exercise of the rightful 
authority of the Government.’”42 
As a consequence of the court’s holding, the protections of the Fifth 
Amendment applied to the SRO’s action.  In reaching its conclusion, the 
court relied upon the federal statutory scheme, without reference to any 
cases addressing the issue of the circumstances under which private action 
should be attributed to the government.43  Soon after the Harwell court 
concluded that the NASD was a governmental actor, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit turned its attention to a national securities 
exchange. 
In Intercontinental Industries, Inc. v. American Stock Exchange,44 the 
Fifth Circuit considered whether the American Stock Exchange was a 
governmental actor.45  A company asserted the applicability of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the exchange’s determination to 
de-list the securities of that company.46  Citing a host of Congressional 
                                                          
 37. See id. at 1188. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1187. 
 42. Id. at 1191. 
 43. For reasons other than the issue of state action, the Harwell Court does cite Handley 
Inv. Co. v. SEC, 354 F.2d 64 (10th Cir. 1965), when addressing petitioner’s due process 
arguments, the Handley court writes “[l]ittle need be said.”  Handley, 354 F.2d at 66. 
 44. 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 45. Id. 
 46. At the time of the dispute, the “[e]xchange rules simply [did] not contain any 
provision governing the hearing to be conducted in connection with a delisting . . . .”  Id. at 
940.  Today, however, the rules of AMEX set forth delisting procedures.  See generally 
American Stock Exchange, AMEX Rule ¶ 10,379A, Section 1010, Procedures for Delisting 
and Removal (2005), http://wallstreet.cch.com/amer 
icanstockexchangeamex/amexcompanyguide/part10/suspensionanddelistingproceduresss100
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requirements regarding the regulation of national securities exchanges and 
the role of the SEC,47 the court concluded that the “intimate involvement” 
of the SRO with the SEC “brings it within the purview of the Fifth 
Amendment controls over due process.”48  Continuing, the court wrote that 
the “position that constitutional due process is not required since the 
Exchange is not a governmental agency is clearly contrary to [Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Authority] . . . .”49 
The Intercontinental decision spawned progeny.  Several months after 
the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York was asked by Crimmins, an associated member of AMEX, to 
enjoin a disciplinary proceeding by the exchange.50  Crimmins asserted that 
he was being denied counsel in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.51  Rejecting the SRO’s argument that the Fifth 
Amendment was inapplicable, the court commented that 
                                                          
9,1010,1011/16260003CD.asp. 
 47. Intercontinental, 452 F.2d at 941 n.9 ( 
1. The Exchange must register with the Commission. (Section 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f).  
2. The Exchange’s rules must be submitted to the Commission and are subject to 
alteration or supplementation by the Commission. (Section 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 
78f(a); Section 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)).  3. The Exchange’s members are closely 
regulated by the Commission. (Sections 9(a), 11, 17(a) and 19(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78i(a), 78k, 78q(a), 78s(a)(3)).  4. A security may not be delisted without 
application to the Commission. (Section 12(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(d)).  5. The 
Exchange may be suspended or its registration withdrawn by the Commission. 
(Section 19(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(1)). 
). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (citing two cases that rely upon Burton:  Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, 
Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) and McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 
1971)).  The reach of Burton, however, has been limited.  See Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 637 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (opining that the “vitality 
of Burton beyond its facts” did not apply to the case at hand); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 
419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974) (emphasizing that “differences in circumstances beget differences 
in law” and that Burton’s holding is limited to lessees of public property); Thomas P. Lewis, 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority—A Case Without Precedent, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 
1458, 1462-67 (1961) (describing the specific circumstances of Burton and noting the 
importance of the Court’s admonition limiting the scope of the decision); Thomas R. 
McCoy, Current State Action Theories, the Jackson Nexus Requirement, and Employee 
Discharges by Semi-Public and State-Aided Institutions, 31 VAND. L. REV. 785, 808-09 
(1978) (discussing the Court’s post-Burton refinement of the symbiosis principle and its 
questioning of the decision’s viability).  But see Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic 
Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 199 (1985) (offering support for Burton and arguing 
that its failure to formalize a rule was not as dire as critics had made it out to be). 
 50. See Crimmins v. Am. Stock Exchange, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1256, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972).   
 51. See id. at 1259.  Today, AMEX rules provide that a respondent in disciplinary 
proceedings has the right to be represented by legal or other counsel throughout the 
proceeding.  See Am. Stock Exch., AMEX ¶ 9907, Rule 7, Notice of Representation (2005), 
http://wallstreet.cch.com/AmericanStockExchangeAMEX/ 
RulesofProcedureinDisciplinaryMatters/default.asp; Am. Stock Exch., AMEX ¶ 9910, Rule 
10, Representation by Counsel (2005), http://wallstreet.cch.co 
m/AmericanStockExchangeAMEX/RulesofProcedureinDisciplinaryMatters/default.asp. 
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[T]he day [was] long gone when a national stock exchange c[ould] be 
considered a private club when it conducts disciplinary proceedings 
against its members or their employees.  When an exchange conducts 
such proceedings under the self-regulatory power conferred upon it by 
the 1934 Act, it is engaged in governmental action, federal in 
character . . . .52 
The court supported its conclusion by relying upon Intercontinental 
(which relied heavily upon Burton) and the nature and degree of federal 
regulation of national securities exchanges. 
Akin to Crimmins, and shortly thereafter, the court again addressed 
whether a national securities exchange—this time the NYSE—should be 
enjoined from proceeding with disciplinary hearings against associated 
exchange members for allegedly violating the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment by denying the aid of counsel.53  According to the district 
court, it was then “beyond dispute that the Fifth Amendment due process 
requirements as to federal action apply to the disciplinary hearings 
conducted by the Exchange.”54  Like Crimmins before it, the district court 
cited Intercontinental.55  Such attribution of private actions to the 
government would not continue as the jurisprudence in this area developed. 
B. Development in State Action Jurisprudence 
Some believe that, in order to stamp out racial discrimination, courts 
gave less credence to arguments that would limit certain constitutional 
strictures to governmental actors.56  Such impetus to treat private actors as 
                                                          
 52. Crimmins, 346 F. Supp. at 1259.  In addition to finding support for its conclusion in 
the Fifth Circuit’s Intercontinental decision, the court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).  Id. at 1259 n.4.  In Silver, the 
justices did not address the issue of whether the exchange was a governmental actor, but the 
court did detail the nature and extent of federal regulation of national securities exchanges.  
In so doing, the Supreme Court noted that, in the Exchange Act, Congress required 
exchanges to provide a “fair procedure” for the disciplining of members and persons 
associated with members.  See Silver, 373 U.S. at 352-53 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(7)). 
 53. Compare Crimmins, 346 F. Supp. at 1258-59 (considering whether AMEX could be 
brought within the purview of the Fifth Amendment), with Villani v. N.Y. Stock Exch. Inc., 
348 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (ruling on the same state-action issue with regard to the 
NYSE).  Today, NYSE Rule 476(h) permits representation by counsel.  See New York 
Stock Exchange, Disciplinary Rules, Rule 476(h) (2005), 
http://www.nyse.com/regulation/construles/1098571481177.html. 
 54. Villani, 348 F. Supp. at 1188 n.1. 
 55. Id.  John J. Villani and Donald Eucker were plaintiffs in the 1972 action before the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking an injunction to restrain 
the New York Stock Exchange from proceeding against them in disciplinary actions.  Id. at 
1185.  In 1975, after the United States had initiated criminal proceedings against Villani and 
Eucker, the duo again sought to enjoin the exchange’s disciplinary proceedings against 
them.  See United States v. Sloan, 388 F. Supp. 1062, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting that, 
although the NYSE was a state actor, it was inappropriate to enjoin the proceedings because 
the defendants could institute a separate action against the Exchange if they were expelled 
and then challenge the expulsions on due process grounds). 
 56. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 388 (“From the late 1940s through the 1960s, 
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governmental actors waned with the passage of the civil rights acts of the 
1960s because alternative means barred the discrimination that previously 
led courts to interpret broadly “state action.”57  In the decades following the 
1961 Burton decision, in which the Supreme Court had liberally construed 
individual action as state action, the Court refined its analysis, narrowing 
those situations in which private actors are treated as governmental actors. 
For the restrictions on the government to be applicable to private actors, 
there must be a close nexus between the government and the challenged 
action such that seemingly private behavior may fairly be attributed to the 
government.58  In determining the fairness of any such attribution, the 
Court has considered whether the disputed action resulted from the 
government’s exercise of coercive powers, significant encouragement, 
willful and joint participation, delegation of a public function traditionally 
performed exclusively by the government, and entwinement in the 
management or control of the private actor to achieve governmental 
objectives.59  The inquiry is “necessarily fact-bound”60 with no single facet 
serving as requisite.  Given the nature of the inquiry, “examples [may] 
work more forcibly on the mind than precepts.”61 
1.  Coercive powers and significant encouragement  
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association,62 the Supreme 
Court addressed whether searches by private railroads could be attributed 
to the government, when the government authorized—but did not 
require63—such searches.  Ultimately, the Court attributed such searches to 
                                                          
the Court often found state action in order to combat racial discrimination.  Later cases, 
especially those concerning other constitutional rights, generally did not find state action 
and the tensions among the decisions never have been resolved.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[A] peremptory strike by a private litigant is fundamentally a 
matter of private choice and not state action.”).  But see id. at 616-31 (concluding in the 
majority opinion that a private litigant in a civil suit that exercised peremptory challenges on 
the basis of race constituted action subject to constitutional restriction because the private 
litigant could not exercise such challenges without the court’s or government’s overt 
assistance, which significantly involved itself in the discrimination). 
 58. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Assoc., 531 U.S. 288, 295 
(2001) (finding that state action may only be found if and only if the actions in question of a 
seemingly private organization or individual are to be appropriately treated as having been 
caused by the state itself); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (holding 
that the question is whether the entity and state are sufficiently intertwined, and that because 
the nature of the state’s involvement may not be immediately obvious, detailed inquiry may 
be required to determine the outcome of the test). 
 59. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296. 
 60. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982). 
 61. Henry Fielding, Joseph Andrews, in JOSEPH ANDREWS AND SHAMELA 47, 57 (Arthur 
Humphreys ed., 1991) (1973); see Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296 (noting that “examples 
may be the best teachers”). 
 62. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 63. See id. at 615 (“The fact that the Government has not compelled a private party to 
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the government because the government had encouraged, endorsed, or 
participated in such searches.64  After finding that substance abuse posed a 
threat to public safety, the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) 
promulgated regulations that authorized private railroads to conduct 
searches in defined situations.  The regulations permitted the FRA to 
receive samples and test results that follow searches conducted under the 
regulations.65  Moreover, the government “removed all legal barriers to the 
[authorized] testing.”66  The regulations prohibited a railroad from 
divesting or compromising by contract the authority to search, and 
authorized the withdrawal of services from an employee that refused to 
submit to permitted substance tests.67  In promulgating those regulations, 
the government “did more than adopt a passive position toward the 
underlying private conduct,”68 it made “plain not only its strong preference 
for testing, but also its desire to share the fruits of such intrusions.”69  
Based on these facts, the court held that the government’s encouragement 
and endorsement of the private searches sufficed to implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.70 
Although the regulations at issue in the Skinner decision evidenced the 
government’s encouragement and endorsement of private searches, 
regulations—even extensive ones—do not necessarily convert private 
conduct into governmental conduct.  In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Company,71 the plaintiff asserted due process violations following the 
termination of her electric service by a privately owned and operated 
corporation.  That corporation, which was subject to extensive regulation 
by the state public utility commission (“PUC”), filed a tariff with the PUC 
in which it reserved the right to discontinue service following notice of 
nonpayment.  The Court reasoned that even assuming the state’s grant of 
monopoly power to a private party, there must be a relationship between 
the challenged actions of the private entity and the monopoly power; none 
was found.72  Although the government approved the utilities’ authority to 
terminate service in the sense that the PUC took no action to prohibit such 
                                                          
perform a search does not, by itself, establish that the search is a private one.”).  In addition, 
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) did promulgate regulations that required 
railroads to conduct searches in certain situations; the Court had no trouble concluding that 
the Fourth Amendment applied to such compulsory searches even though private parties 
conducted the search.  See id. at 614-15. 
 64. See id. at 615-16. 
 65. See id. at 615; 49 C.F.R. § 219.11(c) (1994). 
 66. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at 615-16. 
 71. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
 72. See id. at 351-52. 
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authority, the government did not place it imprimatur on the decision to 
discontinue Jackson’s electric service.73  While the regulations in Skinner 
highlighted the government’s preference for the disputed private searches, 
the government through its regulations in Jackson did not evidence a 
preference for the termination of service for those that fail to remit 
payment. 
2.  Traditionally exclusive state function 
Although courts have determined that the exercise of powers by a private 
party traditionally reserved exclusively by the government may be cause 
for such private party to be subject to constitutional scrutiny,74 the Jackson 
Court determined that the provision of electrical service is not one of those 
powers.75  The Court also rejected the contention that the list of such 
powers should be expanded to include those businesses that affect the 
public interest.76  To do otherwise would provide no meaningful limit, as 
“[d]octors, optometrists, lawyers . . . and grocer[s] selling a quart of milk”77 
all affect the public interest, and such status cannot convert their every 
action into that of the government.78 
Although unsuccessfully pressed in Jackson, the requisites of 
government action were met in Marsh v. Alabama,79 where a Jehovah’s 
Witness was convicted in state court for trespass after refusing to cease her 
distribution of religious literature on the sidewalk of the downtown area of 
Chickasaw.  In Chickasaw, the distribution of such material was strictly 
                                                          
 73. See id.; see also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 
U.S. 522, 547 (1987) (finding that “mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives . . . is 
not enough” to establish the requisite nexus between the state and private entity) (internal 
quotations, brackets, and citations omitted). 
 74. See, e.g., Marsh v. Ala., 326 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1946) (discussing a privately owned 
town acting as a government agent); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (describing 
when a privately owned park functions as a government agent); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 
461, 469-70 (1953) (regarding private elections that effectively produce public officials).  
The Court has mentioned other general areas that may be traditional, exclusive functions of 
a state or municipality—education, fire and police protection, and tax collection—but has 
refused to adopt a bright-line rule regarding these areas.  Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 
U.S. 149, 163 (1978) (dicta). 
 75. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353 (“The [state] courts have rejected the contention that 
the furnishing of utility services is either a state function or a municipal duty.” (citing Girard 
Life Ins. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 393 (1879); Baily v. City of Philadelphia, 184 
Pa. 594, 39 A. 494 (1898))). 
 76. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353-54; San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. 
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 544 (1987) (“The fact that a private entity performs a 
function which serves the public does not make its actions governmental action.”) (internal 
quotes and brackets omitted). 
 77. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354. 
 78. See id. at 353-54; cf. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 
(1978) (holding that if utilities were owned by the government, rather than a private 
company, then the termination of services must be preceded by notice and a hearing). 
 79. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
CLEVELAND OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:17:23 PM 
2005] NYSE AS STATE ACTOR? 15 
verboten.  The defendant’s behavior could not have been barred by the 
legislative body of a community the title of which was held by a municipal 
corporation.80  Chickasaw, however, was a private town owned by a private 
corporation.  Nonetheless, it possessed the characteristics of a typical 
town—a downtown business community, residential buildings, streets and 
sewers.  Although the privately owned downtown area was located on a 
private street, public streets surrounded the area.81  Nothing prevented 
anyone—locals or visitors—from shopping in the area.  The private 
facilities were “built and operated primarily to benefit the public and . . . 
their operation [was] essentially a public function.”82  In balancing the 
rights of property owners against the rights of the people to freedom of 
religion, the “latter occupy a preferred position.”83  Consequently, the 
privately owned town was treated as a governmental actor and the state 
conviction could not stand in light of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.84 
3.  Joint participation 
In 1961 decision of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,85 the 
Supreme Court concluded that the state was a “joint participant” in the 
racially discriminatory serving practice of a privately owned restaurant.  
Because this restaurant was located in a parking building owned and 
operated by a state agency, the Court concluded that the restaurant was 
subject to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.86  The state 
acquired the land and erected the building by expending public funds 
directly or indirectly through revenue raising instruments.87  Parking 
revenue proved inadequate to cover expenses for the structure; to make 
                                                          
 80. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 504-05 (citing, for example, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 
450-51 (1938) (forbidding municipalities from requiring overly restrictive permits for 
citizens wishing to distribute literature); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) 
(holding unconstitutional an ordinance that prohibited distribution of religious handbills on 
city sidewalks); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1938) (holding that a 
municipality cannot forbid door-to-door distribution of literature)). 
 81. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502. 
 82. Id. at 506. 
 83. Id. at 508. 
 84. See id.  Compare Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 
U.S. 308 (1968) (holding that a privately owned shopping center could not prevent 
individuals from picketing a store with which they had a labor dispute), with Lloyd Corp. v. 
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (holding that a privately owned shopping center could prevent 
protestors from distributing anti-war literature).  Despite a logical rationale for the different 
outcomes—whether the content of the speech concerns the operation of the shopping 
center—”it is difficult to explain why the determination of whether a private shopping 
center is a state actor for First Amendment purposes should turn on the message being 
expressed.”  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 399. 
 85. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
 86. See id. at 725. 
 87. See id. at 723-24. 
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good on such shortfalls, portions of the property were leased.  
Consequently, profits derived from the discriminatory practices of the 
restaurant were “indispensable” to the success of the state’s venture.  The 
restaurant benefited from certain tax exemptions afforded the state, from its 
location within a conveniently located parking structure, and from 
maintenance of the facility by the state.88  By flying the state flag above the 
building in which the restaurant was located, the state implicitly placed its 
imprimatur behind the operating practices of the restaurant.89  The interests 
of the state were so connected to the interests of the restaurant and vice 
versa, that the court viewed them as joint participants, leaving the 
restaurant subject to the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment.90 
Since 1961, members of the Court have suggested that the concept of 
“joint participant” should be more narrowly construed.91  In Flagg 
Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks,92 the Supreme Court determined that there was no 
joint participation between the state and a warehouseman that, following 
plaintiff’s eviction, sold plaintiff’s stored possessions to make good on 
plaintiff’s transportation and storage debts.  The city manager arranged for 
plaintiff’s possessions to be stored with the warehouseman, and the 
warehouseman acted pursuant to state statute authorizing such sale.  
Neither the involvement of the city official nor the state statute 
authorizing—but not requiring—the sale of stored goods provided a 
sufficient nexus to hold the state attributable for the actions of the private 
warehouseman.93 
                                                          
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. at 725 (“The State . . . has elected to place its power, property and prestige 
behind the admitted discrimination.”). 
 90. See id. at 725 (“interdependence”); cf. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 
358 (1974) (“symbiotic relationship”). 
 91. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 637 (1991) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“[w]hatever the continuing vitality of Burton beyond its facts”); Lugar v. 
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 950 n.7 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
term “jointly engaged” connotes engagement in a conspiracy); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358 
(“limiting the actual holding [of Burton] to lessees of public property”). 
 92. 436 U.S. 149 (1978). 
 93. See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 161 & n.11.  But see Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42 
(finding governmental action in the attachment of property by a private party due to the 
state-created procedural scheme, the state’s issuance of a writ of attachment, and the 
sheriff’s execution of the writ).  Critics are wary of such distinctions.  See CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 1, at 407 (“In Lugar, state law provided the procedure for prejudgment 
attachment; in Flagg Bros., state law provided for the self-help action.  In fact, in Flagg 
Bros. involvement of the sheriff was unnecessary precisely because the state’s law allowed 
for repossession action without assistance of the sheriff.  Therefore it can be questioned 
whether the distinction . . . based on the involvement of the sheriff should make such a 
difference.”). 
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4.  Entwinement94 
In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation,95 the Supreme 
Court held that, despite Congress’ statutory declaration that Amtrak “will 
not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government,”96 
Amtrak amounted to the government.  The Court reasoned that because 
Amtrak was created by special law for the furtherance of governmental 
objectives and over which the government retained permanent authority to 
appoint a majority of directors, Amtrak could be considered part of the 
government for First Amendment purposes.97  In the decades prior to 
Congress’ creation of Amtrak, private companies that operated passenger 
rail service went bankrupt or faced financial distress.  Congress created 
Amtrak because “public convenience and necessity”98 required the 
continuance and improvement of passenger service by rail.  The 
government controlled Amtrak through the appointment of eight members 
of a nine-member board of directors—the president appointed six 
members99 and the Secretary of Treasury appointed two directors through 
holdings of Amtrak’s preferred stock.100  The government exerted control 
over Amtrak—a non-profit entity—as a policy-maker rather than a creditor, 
and there was no contemplated endpoint to that control.101  Although 
Amtrak was a corporation organized under the laws of the District of 
Columbia, the Court concluded that Amtrak was the government, and that 
the government could not avoid the strictures of the Constitution by 
resorting to corporate form.102 
In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian,103 the Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of whether the actions of the NCAA constituted 
governmental action.  The University of Nevada at Las Vegas suspended 
the coach of its men’s basketball team—Jerry Tarkanian—following a 
report by the NCAA indicating that he had violated ten of its rules.  The 
NCAA placed the UNLV basketball team on probation and ordered the 
                                                          
 94. Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association speaks 
most clearly of entwinement and is discussed infra in Part IV, but the case, which was 
decided in 2001, post-dates a slew of decisions that conclude that the actions of SROs 
should not be attributed to the government. 
 95. 513 U.S. 374 (1995). 
 96. Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1994), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b) (1994)). 
 97. See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400. 
 98. 45 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000). 
 99. Id. § 543(a)(1)(A); Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397. 
 100. 45 U.S.C. § 544(c); Lebron, 513 U.S. at 385. 
 101. See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 399 (distinguishing Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 
419 U.S. 102 (1974), in which the Court found Conrail not to be a federal instrumentality 
despite presidential power to appoint a majority of the board, because the government 
exerted its control over Conrail to protect its interests as a creditor).   
 102. See id. at 394-95. 
 103. 488 U.S. 179 (1988). 
CLEVELAND OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:17:23 PM 
18 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1 
school to show cause why further sanctions should not be imposed if the 
athletic program failed to disassociate itself from Tarkanian during the 
probationary period.104  In state court, Tarkanian established deprivation of 
due process rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment and obtained 
injunctive relief and attorney’s fees.  Only if the NCAA’s action 
constituted governmental action could the NCAA be bound by the state 
court order.105  The Supreme Court determined that the necessary predicate 
was absent. 
UNLV, a state university, is “without question” a governmental actor.106  
The issue is whether UNLV’s compliance with NCAA rules and 
recommendations converted the NCAA into a state actor.  As to the 
NCAA’s rulemaking, UNLV had a voice in the passage of those rules; but 
UNLV is but one of approximately 1,000 members of the NCAA, the 
majority of which were not located in Nevada and did not act under the 
color of Nevada law.107  UNLV could have withdrawn from the NCAA and 
established its own standards or it could have sought to amend those 
NCAA rules of which it disapproved.  Adherence to the NCAA rules was 
the decision of UNLV and its action could not transform the actions of the 
NCAA into the actions of state government.108 
With regard to investigation and enforcement of NCAA rules, Tarkanian 
contended that UNLV delegated those state functions to the NCAA.  
UNLV, however, hardly acted jointly with the NCAA as evidenced by 
UNLV’s adversarial relationship with regard to the matter—UNLV 
preferred and attempted to retain Tarkanian as a coach.  In fact, UNLV’s 
internal investigation reached contrary conclusions to those reached by the 
NCAA.109  The NCAA could not discipline Tarkanian.  UNLV did not 
delegate state authority to the NCAA, so it was not a state actor.110 
                                                          
 104. See id. at 180-82. 
 105. See id. at 181-82 (describing that Tarkanian asserted a violation of section 1983 
which required that the defendant have acted under the color of state law).  The under-color-
of-state-law inquiry under section 1983 mirrors that of the inquiry as to the presence of 
governmental action when determining the applicability of protection afforded by, for 
example, the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.  See id. at 182 n.4.  Lower courts routinely 
determined that the NCAA was a governmental actor prior to 1982 when the Supreme Court 
issued three opinions concerning “state action” on the same day, and thereafter, lower courts 
routinely have held to the contrary.  See id. at n.5. 
 106. See id. at 192.  See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 
(1985) (viewing a county Board of Education as a state actor which must provide due 
process rights to its employees); Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 
(1972) (regarding a state university acting as a governmental agent in its employment 
relationships). 
 107. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193 n.13 (noting that the “situation would, of course, be 
different if the membership consisted entirely of institutions located within the same 
State . . . .”). 
 108. See id. at 194-95. 
 109. See id. at 196. 
 110. See id. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 199.  The Court rejected arguments regarding the 
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C.  Recent Decisions Regarding SROs and State Action 
After the 1960s, just as courts were less willing to attribute the actions of 
private parties to the government generally, so too were courts less willing 
to attribute the actions of SROs to the government.  United States v. 
Solomon111 represents an early decision reversing the trend of concluding 
that the actions of an SRO should be attributed to the government.  Because 
the NYSE permits the suspension or expulsion of a member for refusal to 
testify or provide information,112 Solomon spoke with NYSE investigators 
and provided the requested information.  This information was later 
transmitted to the Commission and federal prosecutors.113  Solomon 
challenged his conviction on the grounds that he was coerced to offer 
testimony in violation of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination.114  Contrary to early decisions,115 the court rejected the 
argument that the NYSE was “in effect the arm of the Government in 
administering portions of the Securities Exchange Act,” in part because the 
“NYSE’s inquiry into [Solomon] was in pursuance of its own interests and 
obligations, not as an agent of the SEC.”116  Solomon also argued that the 
government jointly participated in the Exchange’s enforcement actions 
given federal oversight.  According to Solomon, the Commission benefited 
from the Exchange’s enforcement in a similar manner as the state benefited 
in  Burton.  In Burton, the state benefited from the profits derived from a 
restaurant that racially discriminated among customers.  The court 
distinguished Burton, which focused on race, not self-incrimination.117 
Recently, other courts have reached similar conclusions that the actions 
of SROs should not be attributed to the government.118  No recent decision 
                                                          
NCAA’s alleged usurpation of a traditional, essential, and exclusive state function.  See id. 
at 197 n.18 (supporting the argument against state function (citing San Francisco Arts & 
Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 545 (1987))).  The Court also rejected 
arguments regarding the absence of alternatives due to the NCAA’s status as a monopoly.  
See id. at 199 & n.19 (determining that alternatives, albeit unpalatable ones, existed, but 
regardless, state-conferred monopoly power does not convert the private recipient of such 
power into a state actor (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351-52 
(1974))). 
 111. 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 112. See id. at 865 (quoting Article XIV of the NYSE Constitution). 
 113. See id. at 865-66. 
 114. See id. at 866-67. 
 115. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing court decisions holding that similar SROs are 
government actors in reference to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments). 
 116. Solomon, 509 F.2d at 868-69.  Courts have referenced such self-interest with little 
explanation.  Part II explores why an SRO would create and enforce certain rules. 
 117. See id. at 871 (“Analysis of the particular constitutional provision at issue must be 
among the first, if not the very first, step in the process of ‘sifting facts and weighing 
circumstances’ needed to attribute ‘true significance’ to ‘the non-obvious involvement of 
the State in private conduct.’”). 
 118. See D.L. Cromwell Invs. Inc. v. NASD Regulation Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 158 (2002) 
(rejecting the argument that private actions should be attributed to the government despite 
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has been identified that attributes the actions of a securities exchange or 
association to the government.119   
II.  RATIONAL ACTORS 
A court’s inquiry into government coercion often focuses not only on the 
government but also on the party thought to be coerced.  In the context of 
criminal confessions, courts examine the actions of the government (for 
example, depriving the defendant of sleep or food) as well as 
                                                          
the SRO’s providing documents to the government and the government’s providing to the 
SRO information regarding witness interviews and investigation progress reports because 
the government did not require that information be shared and government did not influence 
the SRO’s investigation); Otto v. SEC, 253 F.3d 960, 965 (7th Cir. 2001) (dicta) (noting that 
heavy governmental regulation does not convert private action into governmental action 
subject to Fifth Amendment due process requirements); Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. 
Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 207-08 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting argument that Fifth Amendment 
right to due process applied to NASD because there was not a close nexus between the 
government and the specific conduct being challenged:  NASD-compelled arbitration); 
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting 
argument that due process right under Fifth Amendment was violated because NASD, not 
the government, required arbitration of disputes and because government approval of private 
rule does not amount to coercion or significant encouragement and because dispute 
resolution is not traditionally an exclusion governmental function); Gold v. SEC, 48 F.3d 
987, 991 (7th Cir. 1995) (dicta) (noting that heavy governmental regulation does not convert 
private action into governmental action subject to Fifth Amendment due process 
requirements); First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 698 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(concluding, without analysis, that NASD is not a governmental actor); Marchiano v. Nat’l 
Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 134 F. Supp. 2d 90, 95 (D.D.C. 2001) (“The court is aware of no 
case . . . in which NASD Defendants were found to be state actors either because of their 
regulatory responsibilities or because of any alleged collusion with criminal prosecutors.”); 
United States v. Shvarts, 90 F. Supp. 2d 219, 222 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting argument that 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments apply to NASD because “[i]t is beyond cavil that the NASD 
is not a government agency”); Graman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 1998 WL 294022, at 
*2-3 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 1998) (mem.) (rejecting argument that due process rights denied 
because NASD is not a governmental actor when government did not coerce NASD into 
making the challenged action, NASD did not rely on government for assistance and 
benefits, and NASD did not perform a function traditionally performed exclusively by the 
government); First Heritage Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 785 F. Supp. 1250, 1251 
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (concluding, without analysis, that NASD is not a governmental entity 
and thus need not comply with constitutional due process requirements); Bahr v. Nat’l Ass’n 
of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 584, 588-89 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (rejecting arguments that 
due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments had been violated because 
no action is attributable to the government when plaintiff dissatisfied with arbitration 
proceedings); United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323, 330-31 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (rejecting 
argument that Fourth Amendment applied to NASD when the employer of the accused 
conducted the search prior to involvement by either the NASD or the government and 
rejecting argument that general government-imposed self-policing does not convert specific 
private act into action by the government); In re Lawrence H. Abercrombie, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-16285, 18 SEC Docket 679, at *5 (Oct. 18, 1979)  (rejecting argument that 
Fifth Amendment applied to NASD because NASD exercised considerable discretion and 
was not controlled by government). 
 119. Although neither a national securities exchange nor a registered securities 
association, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board is an SRO and a court recently 
attributed its rulemaking activity to the government.  See Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 941 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that Rule G-37 drafted by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking 
Board constituted governmental action). 
CLEVELAND OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:17:23 PM 
2005] NYSE AS STATE ACTOR? 21 
characteristics of the defendant (for example, age or educational status).120  
When undertaking state action analysis, courts that focus solely on the 
government and its actions may be under-inclusive in their inquiries as 
considerations tied to the private party may also be appropriate. 
When litigants seek to attribute actions of private parties to the 
government, courts have searched for private rationales, independent of 
government coercion or encouragement, which may have motivated those 
private actors.  Private motivations may cleanse the private actions of any 
purported governmental coercion or encouragement.121 
Rational actor analysis may assist courts in undertaking state action 
analysis.  Did the private actor take the challenged action due to private, 
rational motivations, independent of governmental influence?  Private 
motivations would lead an exchange to achieve the two principal goals of 
federal securities laws.  The private, rational motivations of an exchange as 
well as the private, rational motivations of enforcement officers may 
minimize any governmental coercion or encouragement, leaving the actions 
of the exchange and the exchange’s enforcement officers private in nature. 
The two principal goals of federal securities laws are the disclosure of 
information (upon the public issuance of securities and periodically 
afterwards) and the prevention of fraud.122  Irrespective of federal 
legislation, stock exchanges would adopt rules regarding the disclosure of 
information and the prevention of fraud.  Moreover, the exchanges would 
police and enforce those rules.  Absent federal intervention, the information 
voluntarily disclosed and the vigilance of policing and enforcement may be 
sub-optimal.  Nonetheless, arguments that an exchange is a governmental 
actor because the government compels an exchange to pass and enforce 
rules regarding disclosure and fraud are often overbroad in light of the fact 
that, regardless of governmental action, the exchange would pass and 
enforce similar rules.  To prove successful, arguments of governmental 
compulsion must be more nuanced. 
A securities exchange must account for the concerns and preferences of 
                                                          
 120. See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 438 (finding evidence of possible 
police coercion but negating this coercion because of defendant’s “age, intelligence, and 
education” as a college graduate enrolled in law school). 
 121. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 196 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588, 591 (9th 
Cir. 1967) where the court held that a search by an airline employee was a private search 
when:  (1) the FBI never requested the search, (2) the employee received notice from the 
FBI that boxed goods that lacked the shipper’s identity and address did not contain the 
contents set forth on the way bill, (3) the airline assessed shipping fees based, in part, upon 
the goods being shipped, and (4) the airline had a practice of opening goods to confirm that 
the contents matched the way bill if there were suspicions to doubt the accuracy of the way 
bill). 
 122. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATION LAW 276 (1998) (discussing the two main goals of federal securities laws). 
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the companies whose securities are traded and the investors that are trading 
those securities.  Exchange members earn money on trades executed on the 
exchange, so exchange members seek to attract many issuers of securities.  
An array of investment options may attract investors that will engage in 
trades that yield profits to exchange members.  Consequently, rational 
exchange members and their exchange must be cognizant of, and respond 
to, the preferences and concerns of issuers and investors regarding 
disclosure and fraud. 
A. Voluntary Disclosure 
Companies need money to, for example, introduce new products, expand 
production, and fund research.  Companies may raise money by issuing 
securities.  When a company issues securities, it seeks the maximum price 
for those securities.123  Because of the concerns of the initial purchasers, the 
company must be concerned not only with the initial purchase price but 
also the price of the security in subsequent trades.  Initial purchasers will be 
concerned about their abilities to recoup on their investments.  One means 
of recouping the initial investment is the sale of the security.  If the initial 
purchaser cannot identify easily one that wants to purchase the securities, 
then the initial purchaser would have to expend effort, time, or other 
resources to identify a subsequent purchaser.124  Those possible 
expenditures may diminish the initial purchaser’s value of the security.  
The wise initial purchaser will account for such possible diminishment by 
lowering her initial offer for the securities—a matter about which the 
issuing company cares a great deal.125 
The existence of a centralized market where buyers and sellers easily can 
be identified increases the liquidity of the security and reduces this concern 
of an initial purchaser/future seller.  As a general matter, we would expect 
                                                          
 123. Of course, price is not the sole concern of the company issuing the securities.  For 
example, a company might choose between issuing two securities—one that afforded a 
particular type of preferential treatment to holders and one that did not so entitle holders.  
Although the first security may yield a higher price, the company may prefer to issue the 
second security.  The company may reasonably believe that the company is not being 
compensated adequately for the entitlement afforded by the first security. 
 124. See J. EDWARD MEEKER, THE WORK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 42 (1930) (If “[t]here 
is no organized market . . . [,y]ou must . . . spend both time and money . . . to find a 
buyer.”); see also WILLIAM C. VAN ANTWERP, THE STOCK EXCHANGE FROM WITHIN 6 
(1913) (“[I]t was learned long ago that economy of time and labor, as well as a theoretically 
perfect market, could be best secured by an organization under one roof of as many dealers 
in a commodity as could be found.”); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities 
Market, 37 J. BUS. 117, 126 (Apr. 1964) (“The basic function a market serves is to bring 
buyers and sellers together.”). 
 125. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 684 (1984) (“A firm that wants the highest 
possible price when it issues stock must take all cost-justified steps to make the stock 
valuable in the aftermarket . . . .”). 
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that companies that issue securities want those securities to be traded in a 
liquid market.126  Stock exchanges provide liquidity. 
Just as issuers of securities respond to investors’ preferences for 
liquidity, so too will issuers respond to investors’ preferences for 
information.127  Disclosure of information only at the time of issuance of 
securities will not appease investors.  Initial purchasers become future 
sellers.  Those future sellers want the future stock price to be high—not 
discounted due to uncertainty tied to a dearth of information regarding the 
issuer.  Initial investors fear that, once their money has passed to the issuer, 
officials of the issuer may cease (or otherwise limit) the disclosure of 
information valued by investors.  To combat investor fear and to elevate the 
initial sales price of the securities, issuers may commit to on-going 
disclosure.128 
A company’s failure to provide information may negatively impact the 
price of that company’s securities because investors may assume the 
worst.129  Nonetheless, the price of the securities of a non-disclosing 
company may be buoyed somewhat by other disclosing companies in the 
same market.  Voluntarily disclosed information by other companies or 
disclosures about the industry in which the non-disclosing company 
operates may be considered applicable to the non-disclosing company, 
thereby somewhat dampening the negative impact that would otherwise 
result from non-disclosure.  That one non-disclosing company may not 
suffer the full negative impact of non-disclosure can create a perverse 
incentive,130 the classic “race to the bottom.”  Other companies 
intentionally may fail to disclose in an attempt to free ride on the 
disclosures of others.  Disclosing companies would prefer not to bear the 
full cost of disclosure when non-disclosing companies benefit from such 
disclosure without bearing their share of the cost.131  Thus, a company that 
                                                          
 126. See VAN ANTWERP, supra note 124, at 17 (“These small investors . . . require a 
market in which they can sell and get their money at once . . . .”). 
 127. See id. (“These small investors . . . must have the most accurate information . . . .”). 
 128. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 125, at 684 (“A firm that wants the highest 
possible price when it issues stock must . . . make a believable pledge to continue 
disclosing.”). 
 129. See id. at 683 (“Silence means bad news.”); JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES 
REGULATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 247 (4th ed. 2004) (“[E]mpirical data supports the 
view that financial disclosures reduce the riskiness that surrounds the pricing of securities in 
the marketplace because they remove the uncertainty regarding the firm’s financial position 
and performance.”); compare id. at 252 (noting that non-disclosure may be good—
facilitating the preservation of competitive advantage) with id. at 250 (noting that non-
disclosure may be bad—facilitating entrenchment by incumbent management).   
 130. See RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW 
AND SECURITIES REGULATION 320 (1980) (excerpting a report by William H. Beaver 
providing examples and analysis of corporate disclosure externalities). 
 131. See id. (highlighting market incentives to withhold information from the general 
public). 
CLEVELAND OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:17:23 PM 
24 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1 
is willing to disclose information would be willing to align itself with other 
similarly motivated companies. 
An exchange permits issuers of securities to list their shares for trading 
(providing investors with desired liquidity) after those issuers agree to 
make initial, as well as on-going, disclosures (providing investors with 
desired information).  A stock exchange is comprised of members that 
execute trades in the securities listed on the exchange.  Exchange members 
earn revenue on those trades.  Consequently, members of a particular 
exchange want issuers to list their securities with their exchange.  “Stock 
exchanges compete for listings and trades—the higher the volume of stock 
trades on an exchange, the higher the revenue to exchange members.”132 
Because the success of an exchange depends on the amount of trading, 
exchanges have incentives to adopt rules governing trade that operate to 
the benefit of investors. . . . [E]xchanges have an incentive to adopt rules 
that require listed firms to disclose the amount and type of information 
that investors demand.  Competition among organized exchanges for 
both the listing of firms and the business of investors . . . increases the 
incentives of the exchanges to adopt beneficial rules.133 
The arguments are not simply theoretical.  The New York Stock 
Exchange required that listed companies disclose information for the 
benefit of investors in advance of federally imposed disclosure 
requirements.  New (and relevant) information, particularly financial 
information, impacts the value of securities and thus is of great concern to 
investors.134  Prior to federal involvement, the NYSE obligated listed 
companies to disclose information from their income statements and 
balance sheets.135  In particular, required disclosures for original listings 
included: 
(1) earnings for preceding five years, if available with interest charges, 
depreciation, and federal taxes; (2) income and surplus account of recent 
date for at least two years, if available; (3) balance sheets of same dates; 
(4) balance sheet giving effect to recent financing, if any; (5) similar 
accountings for predecessor, constituent, subsidiary, owned or controlled 
companies . . . .136 
                                                          
 132. DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 118 (2d ed. 2002). 
 133. EASTERBROOK & FISHEL, supra note 122, at 294; see VAN ANTWERP, supra note 
124, at 6 (describing that an exchange’s goals are “best accomplished when the 
organization . . . [adopts] rules of business morality as to insure to every one who does 
business there, great and small, rich and poor, an absolutely square deal.”). 
 134. See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 & n.24 (1988) (discussing the efficient 
capital markets hypothesis); WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE 149-71 (5th ed. 
2003) (same); JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 195-203 
(6th ed. 2004) (same). 
 135. See George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market:  An Evaluation 
of the Securities Act of 1934, 63 AMER. ECON. REV. 132, 142 (Mar. 1973). 
 136. MEEKER, supra note 124, at 555 app.:  Requirements for Original Listing. 
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Additionally, the application for original listing required disclosure of 
dividends (paid or declared) as well as the issuer’s policy regarding 
depreciation.137  The listing of additional amounts required disclosure of 
dividends paid and declared since the previous application, company policy 
regarding depreciation and depletion, and certain financial information, 
namely “[i]ncome account, surplus account and balance sheet of recent 
date . . . .”138  Requisite on-going disclosures included periodic statements 
of earnings and, at least annually, a balance sheet, income statement and 
surplus account statement.139 
Required disclosure extended beyond financial matters to other matters 
of concern to investors.  The NYSE listing application included agreements 
that required the disclosure of any change in the general character or nature 
of the issuing company’s business, as such changes could impact the 
company’s worth.  Because the issuance of additional securities could 
diminish an original investor’s influence with regard to the company’s 
operations, and because such information could be provided efficiently, the 
NYSE served as the collective body through which issuers could align 
themselves and through which collective agreements could be enforced.  
Hence, the listing application also included agreements that required 
disclosure of the “issuance or creation . . . of any rights to subscribe to . . . 
its securities, or of any other rights or benefits pertaining to ownership in 
its securities . . . [as well as the] issuance of Options or Warrants to 
purchase stock . . . .”140 Furthermore, it was not as if the NYSE acted once, 
and only once, prior to the federal government imposing regulations.  The 
NYSE continued to increase the disclosure obligations of listed companies 
in advance of federal requirements.141 
B.  Weaknesses in the Voluntary Disclosure Argument 
1.  Excessive compensation 
Scholars have noted that prior to the passage of the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, firms paid excessive 
                                                          
 137. See id. at 555. 
 138. Id. at 557-58.  
 139. See id. at 561. 
 140. Id. at 562. 
 141. See MEEKER, supra note 124, at 94 (demonstrating how the NYSE’s Committee on 
Stock List imposed requirements that became “more exacting year after year”).  It may be 
suggested that, while the NYSE ramped up the disclosure obligations of listed companies, 
the increase occurred only after federal involvement was a foregone conclusion.  See SUSAN 
M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 114 (1975) (pointing 
out that “the practice of voluntary disclosure by corporations . . . was widespread before the 
SEC was founded . . . .”). 
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compensation to insiders and underwriters.142  Federally mandated 
disclosure, the argument goes, reduces the threat of excessive 
compensation, protecting the investing public. 
Reliance on voluntary disclosure will not stamp out excessive 
compensation to insiders, but neither will federally mandated disclosure.  
For example, in public filings with the SEC, Walt Disney disclosed its 
employment agreement with Michael Ovitz.143  Disclosure did not prevent 
Ovitz’s exceptionally generous compensation package.144  Although the 
package may not have been impermissibly excessive under corporate 
law,145 many have criticized the lavish package as excessive.146  Even 
courts, which are generally reluctant to criticize the actions of corporate 
boards, have suggested that the package may have been over-the-top.147  
The Ovitz case constitutes only anecdotal evidence, but other anecdotes 
exist.148  Scholars have spilled much ink on the large disparity between 
executive compensation and compensation received by the blue-collar 
workforce in the United States as contrasted with the smaller disparities 
found among companies operating in other countries.149  Federally 
                                                          
 142. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate 
Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 45-51 (1983) (describing excessive compensation to 
insiders and underwriters as one justification for the securities acts and disclosure 
requirements).  Insiders include directors and officers of an issuer, see 15 U.S.C. § 78p 
(2000), and may include large shareholders, see id., as well as third parties, see United 
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647-48, 652-53 (1997) (holding that outside counsel acted 
deceptively in violation of federal securities laws when he appropriated non-public 
information from the firm’s client and traded on the basis of that information).  
Underwriters serve as middlemen between issuers and the investing public.  See 15 U.S.C. § 
77b(a)(11) (defining “underwriter” as “any person who has purchased from an issuer with a 
view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any 
security . . . .”); Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 
207, 217 n.17 (1984) (describing the role of underwriters as agents for the issuer in the 
distribution of securities to the general public). 
 143. See Disney Enters. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at Ex. 10(e) (Dec. 15, 1999), 
available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29082/0000912057-95-010655.txt (detailing 
the employment arrangements of Michael Ovitz’s). 
 144. See id. 
 145. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262-64 (Del. 2000) (noting that although it was 
lavish, Ovitz’s compensation package was not irrational). 
 146. See, e.g., Bruce Orwall & Joann S. Lublin, The Rich Rewards of a Hollywood Exit, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1996, at B1 (quoting various Disney shareholders expressing 
disapproval of Ovitz’s compensation package as “difficult to justify” and “perverse”); 
Editorial, Unearned Megabucks, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 21, 1996, at 63A 
(describing Ovitz’s severance package as “outrageous” and as “an incredible sum of money 
for someone who does not seem to have added a penny to the value of the company”). 
 147. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 350 (Del. Ch. 1998) 
(noting the “sheer magnitude of the severance package” and the “board’s extraordinary 
decision to award a $140 million severance package”); see also Brehm, 746 A.2d at 250 
(describing Ovitz’s “extraordinarily lucrative contract”). 
 148. See Orwall & Lublin, supra note 146, at B1 (charting generous severance packages 
of numerous executives in the entertainment industry). 
 149. See, e.g., MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 665 (8th ed. 2000) (citing G. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH 
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mandated disclosure will not eliminate excessive compensation.  As such, 
we must be willing to accept some instances of excessive compensation.  
Perhaps a better question might be:  Does federally mandated disclosure 
lead to cost-effective disclosures that would not otherwise be made by 
companies that list their shares on a stock exchange?  No clear evidence 
has been identified. 
Although federally mandated disclosure may have accelerated the 
reduction in excessive compensation to underwriters and insiders, federally 
mandated disclosure may have been unnecessary.  Turning first to 
underwriters’ compensation, it is true that underwriters’ compensation fell 
in the decades immediately after the passage of the securities acts, but 
underwriters’ compensation had begun declining in the decades before the 
passage of the Securities Act of 1933.150  Factors contributing to declining 
underwriter compensation would include, among other things, “increased 
sales to institutions, increased competition among underwriters, 
and . . . competitive bidding requirements.”151  Underwriters serve as 
middlemen between issuers and the investing public.152  If there are 
“increased sales to institutions” such as mutual funds, then underwriters 
expend fewer resources to sell remaining shares to the public.  
Consequently, less compensation is in order.  Moreover, if there is 
“increased competition among underwriters” or “competitive bidding,” 
then underwriter compensation should fall. 
Regardless, prior to the enactment of the 1930s federal securities laws, 
the NYSE had adopted rules that seemed to require disclosure of excessive 
compensation to both underwriters and insiders.  (For now, the focus is 
simply the voluntary adoption of rules regarding disclosure; enforcement 
(or the suboptimal enforcement) of those rules will be addressed shortly.)  
Before Congress spoke in 1933 and 1934, the NYSE called for listed 
companies to disclose any disposal of property (or stock interest) if such 
disposal would impair that company’s financial position.153  Likewise, 
                                                          
OF EXCESS 27, 206-09 (1991)): 
[B]etween CEO compensation and average salaries.  The average American CEO 
makes 120 times the compensation of the average manufacturing worker, and 150 
times the average compensation of workers in manufacturing and service 
industries.  In contrast, the average Japanese CEO seems to make only 16 times the 
pay of an average Japanese industrial worker, and the average German CEO seems 
to make about 21 times the pay of the average German factory worker. 
 150. See Seligman, supra note 142, at 47-48 (1983) (observing that the four decade 
decline can be “attributed to causes other than SEC mandatory disclosures”). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11) (2000) (“The term ‘underwriter’ means any person who 
has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection 
with, the distribution of any security . . . .”). 
 153. MEEKER, supra note 136, at 560-61 (requiring applicants to notify the NYSE if a 
disposal of property or stock would “impair or materially affect its financial position or the 
nature or extent of its operations as theretofore conducted”). 
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excessive compensation, payment in excess of the value of the 
consideration received, seemingly impairs a company’s financial position.  
Arguably the NYSE rules required such disclosure in advance of the 
federal mandate. 
Moreover, prior to the enactment of the 1930s federal securities laws, the 
NYSE rules also contemplated that investment trusts154 disclose contracts 
with management.155 Investment trusts were required to disclose “all 
significant provisions contained in any existing agreements or contracts 
which define the powers and privileges of the management and the 
restraints thereon,”156 as well as the agreements or contracts themselves.157  
Additionally, investment trusts had to abide by the following: 
If the investment trust is managed directly or indirectly by another 
individual, firm or corporation, a copy of each contract with such 
individual, firm or corporation must be included in the body of the 
application. 
Each application must present full details regarding the basis on which 
compensation for management is computed, including direct payments, 
options, warrants and any other form of direct or indirect compensation 
either present or future. 
Applicant companies must agree promptly to advise the Exchange, on 
behalf of themselves and of any subsidiaries which have been or may be 
formed, of any change in the terms or conditions of any management 
contracts existing at the time of listing and of the terms and conditions of 
contracts subsequently concluded.158 
By requiring disclosure of management agreements with investment 
trusts, the NYSE seemingly addressed the potentiality of excessive 
compensation before the issue was addressed by Congress.  As to 
commissions on trades, investment trusts could charge only the 
commission authorized by an exchange, and “only customary and 
reasonable commissions” for trades of shares of unlisted companies.159 
The NYSE rules also included a catchall disclosure requirement 
applicable to all listed companies; listed companies agreed “[t]o furnish the 
New York Stock Exchange, on demand, such reasonable information 
concerning the company as may be required.”160  The NYSE could have 
                                                          
 154. See id. at 569 (defining investment trusts as including companies “engaged 
primarily in the business of investing and reinvesting in the securities of other corporations 
for the purpose of revenue and for profit, and not in general for the purpose of exercising 
control”). 
 155. See id. 
 156. Id. at 570. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 571. 
 160. Id. at 563. 
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construed the catchall rule to require disclosure of excessive compensation 
as the Commission has subsequently done.  In In the Matter of Franchard 
Corp.,161 the Commission required disclosure of conflict-of-interest 
transactions by which a manager enriched himself at the expense of the 
issuer and its shareholders.  The Commission also required the disclosure 
of information that was not specifically required to be disclosed otherwise.  
This was based, in part, on a generic catchall provision:  Rule 408, which 
requires that no statements be misleading.162 
As the NYSE revised its listing requirements to add disclosure 
obligations, there may have been adequate disclosure required of newly 
listed companies.  Some believed, however, that the companies that had 
previously listed their securities could not be compelled to adhere to the 
new disclosure obligations.163  Even with respect to those companies that 
entered into contracts with the Exchange to list their securities prior to new 
disclosure obligations, the NYSE generally required compliance with the 
new disclosure obligations.  For example, the NYSE generally required 
listed companies to disclose quarterly earnings statements.164  The 
Commission did not require quarterly disclosure until decades later.165  
And, as would be expected, some companies disclosed information above 
and beyond the requirements of the NYSE to appease investors and to 
counter their perception of companies that “silence-equals-a-negative.”166 
Another reported weakness in a scheme of voluntary disclosure is the 
existence of insider trading (arguably another means by which to achieve 
excessive compensation).  Efficiency arguments suggest that private rules 
regarding insider trading would be sub-optimal.  Even though private 
                                                          
 161. Securities Act Release No. 33-4710, 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964). 
 162. 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (2005) (“In addition to the information expressly required to 
be . . . [disclosed], there shall be added such further material information, if any, as may be 
necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they are made, not misleading.”). 
 163. See Seligman, supra note 142, at 55 (quoting S. REP. NO. 73-792 (1934):  
“Although the exchanges have endeavored to bring about an improvement in the type of 
financial reports filed by corporations, they have been hampered by the terms of the listing 
contracts made with issuers, which they have not considered themselves entitled to modify 
without the consent of such issuers.”); see also MEEKER, supra note 136, at 581 (The 
Exchange “cannot attempt to repudiate [prior] agreements [that did not impose the 
requirement] and substitute for them others calling for quarterly earning statements.”). 
 164. See MEEKER, supra note 124, at 581 (noting that the Exchange may grant 
companies leniency for good reason and on a case-by-case basis). 
 165. Benston, supra note 135, at 138. 
 166. See MEEKER, supra note 124, at 581 (recognizing how the U.S. Steel Corporation 
has exceeded the Exchange’s listing requirements); see also OESTERLE, supra note 132, at 
112 n.70 (noting that in response to the “financial accounting woes of Enron and Global 
Crossing . . . other companies, such as General Electric, rushed to put out clearer and more 
complete reports, beyond what GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) [and the 
Commission] require” in order to restore shareholder confidence in the accuracy of their 
reports). 
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regulations may be less than ideal, governmental regulation of insider 
trading is not without its critics. 
Governmental regulation of insider trading may be superfluous because 
certain arguments suggest that companies voluntarily would adopt rules 
that bar insider trading.  First, companies routinely enter into contracts in 
order to prevent trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information 
with those who provide services and who, by providing these services, 
receive such information.167  Such contractual restrictions pre-dated federal 
securities laws.168  Second, companies prohibit insiders from trading freely 
in the company’s own securities.169  Some traders prefer securities that 
fluctuate wildly in price, allowing them opportunities to trade profitably.170  
Left unchecked, managerial insiders could cause their company to take 
actions that would create such volatility in stock price, in turn creating 
profitable trading opportunities for themselves.171  To protect investors, and 
as a guard against the creation of volatility, companies voluntarily and 
routinely limit insiders’ opportunities to trade in the company’s 
securities.172 
                                                          
 167. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997) (noting that the company 
and its outside counsel “took precautions to protect the confidentiality” of the company’s 
planned tender offer); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 23 (1987) (recognizing the 
official policy of the Wall Street Journal of keeping the contents of a column that discussed 
stocks and consequently impacted the market confidential before publication).  See 
generally SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2004) (chronicling how “[a] 
confidentiality agreement was executed . . . . and due diligence began”); AES Corp. v. Dow 
Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 176 (3d Cir. 2003) (documenting how a confidentiality agreement 
was  “a precondition to receiving the Offering Memorandum . . . .”); Hartmarx Corp. v. 
Abboud, 326 F.3d 862, 864 (7th Cir. 2003) (detailing how a confidentiality agreement was 
necessary before providing financing details); Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257 
F.3d 171, 184 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting how the companies engaged in the transaction “had 
entered into a confidentiality agreement and engaged in extensive due diligence . . . .”). 
 168. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 122, at 259. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See id. at 260; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 459 (5th ed. 
1998) (noting that managers’ energies might be drawn away from their managerial duties 
and directed toward creating volatile stocks). 
 171. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 122, at 260; POSNER, supra note 170, at 
459. 
 172. See PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP, NEW COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES NECESSARY TO 
MEET NEW FILING REQUIREMENTS FOR SECTION 16 REPORTS 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.prestongates.com/images/pubs/BUS%20ENews%20Alert%20081202.pdf 
(“[T]he Company’s pre-clearance procedures . . . require [Company insiders] not to engage 
in any transactions involving the Company’s securities without first obtaining pre-clearance 
of the transaction from the Company.  Pre-clearance procedures and black-out periods help 
to prevent inadvertent violations of the federal securities laws prohibition on insider trading.  
Companies that do not have such procedures in place should consider adopting [them] as 
soon as possible.”); NETFLIX, INC., INSIDER TRADING COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 1-2, 
http://ir.netflix.com/downloa 
ds/2002_insider_policy.doc (“The Company has determined that all directors and officers 
and those other employees of the Company identified on Attachment 4 (as may be amended 
from time to time), shall be prohibited from buying, selling or otherwise effecting 
transactions in any stock or other securities of the Company or derivative securities thereof 
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While these arguments suggest that governmental involvement barring 
insider trading is unnecessary because private rules suffice, other 
arguments counsel against all barriers on insider trading—both 
governmental and private.  First, allowing insiders to trade based on 
material, non-public information causes the market to move and reflect 
information that companies may not otherwise disclose.173  Accurate 
pricing protects investors generally and increases the likelihood that goods 
will be allocated in an efficient manner.  Second, investors arguably benefit 
from insider trading because firms could lower compensation to insiders 
with the understanding that a portion of insiders’ incomes would come 
from insider trading profits.174 
Despite arguments suggesting that private rules would curb insider 
trading and arguments favoring the absence of restrictions, firms are likely 
to concoct suboptimal disclosure rules regarding insider trading because of 
the high cost of their creation and enforcement.175  For example, rules 
addressing who constitutes an “insider” and those to whom the restrictions 
should apply, have not been specific, which complicates their 
enforcement.176  Furthermore, such rules apply to “material” misstatements 
and omissions, but a clear understanding of “materiality” in various settings 
has been elusive.177  Individuals may evade rules prohibiting insider 
                                                          
except during a [specified] trading window that will begin . . . following the date of public 
disclosure of the Company’s financial results . . . and will end . . .  on the last day of the 
second calendar month of the next fiscal quarter.  In addition, the Company shall have the 
right to impose special black-out periods . . . .”). 
 173. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 122, at 256-57 (arguing that insider 
trading provides a valuable mechanism through which firms can disclose information and 
maximize the firm’s worth for the benefit of insiders and shareholders alike); POSNER, supra 
note 170, at 459 (positing that allowing insider trading may not be bad thing because it 
would encourage otherwise risk-averse managers to take risks, which would benefit 
shareholders with diversified portfolios). 
 174. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 122, at 257-58 (pointing out the benefits 
of allowing managers to alter their compensation packages based on new knowledge, rather 
than continuously renegotiating contracts, and arguing that allowing insider trading is a 
good way to distinguish superior managers). 
 175. See id. at 257 (observing complete disclosure is costly and after a point, does not 
survive a cost-benefit analysis); POSNER, supra note 170, at 460 (noting the high costs of 
enforcement and some of the complications surrounding the issue). 
 176. See COX ET AL., supra note 129, at 854 (posing the question “Who is an Insider?”).  
Compare Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231-34 (1980) (holding that the financial 
printer, who was retained by the acquirer, was not an insider and therefore not under a duty 
to disclose because he received no information from the target company and he had no 
special relationship with the shareholders), with United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 
647, 666-67, 676 (2000) (holding that an attorney working at a law firm retained by the 
acquirer was an insider and was in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality when he 
purchased shares after misappropriating information from the acquirer, despite the absence 
of a relationship between the attorney and shareholders of the target). 
 177. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7881, 73 
SEC Docket 3 (Aug. 15, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm (“[The 
Commission] acknowledges . . . that materiality judgments can be difficult . . . .”); see COX 
ET AL., supra note 129, at 561-628 (detailing the considerations and complications of 
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trading, complicating detection and thus enforcement.178  Even if it were 
true that private disclosure rules were ineffective, and that the prevention of 
insider trading were an unqualified good, federal anti-fraud rules that ban 
insider trading and federal rules requiring exchanges to enforce those bans 
may achieve the desired end without requiring mandatory disclosure.179  
Anti-fraud rules, however, speak with less force to firms’ silence.  So, why 
not a mandatory disclosure rule to counter any tendency toward silence?  
We have already covered this ground to a certain extent.  Recall that 
companies that issue securities generally seek the highest price for those 
securities, and to achieve that end, those issuers must make initial (and 
commit to make on-going) disclosures.180  Even a company that discloses 
in self-interest, however, may not make optimal disclosures due to third-
party effects and the last period problem, addressed below. 
2.  Third-party effects 
Although a company acts in its self-interest by disclosing information 
voluntarily, a company may not disclose the ideal amount and quality of 
information if it cannot reap the benefits that flow from such disclosure.  
For example, when Alpha Company discloses information, such 
information may reach Ina Investor who, based upon Alpha’s disclosures, 
invests in Alpha’s competitor, Omega Company.  Investor—the third 
party—attached value to and benefited from Alpha’s disclosure, but Alpha 
cannot charge Investor for the information.  Omega—Alpha’s competitor—
also benefits from Alpha’s disclosure.  Omega was able to secure funds 
(Investor’s investment) without making (or paying to make) the disclosure.  
Depending on the nature of Alpha’s disclosure, Omega may learn about 
Alpha’s business such that Omega can gain a competitive advantage over 
Alpha, or minimize Alpha’s competitive advantage.  Because such third-
party beneficiaries will not compensate the disclosing firm, the disclosing 
                                                          
assessing materiality). 
 178. See generally JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991) (documenting the Wall 
Street insider trading scandals of the 1980s). 
 179. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 122, at 297 (observing that “proponents 
of mandatory disclosure have not established that there is a lesser incidence of fraud with 
disclosure rules than with antifraud legislation alone”); see also Benston, supra note 135, at 
135-36 (noting “there is no empirical or a priori basis for an assertion that the ‘34 Act has 
had a net positive effect on the publication of fraudulent or misleading financial 
statements”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and The Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 739-40 (1984) (questioning the need for mandatory 
disclosure despite the difference in interests of managers and shareholders which may 
encourage fraud).  But see Seligman, supra note 142, at 18 (showing that prior to the 1933 
and 1934 Acts, virtually every state had adopted an anti-fraud statute regarding securities, 
but those statutes did not prevent widespread fraud because those state statutes only applied 
intrastate such that the restrictions could be evaded).  Consequently, a federal anti-fraud rule 
may be appropriate. 
 180. See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text. 
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firm will under-produce information, disclosing less than the optimal 
amount of information.  Relative to a world without a stock exchange, an 
exchange may lessen such third-party effects, but they will not be 
eliminated. 
3.  Last period problem 
A company’s current willingness to disclose information rests, in part, 
on future discipline.  Current investors become future sellers and those 
future sellers (and future purchasers) want information.  Current 
management responds accordingly.  A manager without a future—one that 
is in his last period181—may not be disciplined to make the desired 
disclosures.182  An exchange seeks to remedy the matter by contract; those 
companies that list their securities on the exchange must provide on-going 
disclosure.  Although the company may continue, managers in their last 
period have no incentive to disclose thoroughly such that their influence 
results in suboptimal disclosure.183  A mandatory disclosure system makes 
silence actionable, whereas silence absent a duty to disclose (and there 
would be no duty in a world of voluntary disclosure) would not be 
actionable.  Of course, if, in their last period, managers act in their self-
interest and to the detriment of the shareholders at large, remaining silent in 
doing so, then those shareholders have a cause of action, independent of 
federal rules requiring disclosure.184  Again, the assumption is that 
“[s]ilence means bad news.”185  Accordingly, those not in their last period 
may impose pressure to disclose to protect their reputations and avoid 
future negative inferences by investors. 
Exchanges seek to dampen the threat of non-disclosure by listed 
companies by requiring that these companies have independent third parties 
certify the accuracy of their disclosures.  Accountants, underwriters, and 
lawyers provide such certification, and often signal the quality of an issuer.  
Prior to any federally imposed requirement, the NYSE required that the 
                                                          
 181. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 134, at 566-67 (“In this ‘end game,’ there is greater 
reason for managers to act opportunistically . . . . Economists call this a ‘final period’ 
problem, referring to the fact that the agent no longer has the same incentives to serve the 
principal faithfully.”). 
 182. See POSNER, supra note 170, at 370 (“Reputation alone will ordinarily restrain 
employers, unless the employer . . . . is in his last period.  In that event , the employee has 
little to lose from being fired—by the hypothesis of a last period, the employer is about to 
go out of business . . . .”). 
 183. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 864-74, 893 (Del. 1985) (discussing 
target management’s failure to disclose information regarding the process by which target 
and acquirer reached the acquisition price when the individual that served as both target’s 
chairman and chief executive officer was on the verge of retirement). 
 184. See id. at 858 (holding that target management’s failure to inform itself adequately 
amounted to a breach of the duty of care and such breach could not be cured by shareholder 
approval because target’s management failed to disclose how it informed itself). 
 185. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 125, at 683. 
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financial statements of listed companies be audited by independent 
accountants, and listed companies did not view such a requirement as an 
unwanted intrusion.186  Investors’ concerns of omissions would be quieted 
by third-party review certifying the accuracy of disclosures, and implicitly, 
the absence of material omissions.  Underwriters “compel disclosure of 
embarrassing facts uncovered during the course of its investigation”187 in 
order to preserve their reputations and avoid liability for fraud.188  
Companies that tap the public for funds seek underwriters of the highest 
reputation as a signal of the issuer’s quality,189 and because issuers seek 
underwriters with the best reputations, 
[P]restigious underwriters reject many more candidates than they 
accept . . . . [T]he screening and investigative processes employed [by 
underwriters] . . . . should weed out those prospective issuers least likely 
to make productive use of publicly invested funds and should identify 
elements of risk in those issues which are selected and presented to the 
public.190 
Attorneys can also signal issuer quality.191  Because of potential liability 
stemming from their expertise in connection with issuances,192 attorneys, 
like underwriters, may be selective as to which issuers they represent.193  
                                                          
 186. See MEEKER, supra note 124, at 573 (stating that “[t]here must be appended to all 
financial statements and inventories required by the Committee, the certificate of a public 
accountant, qualified under the laws of some state or country, which certificate shall contain 
a statement that no one of the items carried under the term ‘Miscellaneous’ in the list of 
Investments has been held for more than one year.”); see also George J. Benston, The Value 
of the SEC’s Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44 ACCT. REV. 515, 520 (July 1969) (In 
1932, “all corporations applying for a listing on the NYSE were required to have their 
annual statements audited by independent public accountants”); id. at 519 tbl.I (indicating 
that, in 1926, prior to federally imposed disclosure requirements, eighty-two percent of 
companies that disclosed financial statements were audited by certified public accountants 
(CPAs) whereas, after federally imposed disclosure requirements in 1934, ninety-four 
percent of companies that disclosed financial statements were audited by CPAs). 
 187. Michael P. Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the 
New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REV. 776, 786 (1972). 
 188. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5) (2000) (listing underwriters as liable with respect to 
fraud); e.g., Norman v. Paco Pharm. Servs., Inc., 1989 WL 110648, at *1, *10 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 22, 1989) (unreported) (including co-underwriters as defendants and refusing to 
dismiss counts of fraud and deceit). 
 189. COX ET AL., supra note 129, at 114 (“[I]ssuers seek high reputation underwriters as 
one of the strategies they pursue to signal the security’s quality.”). 
 190. Dooley, supra note 187, at 786-87; see POSNER & SCOTT, supra note 130, at 325 
(excerpting a report by William H. Beaver observing that firms try to “signal their higher 
quality” by having independent third parties oversee their disclosure systems). 
 191. See Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 31 
(1995) (suggesting that, with respect to legal opinions in registered offerings, the prestige of 
outside counsel bolsters the reputation of issuers and only the most elite issuers rely solely 
on in-house counsel). 
 192. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (suggesting an attorney may be liable for material 
misrepresentations and omissions in registration statements). 
 193. COX ET AL., supra note 129, at 114 (suggesting the reputation of the lawyer can 
signal the “quality of the offering”). 
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These means of certification, whether exchange-imposed or self-induced, 
minimize the need for federally imposed disclosure obligations. 
Although “it is unquestionably true that [federal] disclosure rules have 
led corporations to disclose more information now than they did before 
1933,”194 companies made voluntary disclosures in advance of the passage 
of federal securities laws, and would have continued to make similar 
disclosures had those laws never been passed.  Arguments that the NYSE 
constitutes a governmental actor because the government compels it to 
require disclosure are overbroad.  Likewise, arguments suggesting the 
presence of encouragement or entwinement do not possess compelling 
force. 
C.  Anti-fraud rules 
Because market incentives may lead to sub-optimal disclosure,195 rules 
that bar fraud may fill the void.  Certainly, rampant fraud in a market will 
deter investors from trading in that market.  As mentioned above, the 
absence of traders or decreased liquidity negatively impacts the value of the 
security at issue.  Therefore, issuers would prefer to stamp out fraud.196  
Moreover, fewer trades yield less revenue for exchange members that 
execute these trades.197  Consequently, the exchange members would prefer 
an absence of fraud.  Thus, one would expect that an exchange will respond 
to the preferences of investors, issuers, and exchange members by 
proscribing fraud.198  In fact, the NYSE proscribed fraud in advance of any 
federally imposed prohibition.199  Regarding antifraud rules, the rub tends 
to appear, not in their adoption, but in their enforcement. 
                                                          
 194. EASTERBROOK & FISHEL, supra note 122, at 299. 
 195. See id. at 283 (reasoning that “[a]uditing, investment banking, and underwriting 
firms are expensive to . . . operate; . . . debt and dividends entail transaction . . . costs; 
managers must be paid extra . . .; verification . . . by . . . buyers may be the most expensive 
of all”). 
 196. See OESTERLE, supra note 132, at 111 (arguing that lenient requirements for listing 
securities may allow some firms to act fraudulently).  Companies themselves may also 
respond.  See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HIGHLIGHTS OF GAO’S CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FORUM 8 (2002) [hereinafter 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d 
02494sp.pdf (pointing out that recent business failures have forced many companies to 
examine risks more closely). 
 197. See OESTERLE, supra note 132, at 118 (emphasizing that exchange members’ 
revenue increases as the volume of stock trades increases). 
 198. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 122, at 294 (explaining the incentives for 
exchanges to adopt rules which minimize fraudulent acts).  For example, exchanges are 
benefited by a decrease in fraud because it encourages repeat business from investors.  Id. 
 199. See MEEKER, supra note 124, at 41 (acknowledging that the NYSE has a self-
imposed policy of deterring fraudulent methods by adopting and enforcing stern rules for 
exchange members). 
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D.  Enforcement 
“Unenforced rules are no rules at all.”200  Rules lose meaning unless 
policed and enforced.  The Exchange Act authorizes the Commission to 
suspend or revoke an SRO’s registration, censure the SRO or limit its 
activities, functions, and operations.201  Additionally, the Commission may 
seek an injunction to compel compliance with those laws and rules.202  
Accountability influences behavior.203  Consequently, some commentators 
have suggested that such federally imposed enforcement obligations (and, 
as such, federally imposed penalties for failure to enforce) convert private 
action into state action.204 
Even absent federal intervention, the NYSE would police and enforce 
rules regarding disclosure and fraud because the concerns of the NYSE and 
federal regulators generally overlap.205  Just as private incentives would 
lead an exchange to promulgate such rules, private incentives generally 
would lead an exchange to police and enforce those rules.206  Of the 
                                                          
 200. Toscano v. Chandris, S.A., 934 F.2d 383, 387 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 201. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1) (2000) (empowering the SEC to limit operations of an 
SRO if, after notice and a hearing, the SEC determines that the SRO failed to enforce 
compliance by a member, associated person or participant with the Act, the related rules, or 
the SRO’s own rules). 
 202. See id. § 78u(e)-(f) (stating that the U.S. government has the power to issue writs of 
mandamus, injunctions, and orders commanding compliance with the rules). 
 203. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of 
Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1064-65 (2001) (reasoning that accountability forces 
decision makers to justify their actions and suffer negative consequences for poor decisions 
which the decision maker wants to avoid). 
 204. See Richard L. Stone & Michael A. Perino, Not Just a Private Club:  Self-
Regulatory Organizations as State Actors When Enforcing Federal Law, 1995 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 453, 463 (1995) (suggesting that, because SROs must enforce federal rules, they 
should be viewed as state actors).  See generally William I. Friedman, The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Public/Private Distinction Among Securities Regulators in the U.S. 
Marketplace—Revisited, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 727 (2004) (same). 
 205. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT:  2003 
CONFERENCE ON FEDERAL-STATE SECURITIES REGULATION (2003), http://www.sec.gov/info 
/smallbus/ffedst2003.htm (stipulating that the concerns of the SROs considerably overlap 
with those of the SEC and state securities administrators). 
 206. See OESTERLE, supra note 132, at 111 (reasoning that enforcement of rules 
increases returns on investment and thus increases demand for an exchange’s listings); Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 196 (1988) (declaring that members 
of an organization all have an interest in the enforcement of standards promulgated by the 
organization); United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 869 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding that 
NYSE’s investigation of an alleged violator was “in pursuance of its own interests and 
obligations [and] not as an agent of the SEC”); United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323, 
327 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that a search was not a governmental search when the search 
served the purpose of the employer by protecting the employer from extensive civil 
liabilities if its employees committed wrongs while employer supervision was lax).  See 
generally Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public 
Companies:  Hearings Before the S. Comm. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th 
Cong. 572 (2002) (statement of Robert R. Glauber, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.) [hereinafter Enron Hearings] (testifying 
that NASD’s members are benefited by “tough and even-handed” enforcement of the rules).   
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NYSE’s approximately 1,500 employees, five hundred serve in 
enforcement positions.207  Arguments that the government coerces an 
exchange to police and enforce its rules are overbroad because an exchange 
serves its interests by policing and enforcing its rules.208  
1.  Conflict 
Although there may be a general overlap between the interests of the 
NYSE and the Commission, which may serve to dampen the impact of any 
purported federal coercion or encouragement, the interests of the NYSE 
and the Commission sometimes conflict.  “Exchange regulators [may] be 
reluctant to take steps that would put member firms out of business or 
would generally reduce member firms’ income.”209  On numerous 
occasions, contrary to governmental preferences, the NYSE or some other 
SRO furthered its own interests or the interests of its members to the 
detriment of the public.  The congressional design calls for the Commission 
to protect the public against such self-interested behavior by SROs.  On 
occasion, however, the Commission has failed to scrutinize SROs closely 
on an on-going basis, in part, because of limited resources.210 
Instead of continuous scrutiny, the Commission, at times, has responded 
only after crises have erupted.  At such points, factors (other than the 
Commission) have contributed to remedial action implemented by SROs.  
For reasons more fully explained below and in the following section, the 
requisite federal coercion, encouragement, or entwinement seems lacking 
for attribution of private action to the government.  A few public/private 
conflicts are examined below. 
During the mid-1960s, as the exchange members’ focused on garnering 
more trades (and thus more income), exchange members paid inadequate 
attention to effecting these trades.  Increased trading volume exposed 
exchange members’ inefficiencies in effecting the trades.  This resulted in, 
                                                          
 207. See NYSE, INC., STOCK MARKET SAVVY:  INVESTING FOR YOUR FUTURE 6 (2001), 
available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/TG_Mech.pdf (stating that over one-third of NYSE 
employees are involved in regulation); U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 1997 
CONFERENCE ON FEDERAL-STATE SECURITIES REGULATION:  FINAL REPORT (1997), 
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/ffedst97.htm (stating that, of the 500 NYSE employees 
involved in regulation, 250 are examiners, 120 are involved with enforcement and 100 are 
investigators). 
 208. Compare infra Part IV (arguing that joint investigations may entwine governmental 
and private actors, such that actions of SROs should be attributed to the government). 
 209. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET:  A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 464 (2d ed., 
Northeastern Univ. Press 1995). 
 210. See S. REP. NO. 94-29, at 34 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 212 
(explaining that “[t]here may have been undue deference to the self-regulatory organizations 
because of the cumbersomeness of the oversight mechanisms or the unavailability of 
appropriately focused remedies”). 
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for example, untimely delivery of securities or funds to customers.211  Piled 
on top of losses due to operational inefficiencies were losses due to 
declining trading volume that stemmed from a stock market decline.212  An 
alarming number of NYSE members (and non-members) failed.213  The 
exchange and its members failed to regulate themselves, and investors lost 
in the process.  Nevertheless, this was not the finest hour for the 
Commission either.  The Commission had received an increasing number 
of customer complaints regarding broker-dealer inefficiencies,214 and was 
“aware that a crisis existed and that additional restrictions were 
necessary.”215  The Commission, however, 
[D]id not have reliable data on the seriousness of individual broker-
dealer back-office or financial problems until it was too late for the 
Commission to prevent firm failures.  Nor until it was too late did the 
SEC appreciate the weaknesses in New York Stock Exchange audit 
procedures or the extent to which the Exchange’s unwarranted optimism 
endangered investors.216 
The Commission failed to anticipate the problems experienced by the 
NYSE and its members and the Commission was not focused on exchange 
members’ operational and financial capacities.217  During and after the 
crisis, the Commission deferred to industry self-regulation.218  Eventually, 
the crisis prompted Congress to act—creating the Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation and empowering the Commission to require SROs 
to examine or inspect the financial condition of members.219 
In 1975, the SEC adopted a rule abolishing fixed commission rates that 
NYSE members charged non-members to trade on the exchange.220  These 
                                                          
 211. See SELIGMAN, supra note 209, at 450-51 (explaining that, during the period of 
1967-70, the NYSE intervened in the affairs of over half of the members that dealt with the 
public because of such operational inefficiencies). 
 212. See id. at 451 (explaining that the NYSE was forced to shorten the trading days in 
response to the declining market). 
 213. See id. at 452-53 (recalling that the “greatest rash” of financial firm failures in the 
history of Wall Street occurred during this period:  “Approximately 160 New York Stock 
Exchange member organizations went out of business in 1969 and 1970, about 80 merging 
with other firms, and the other 80 . . . quietly dissolved, self-liquidated, or retired from the 
securities business.”). 
 214. See id. at 451 (recalling that customer complaints about broker-dealers rose by 
nearly 8000 between 1968 and 1969). 
 215. Id. at 463 (recalling that SEC Chairman Cohen alerted the SEC that the situation 
surrounding the NYSE was getting worse). 
 216. Id. at 458. 
 217. See id. at 460-61 (explaining that the Commission misunderstood and thus 
underestimated the NYSE’s capability of monitoring the financial integrity of its members). 
 218. See id. at 464 (terming such deference as “not fully defensible”). 
 219. See id. at 465;  Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-lll 
(1970) (amended 2004) (restoring to investors funds under the control of financially 
troubled brokerages). 
 220. See Adoption of Securities Exchange Act Rule 19b-3, Securities Act Release No. 
34-11203, 40 Fed. Reg. 7,394 (Feb. 20, 1975) (abolishing the ability of an exchange to 
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rates were higher than those that would have been produced by 
competition, which damaged public investors. Fearing damage to their 
bottom line, some exchange members preferred fixed commission rates to 
lower rates set by rule or by competition.  Other members may not have 
objected to unfixing rates for reasons articulated by NYSE President 
Robert Haack.  According to Haack, because the exchange began to face 
competition from regional exchanges and the over-the-counter market (all 
of which negotiated commission fees), the NYSE was losing transactions to 
the other markets, which damaged the NYSE and its members.  Therefore, 
abolishing fixed commission rates would ultimately serve the NYSE and its 
members.221  Lower rates may have permitted greater trading volume and 
ultimately greater profits, which seems to have occurred.222  Because the 
NYSE had charged fixed commission rates for one-hundred years, the SEC 
had “long ignor[ed] the costs to investors of the Exchange’s fixed 
brokerage commission rate structure.”223  Unfixing the rates took 
decades.224 
More recently, New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer spearheaded a 
crusade against misdeeds by members and broker-dealers.225  Allegations 
against NYSE members included the distribution of fraudulent “buy, sell, 
or hold” recommendations to investors, which were designed to attract or 
preserve more profitable investment banking relationships with corporate 
clientele.226  In settling charges, members agreed, among other things, to 
insulate research analysts from investment bankers.227  One might have 
suspected that the NYSE would be slow to police such misdeeds, but the 
Commission was “relatively slow . . . in pursuing the conflicts of 
                                                          
require its members to charge a fixed rate for commission in exchange for the use of the 
exchange’s facilities). 
 221. See SELIGMAN, supra note 209, at 477 (arguing that fixed commission rates would 
have decreased the profitability of the exchanges). 
 222. See id. at 485 (explaining that lower rates lead to more players in the market, thus 
leading to rapid growth in the securities industry). 
 223. See Joel Seligman, Cautious Evolution or Perennial Irresolution:  Stock Market 
Self-Regulation During the First Seventy Years of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
59 BUS. LAW. 1347, 1359 (2004) (noting that the NYSE expected no intervention by the 
SEC because the SEC rarely interfered with its activities in the past). 
 224. See id. at 1366 (explaining that the lack of intervention by the SEC over the years 
left many issues to be addressed). 
 225. See Robin Sidel, Wrong Number:  Some Untimely Analyst Advice on WorldCom 
Raises Eyebrows, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at A12. 
 226. See DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT:  CASES 
AND MATERIALS 755 (2003) (detailing investigations into NYSE’s members stock 
recommendations which were “supposedly independent and objective investment advice”) 
(citation omitted). 
 227. See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC, NY Attorney 
General, NASD, NASAA, NYSE and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement To 
Reform Investment Practices (Dec. 20, 2002) (on file with the American University Law 
Review), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-179.htm. 
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interest . . . .”228  The Commission could not have been “shocked, simply 
shocked”229 that the opportunity to collect investment banking fees might 
have colored those members’ stock recommendations to investors.  The 
Commission appears not to have initially identified the problem nor has it 
lead the path to its resolution. 
Others have suggested that the role played by the Commission in 
overseeing the operations of SROs indicates that the actions of the SRO 
should be attributed to the government.  At times, even when the NYSE has 
acted to the detriment of the public, the response of the Commission has 
been other than swift and sure.  Governmental coercion, encouragement, or 
entwinement is not always present and hardly seems conclusive. 
2.  Individual enforcement officials 
Of course, an exchange must act through natural persons.230  As such, the 
motivations of these individuals should be considered.  How might a 
rational SRO enforcement official behave?  Many of the same arguments 
that suggest that an SRO may under-enforce rules also suggest that an SRO 
enforcement officer may not be influenced by accountability to the 
government.  Therefore, there may be no governmental coercion and thus, 
no governmental action.  The fact that the SRO is accountable to the 
Commission,231 as well as the Commission’s oversight of SRO 
enforcement actions, has led some to believe that the acts of the SRO 
should be attributed to the government.232  Certainly there is some truth to 
                                                          
 228. See NAGY ET AL., supra note 226, at 758.  But c.f. Charles Gasparino & Scot J. 
Paltrow, SEC Joins Pack, Opens Inquiry into Analysts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2002, at C1 
(reporting that the SEC plans to take an active role in the investigation into the practices of 
Wall Street analysts). 
 229. See CASABLANCA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1942) (“I’m shocked, simply shocked, to 
find that gambling is going on in this establishment.”). 
 230. See Phyllis Diamond, SEC Demand for ‘Cooperation’ Seen Raising Due Process 
Concerns, 36 FED. SEC. & L. REP. 1070, 1074 (2004) (“[T]he SEC assesses a company 
based in part on what remedial measures it has implemented . . . . [Kenneth B. Winer, 
former senior counsel and branch chief of the SEC Division of Enforcement, continued,] ‘It 
also means that relatively junior members of the SEC staff have the ability to effectively 
terminate careers.’”); Mark Maremont & Deborah Solomon, Missed Chances:  Behind 
SEC’s Failings:  Caution, Tight Budget, ‘90s Exuberance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2003, at 
A1 (reporting that four of five staffers in the NASDAQ Stock Market’s self-regulatory body 
had less than one year’s experience). 
 231. See Enron Hearings, supra note 206 (statement of Robert R. Glauber, Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer, National Association of Securities Dealers Inc.) (stating that 
the SROs are accountable to the SEC in the same manner that SRO members are 
accountable to the NASD). 
 232. See Stone & Perino, supra note 204, at 463 (suggesting that, because of the 
government’s influence over SROs in the performance of enforcement duties, SROs should 
be considered state actors); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1367, 1423 n.198 (2003) (suggesting that, because SROs play a significant role in the 
federal regulation of securities and because the role of the federal government may be more 
residual, SROs may be state actors in light of the privatization of enforcement 
responsibilities). 
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the assertion that accountability to the government will influence an 
enforcement officer.  A rational actor analysis, however, suggests that the 
purported influence of Commission review on SRO enforcement actions is 
overstated. 
First, the employee is accountable to the employer.  A rational employee 
generally would act to serve the employer’s interests.  To serve their own 
interests, rational SRO enforcement officers would seek to further the 
interests of the SRO itself by exercising discretion in requiring disclosure 
to facilitate liquidity in the market and in stamping out fraud.  So, as 
suggested by the Solomon court,233 enforcement furthers the SRO’s own 
private interests and such private actions generally should not be attributed 
to the government. 
Looking beyond the broad influences on the decision-making process of 
an SRO enforcement officer, the degree to which an SRO decision maker is 
influenced by governmental oversight must be considered in light of the 
frequency with which the government exerts influence and the magnitude 
of such influence.234 
a.  Enforcement is infrequent 
The Commission, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, possesses 
the power to suspend or revoke the registration of an exchange that has 
failed to enforce compliance with the exchange’s own rules and federal law 
and rules,235 but the Commission has exercised the power only once, 
withdrawing the registration of the San Francisco Mining Exchange.236  In 
that one instance, however, 
                                                          
 233. See United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 868-69 (2d Cir. 1975) (indicating, 
without elaboration, that self-interest motivates SRO enforcement). 
 234. See Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 111-
13 (1955).  Such officers exercise discretion regarding, among other things, whom to 
investigate, whom to charge, with what to charge them, and what sanctions to seek.  When 
exercising discretion, the NYSE enforcement officer operates with imperfect information as 
to the potential outcomes that will follow from such decisions and their likelihood of 
occurrence.  Rational actors gather information to enable them to estimate accurately the 
likelihood of those potential outcomes.  Initially, additional nuggets of information enable 
actors to make decisions that are more informed.  The rational actor, however, will not 
gather every possible datum that could impact the determination of the likelihood of the 
event under scrutiny.  One acts with “bounded rationality.”  Even if every piece of 
information were available, no decision maker would attempt to obtain every such nugget.  
At some point, it becomes difficult to locate new pieces of information and these additional 
nuggets of information may add little to the competence of the decision maker—diminishing 
returns, or marginal decreasing utility.  The rational actor is not presumed to know all.  
 235. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (2000) (empowering the SEC to limit operations of an SRO 
if, after notice and a hearing, the SEC determines that the SRO failed to enforce compliance 
by a member, associated person or participant with the Act, the related rules or even the 
SRO’s own rules). 
 236. See generally San Francisco Mining Exch. v. SEC, 378 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1967) 
(upholding an SEC determination withdrawing the registration of the San Francisco Mining 
Exchange due to violations of regulations by members of the Exchange). 
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[T]here had been numerous and repeated violations of statutes and 
regulations involving members and officials of the Exchange and issuers 
of securities listed on the Exchange; . . . the Exchange had not made any 
effort to force issuers or members to comply with the Act or to force them 
to comply with its own rules . . . ; . . . [and] the Exchange had been a 
vehicle for evading and circumventing provisions of the statutes and 
regulations designed for the protection of investors . . . .237 
A nuclear sanction that results from pervasive enforcement problems at 
the exchange may enter the decision-making calculus of the exchange and 
thus may indirectly impact the decision-making process of an individual 
SRO enforcement officer.  However, the direct, marginal impact of nuclear 
sanctions for pervasive problems on the decision-making process of an 
individual SRO enforcement officer (who handles a relatively small portion 
of the SRO’s overall enforcement caseload) would be small.238 
In 1975, Congress amended the Exchange Act to expand the 
Commission’s ability to discipline SROs.  The amendments included 
censure and limitations on the activities, functions, and operations of an 
SRO.239  Even with less draconian disciplinary options than suspension or 
revocation of registration, enforcement actions against SROs have been 
few in number.240  Because the Commission has imposed such lesser 
sanctions so few times, those sanctions are unlikely to influence an SRO 
enforcement official to any great degree. 
If the Commission almost never intervenes formally, then the actions of 
the SRO may frequently be in line with the Commission’s preferences.  An 
SRO may behave this way because it is compelled to do so.  However, it 
may also behave this way because the interests of the Commission and the 
interests of the SRO are aligned.  Of course, if the government is not 
compelling the behavior, that is, if the SRO enforces the laws and rules to 
                                                          
 237. Id. at 164 (emphases added). 
 238. See Richard A. Posner, The Probability of Catastrophe, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2005, 
at A12 (contending that elected officials with limited terms of office are not likely to be 
influenced by “low-risk disaster possibilities”). 
 239. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (empowering the SEC to suspend or revoke the registration 
of an SRO in the name of public interest if the SRO does not comply with any of the rules 
and regulations set forth in the Act). 
 240. See, e.g., Midwest Clearing Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 31,416, 52 SEC 
Docket 2384 (Nov. 6, 1992) (censuring the Midwest Clearing Corporation for violating the 
requirements of the Exchange Act); Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Exchange Act Release No. 
26,809, 43 SEC Docket 1267 (Nov. 6, 1992) (censuring the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange for violating its own rules); Philadelphia Stock Exch., Exchange Act Release No. 
16,648, 19 SEC Docket 876 (Mar. 13, 1980) (censuring the Philadelphia Stock Exchange 
for failing to enforce compliance with the Exchange Act by its members); Boston Stock 
Exchange & Boston Stock Exchange Clearing Corporation, Exchange Act Release No. 
17,183, 21 SEC Docket 22 (Oct. 1, 1980) (censuring the Boston Stock Exchange for failing 
to monitor properly its members); see also Deborah Solomon et al., SEC Prepares to 
Charge the NYSE, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2005, at C3 (reporting that the NYSE will soon be 
charged with violating the Exchange Act by failing to monitor properly specialists). 
CLEVELAND OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:17:23 PM 
2005] NYSE AS STATE ACTOR? 43 
further its own interests (independent of governmental influence), then the 
argument that the SRO amounts to a governmental actor is weakened.  
Although evidence of their common interests abounds,241 representatives of 
the federal government have stated their personal beliefs that SROs do not 
adequately enforce laws and rules.  Competition may be the principal 
source for deviation from the ideal level of enforcement (from the 
perspective of the federal government) and the SRO’s actual level of 
enforcement.242 
For example, the NYSE faces competition from the American Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ; such competition may negatively impact 
enforcement.243  For example, competition may cause the NYSE to allocate 
resources away from enforcement of anti-fraud rules because such rules are 
difficult to craft with precision and because detection of violations is 
difficult.  Moreover, an SRO may under-enforce because of the fact that the 
federal government independently enforces anti-fraud laws244 and investors 
privately enforce those laws.245  Because SRO enforcement may fail or may 
otherwise be supported by governmental and private enforcement actions, 
SROs may not enforce the relevant laws and rules with the optimal level of 
vigilance.246  Instead, SROs may allocate resources away from enforcement 
                                                          
 241. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT:  2003 
CONFERENCE ON FEDERAL-STATE SECURITIES REGULATION (2003), 
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/ffedst2003.htm (illustrating that the concerns of the SROs 
considerably overlap with those of the SEC and state securities administrators); U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 1997 CONFERENCE ON FEDERAL-STATE SECURITIES 
REGULATION:  FINAL REPORT (1997), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/ffedst97.htm 
(suggesting that duplicative examination may be avoided by encouraging information 
sharing between the SROs and the SEC).  The Report also states that the SEC wishes to 
combine surveillance and enforcement work with the SROs.  Id. 
 242. See Annette L. Nazareth, Director of Division Market Regulation, Remarks at an 
Options Industry Conference (Apr. 23, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
spch042304.htm (theorizing that pressure from competitors leads to lessened regulatory 
policies).  But see Enron Hearings, supra note 206 (statement of Robert R. Glauber, 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, National Association of Securities Dealers Inc.) 
(stating that SROs are able to use private expertise where the government may not due to the 
availability of funding in the private sector). 
 243. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 134, at 580 (explaining that NASDAQ and 
American Stock Exchange are able to compete with the NYSE by offering less restrictive 
eligibility criteria); James D. Cox, Brands v. Generics:  Self-Regulation by Competitors, 
2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 15, 15 (2000) (explaining that, in addition to competing in the 
securities markets, both NYSE and NASDAQ also compete with electronic communications 
networks). 
 244. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 642-43 (1997) (holding that a 
person who violates anti-fraud rules may be held criminally liable); SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 839-42 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (holding that a company may be 
held liable for violation of anti-fraud rules).  But see NAGY ET AL., supra note 226, at 435 
(arguing that the SEC may overlook smaller cases of fraud, allowing those cases to be 
addressed in civil actions or by other regulatory agencies). 
 245. See COX ET AL., supra note 129, at 717 (noting that private enforcement is an 
“indispensable component” of the design of federal securities law).   
 246. See Seligman, supra note 142, at 54 (arguing that the NYSE’s efforts at enforcing 
its listing requirements were minimal). 
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to areas that yield more “bang for the buck.”  This is not to say that a race 
to the bottom will result in SROs’ providing no enforcement whatsoever 
because investors and exchange members would not tolerate such 
circumstances.  Consequently, SROs’ view of the ideal level of self-
enforcement will be less than the government’s view of the ideal level of 
SRO self-enforcement.  Given a disparity between these views, why 
doesn’t the Commission intervene more frequently? 
Rather than near perfect alignment of SRO and Commission interests, 
the general absence of intervention by the Commission may stem from fact 
that the costs of intervention exceed the benefits of intervention.  Because 
there are many points of alignment between the interests of the 
Commission and the interests of the SROs, the Commission may elect to 
devote precious resources elsewhere.  This may result in infrequent 
intervention in SRO enforcement actions.  Infrequent intervention by the 
Commission into SRO enforcement matters may lead an individual SRO 
enforcement official to discount the influence of Commission oversight. 
Intervention, in fact, seems infrequent.247  “The ideal asks [government 
officials] to be perfectly selfless, perfectly faithful agents of the public 
interest.  The reality is much more complex.”248  Time is a precious 
commodity.  Intervention by governmental staff would be more time 
consuming than deference to SRO enforcement.  Each staff member of the 
Commission faces choices—spend Saturday playing golf or spend Saturday 
in the office.  A Commission staff member’s salary is not linked to the 
number of successful enforcement actions or the complexity of filings 
reviewed.249  Commission employees have no immediate financial stake in 
any enforcement action.250  At some point, a Commission staffer that shirks 
his responsibilities would jeopardize his continued employment.  Relative 
to the private sector, however, it is difficult to terminate poor-performing 
governmental employees.251 
                                                          
 247. Cf. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 196, at 8 (testimony of David Walker, 
Comptroller General, U.S. Accounting Office) (stating that the most effective means for 
regulation is aggressive oversight of SROs by regulators). 
 248. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463, 2470 (2004). 
 249. See Maremont & Solomon, supra note 230, at A1 (reporting that Commission 
staffers pick small filings that are easy to review in order to meet their goals for number of 
reviewed filings).  Maremont and Solomon also report that staffers have the option of 
ordering more time-consuming, complex reviews but are given little incentive to do so.  Id. 
 250. There may be future rewards for diligent, successful work, but those future rewards 
must be discounted to a lesser present value.  See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, 
Pricing the Priceless:  Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1553, 1559-60 (2002) (explaining that future rewards are discounted to a lesser present 
value). 
 251. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of 
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 27 (arguing that “governmental employees are often 
harder to fire if they perform poorly”). 
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Ours is a government not only of limited powers, but also of limited 
resources.  Governmental agencies have limited budgets so officials must 
exercise judgment in the proper allocation of those limited resources.252  
“[L]imited resources have forced the SEC to be selective in its enforcement 
activities. . . .”253  “[N]obody ha[s] time to . . . prospect[] for new 
matters.”254  Although governmental intervention may result in greater 
sanctions than imposed solely by SRO enforcement,255 governmental 
officials may allocate precious resources elsewhere in hopes of better 
fulfilling its goal of serving the public’s interest.256  Deference to an SRO 
enforcement action does provide benefits.  Specifically, it frees up limited 
resources to pursue other enforcement actions or other rulemaking. 
Theory is borne out in practice.  In 2002, the NYSE undertook two 
hundred fifty-five disciplinary actions.  As the appointed regulatory 
agency,257 the Commission—on its own motion or upon application by the 
                                                          
 252. See Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. L.J. 2267, 2273-
74 (1998) (explaining that public officials must make judgments based on political and 
media pressures); Maremont & Solomon, supra note 230, at A1 (conceding that the SEC’s 
Division of Enforcement “sometimes has to make tough choices about what to pursue”). 
 253. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PROTECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST:  SELECTED 
GOVERNANCE, REGULATORY OVERSIGHT, AUDITING, ACCOUNTING, AND FINANCIAL 
REPORTING ISSUES 25 (2002) (testimony of David Walker, Comptroller General, U.S. 
Accounting Office) [hereinafter SELECTED GOVERNANCE] (stating that the imbalance 
between staff resources and the SEC’s workload has resulted in great strain on the 
Commission); see id. at 19 (indicating that the SEC must prioritize cases as it is not capable 
of prosecuting every case); COX ET AL., supra note 129, at 773 (stating that the SEC’s “trial 
staff is too small to handle more than a fraction of the cases being investigated”).  Not only 
must SEC enforcement staff be concerned about the agency’s own resources, but they may 
be unable to ignore administrative and judicial resources.  “Judges want us to settle, and if 
we don’t, they are not happy campers.  They don’t have the resources to try these cases.”  
Rachel McTague, High Court Ruling on Secondary Liability For Securities Fraud Tested, 
Lawyer Says, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 2059 (2004) (quoting private attorney Melvyn I. 
Weiss). 
 254. Maremont & Solomon, supra note 230, at A1 (quoting Richard Sauer). 
 255. See COX ET AL., supra note 129, at 773 (arguing that settlements allow SEC 
enforcement staff to claim victory without subjecting the defendant to harsh punishment 
because the defendant may consent to an injunction without admitting or denying a claim); 
Bibas, supra note 248, at 2471 (arguing that prosecutors are encouraged to settle cases 
which may ultimately end up in harsher penalties than those imposed via a plea-bargain).  
“Many NYSE enforcement actions are resolved by plea-bargain.”  See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., 
Interactive Brokers LLC, Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-2 (Jan. 13, 2004), available 
at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/04-002.pdf (censuring and fining defendant $170,000); NYSE, 
Inc., Helfant Group, Inc., Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-3 (Jan. 13, 2004), available 
at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/04-003.pdf (censuring and fining defendant $225,000); NYSE, 
Inc., The Williams Capital Group, L.P., Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-4 (Jan. 13, 
2004), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/04-004.pdf (censuring and fining defendant 
$25,000); NYSE, Inc., SGCowen Securities Corporation, Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 
04-5 (Jan. 13, 2004), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/ 
04-005.pdf (censuring and fining defendant $60,000). 
 256. See Sunstein, supra note 252, at 2274-80 (contrasting the limited budget of a typical 
prosecutor with the budget of the Independent Counsel that appears to be less constrained). 
 257. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(34)(E) (2000) (identifying the Commission as overseer of 
national securities exchanges and registered securities associations). 
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person aggrieved—was empowered to review the merits and sanction 
imposed by the NYSE in any such disciplinary action.258  The SEC 
formally reviewed only a handful of the two hundred fifty-five disciplinary 
actions and those reviews seemed to be favorable to the NYSE.259  
However, despite the typical absence of formal review, one should not 
conclude that the Commission conducts no review of NYSE disciplinary 
actions.  If the results of any such informal review are not communicated to 
the NYSE or its enforcement officials,260 then the NYSE essentially 
receives silence as feedback.  From the perspective of the SRO official, 
silence is a good thing;261 silence means the absence of embarrassing 
rebuke by the government.  Limited intervention by the government—in 
light of the SRO’s and Commission’s mutual interests—undermines any 
argument that the government compels such enforcement and counsels 
against the general treatment of the SRO as a governmental actor. 
SROs (and their representatives) generally make enforcement decisions 
without consulting federal representatives and without federal specification 
about how SRO discretion should be exercised.  Therefore, general 
arguments of entwinement between SROs and the government seem 
overbroad.262 
b.  Enforcement is slow 
 Just as infrequent governmental intervention in SRO enforcement 
actions undermines arguments that the government compels such 
                                                          
 258. See id. § 78s(d)-(e) (granting the Commission power to review any disciplinary 
actions imposed by an SRO). 
 259. See In the Matter of the Application of Stephen Michael Sommer and Spyder Sec. 
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 49,052, 81 SEC Docket 3256 (Jan. 12, 2004) (affirming 
findings of violations and sanctions of NYSE Disciplinary Action); In the Matter of the 
Application of Anthony A. Adonnino and Thomas Cannizzaro, Exchange Act Release No. 
48,618, 81 SEC Docket 709 (Oct. 9, 2003) (affirming findings of violations and sanctions of 
NYSE Disciplinary Action, but terming the sanctions as “lenient”); see also In the Matter of 
the Application of Calvin David Fox, Exchange Act Release No. 48,731, 81 SEC Docket 
1511 (Oct. 31, 2003) (remanding to the NYSE for additional findings without suggesting 
any view as to the outcome).  There would be little cause for review if the NYSE’s 
enforcement post-dated the Commission’s enforcement action, as sometimes occurred.  
NYSE Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 02-92 (Apr. 24, 2002). 
 260. See William R. McLucas et al., A Practitioner’s Guide to the SEC’s Investigative 
and Enforcement Process, 70 TEMPLE L. REV. 53, 56 (1997) (noting that public disclosure 
regarding informal investigations is “exceptionally rare,” but permitted by 17 C.F.R. 
§ 202.5(a) (1996)); see also SEC v. O’Brien, 467 U.S. 735, 744 n.14 (1984) (stating that 
“virtually all” investigations by the Commission are not made public). 
 261. Silence arguably amounts to approval by the government.  See Peter Tiersma, The 
Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“Silence is consent.”).  One might 
question the wisdom of giving argumentative force to inaction by the Commission.  See 
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the 
“wisdom of assuming that dogs will bark”). 
 262. Compare accompanying text, with Part IV (arguing that joint investigations may 
entwine governmental and private actors, such that actions of SROs should be attributed to 
the government). 
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enforcement, so too does lengthy delay between original decisions by SRO 
enforcement officers and government review.  Intervention by the 
government in NYSE enforcement actions may be slow.263  In the 
disciplinary action against Sohmer/Spyder Securities, the NYSE Hearing 
Panel issued its decision on July 25, 2002.  The Board of Directors of the 
NYSE affirmed the decision of the hearing panel on April 3, 2003 and the 
SEC issued its release affirming the findings of violations and sanctions 
imposed by the NYSE on January 12, 2004.264  Such length of time 
between the initial action by an SRO and the Commission’s review are not 
anomalous.265  
 The point here is not to criticize the length of time that it took for the 
NYSE’s board or the Commission to issue their decisions; such criticism 
likely would be misplaced as those bodies awaited written submissions 
from the parties.  The point is that, despite that, in the judicial arena, the 
passage of less than two years from hearing to appeal may be considered 
lightning quick, lengthy delay in governmental review of SRO enforcement 
matters lessens the influence of such intervention on the discretion 
originally exercised by SRO enforcement officials.  Moreover, as 
governmental influence on such SRO discretion lessens, arguments of 
governmental coercion or encouragement lose force. 
The passage of time lessens the influence of governmental review 
because of discounting and SRO turnover.  A rational actor will consider 
the consequences of her actions, but the magnitude of those consequences 
will vary depending on the time at which those consequences are realized.  
One should discount future harms to some current value when deciding 
whether to take an action that could produce those harms.266  An example 
may make plain the concept.  A debt (harm) of $100 today is worse than a 
debt (harm) of $100 one year from today.  With an annual interest rate of 
                                                          
 263. See SELECTED GOVERNANCE, supra note 253, at 25-26 (theorizing that enforcement 
investigations may be lengthened due to the limited resources available to the Commission); 
id. at 8 (arguing that effective enforcement requires time); COX ET AL., supra note 129, at 
782 (arguing that the overcrowding of federal court dockets results in “considerable delays” 
in having cases heard). 
 264. NYSE, Inc., In the Matters of Stephen Michael Sohmer and Spyder Sec., Inc., 
Requests for Review of Exchange Hearing Panel Decisions 02-156, 02-157 (Apr. 3, 2003), 
available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/02-156-157sec.pdf. 
 265. See  NYSE, Inc., In the Matter Calvin David Fox, Exchange Hearing Panel 
Decision No. 02-110 (Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/02-110s 
ec.pdf (indicating that approximately 15 months passed between the NYSE hearing panel’s 
decision and the SEC’s release on the matter); NYSE, Inc., In the Matter of AFC Partners, 
LLC et al., Requests for Review of Exchange Hearing Panel Decisions 02-12, 02-13, 02-14 
(Oct. 3, 2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/02-012-014SEC.pdf  (indicating that 
approximately twenty-one months passed between the NYSE hearing panel’s decision and 
the SEC’s release affirming the findings of violations and sanctions). 
 266. See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 250, at 1559-60 (illustrating how 
economists discount future costs and benefits). 
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five percent, a debt (harm) of $100 payable in one year amounts to a debt 
(harm) of about $95 today.  The further in the future that the $100 debt 
(harm) is payable, the smaller that debt (harm) is today. 
Because governmental review will occur in the future and because any 
rebuke that would follow from such governmental review will occur in the 
future, the negative impact stemming from any governmental rebuke must 
be discounted to a lesser current value.  Such discounting lessens the 
influence of governmental review and weakens arguments that SROs act 
due to governmental compulsion.267 
Aside from the fact that slow feedback lessens the disciplinary impact of 
governmental review, turnover at the NYSE may lessen the impact of 
governmental review.  The NYSE official that made the original decision 
subsequently reviewed by the Commission may have left the NYSE.268  Of 
course, the Commission’s intervention may influence others at the NYSE, 
but those others may easily distance themselves from the decision that 
resulted in the Commission’s intervention.  Hindsight is 20/20.269  
Additionally, lawyers, in particular, possess expertise in analogizing and 
distinguishing one case from another.  Lawyers may distinguish themselves 
and their decisions from the decision that resulted in Commission 
intervention.  This ability to distinguish one scenario from another lessens 
the influence of governmental review.270  Even if the SRO still employs the 
original decision maker, that decision maker similarly may distinguish the 
prior episode.  “Nearly all failures can be ascribed, if observers are so 
inclined, to intervening and unforeseen situational factors rather than flaws 
                                                          
 267. Rational individuals discount future risks, but intelligent individuals may be more 
likely to discount at the appropriate rate than those of less intelligence.  See Bibas, supra 
note 248, at 2506 (linking impulsiveness with overly high discount rates and indicating that 
impulsiveness is negatively correlated with intelligence); Gary S. Becker, Editorial, . . . And 
the Economics of Disaster Management, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2005, at A12 (“[E]ducated 
persons take a much longer time perspective in their personal decisions.”). 
 268. Turnover at SROs has been high.  See DIV. OF TRADING AND MKTS., COMMODITY 
FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL AND SALES PRACTICE COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAM OF THE CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE (1988), http://www.cftc.gov/tm/tmcm 
erer092998.htm (“As of December 31, 1994, CME’s 23 auditors had an overall average 
experience of 3.9 years. At March 31, 1998, the average experience for CME’s 17 auditors 
decreased by 25 percent, to 2.9 years, largely due to staff turnover.  The number of audit 
staff ‘on-board’ also declined by 25 percent.”); Maremont & Solomon, supra note 230, at 
A1, A5 (“In 1999 inspection of the National Association of Securities Dealers, the 
NASDAQ Stock Market’s self-regulatory body, four of the five staffers on the task had less 
than a year’s experience . . . . Then the lead attorney on the exam left, and the case was 
assigned to another attorney, who left two months later.” (referencing a report authored by 
consultants McKinsey & Co.)).    
 269. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“20/20 vision of hindsight.”); Barker 
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 534 n.39 (“Hindsight is, of course, 20/20 . . . .”). 
 270. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of 
Decisions, 59 J. BUS. 251, 274 (1986) (arguing that unique decisions “provide little 
opportunity for learning”); id. (“[V]ariability in the environment degrades the reliability of 
the feedback, especially where outcomes of low probability are involved . . . “). 
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in the decision.”271 
Because the federal government formally intervenes infrequently, “the 
primary means by which the SEC has exercised regulatory authority over 
the exchanges has . . . been . . . through informal communication, 
interaction, and persuasion.”272  Such “regulation by raised eyebrow”273 
does not amount to governmental compulsion or significant 
encouragement, nor does it constitute entwinement in the SRO’s exercise 
of discretion, as the SRO may ignore the federal agency’s suggestion.274 
c.  Enforcement is unclear 
The influence of accountability is impacted by the ability of decision 
makers to surmise the outcome preferences of the audience to whom they 
are accountable.275  “When individuals are accountable to an audience 
whose preferences are known, these individuals . . . alter the outcome of 
their decisions to come closer to an outcome that would satisfy their 
audience . . . . Individuals who are accountable to an audience with 
unknown views are significantly more self-critical while making their 
decisions.”276  Because federal preferences may be unclear, SROs and SRO 
enforcement officials may be less likely to be influenced by federal 
intervention, and arguments of governmental compulsion or 
encouragement become overbroad.  Federal preferences may be unclear 
because the federal government generally does not intervene in SRO 
enforcement actions, and when it speaks, it does not always speak clearly. 
If, as suggested above, silence is the predominant form of feedback that 
the government provides SROs, then it becomes more difficult for an SRO, 
or an individual SRO enforcement officer, to discern federal preferences.  
Whether the Commission even reviews an SRO enforcement action is 
uncertain,277 and even if review were certain, SRO enforcement officers 
                                                          
 271. Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions:  A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. 
L. REV. 101, 151 (1997). 
 272. Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities 
Industry and the Antitrust Laws:  Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REV. 475, 
483 (1984); see Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing 
Standards Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 BUS. LAW. 1461, 1501 (1992) (noting that 
the Commission has used subtle pressure to achieve its goals). 
 273. Michael, supra note 272, at 1501. 
 274. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 134, at 579-85 (discussing SROs’ refusal to adopt a 
“one share, one vote” rule despite governmental pressure). 
 275. See Seidenfeld, supra note 203, at 1064-65. 
 276. Id. at 1066. 
 277. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2) (2000) (providing for review only on a motion by the SEC or 
application by the subject of the enforcement action); see Maremont & Solomon, supra note 
230, at A1, A5 (“Richard Sauer, who left the [SEC’s Enforcement] division earlier this year, 
says, ‘Because resources were so stretched, nobody had time to go around prospecting for 
new matters.’”). 
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may not know the preferences of their audiences.  An SRO line officer 
cannot know the particular Commission staffer who might review the 
enforcement action.278  Arguably, the SRO could equate the views of the 
Commission to every Commission staffer.  The number of issues that arise 
in any particular enforcement action ensures that some issues arise for 
which the Commission has not spoken clearly.279  For these issues, the SRO 
must predict the position that the Commission would adopt.  Nonetheless, 
like predictions in any other arena, predictions regarding the Commission’s 
position may not be easy, and poor predictions may result. 
Certain facts may contribute to poor predictions.  First, the Commission 
seeks to achieve multiple goals, which may lead to inconsistent views on a 
particular issue.280  Second, the Commission is not headed by a single 
person, with whose views we might associate the Commission, had the 
Commission’s organizational structure been more akin to the CEO of a 
popular company.281  With the Commission headed by five people,282 
however, the attribution of the views of a group of leaders to the 
organization becomes more difficult.  Third, no more than three of the five 
commissioners may be members of the same political party,283 further 
complicating predictions as one’s views do not always follow party lines.284  
                                                          
 278. See Seidenfeld, supra note 203, at 1074 (“An agency is unlikely to know the 
identity of the particular OIRA desk officer who will be assigned to review the regulatory 
impact analysis for a proposed rule.”). 
 279. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (“[S]tatutes are ambiguous, . . . it is reasonable or even inevitable for 
agencies to exercise discretion when interpreting laws, . . . there is just no right 
answer . . . .”). 
 280. See Maremont & Solomon, supra note 230, at A1, A5 (“[The Commission] has 
sometimes been pulled between its not-always-consistent missions of protecting investors 
and keeping U.S. financial markets globally competitive.”). 
 281. Sometimes, a leader of an organization embodies that organization, for example, 
Jack Welch and General Electric.  Welch’s approach “involves a personal ideology that he 
indoctrinates into GE managers through speeches, memos, and confrontations . . . Welch 
makes pronouncements . . . and he institutes programs . . . that become the GE party 
line . . . . GE managers must either internalize his vision, or they must leave.”  Michael 
Maccoby, Narcissistic Leaders:  The Incredible Pros, the Incredible Cons, HARV. BUS. REV. 
Jan. 2004, at 92, 100; see Dawn C. Chmielewski, Board Confident in Temporary Chief, SAN 
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 3, 2004, at 1C, 4C (“[Steve] Jobs is the quintessential Silicon 
Valley chief executive—an entrepreneur whose strong personality and evangelical passion 
have come to embody his company.”); Susan Vinella, IMG:  New Faces, New Era, THE 
PLAIN DEALER,  May 8, 2004, at D1 (“Few chief executive officers embody their companies 
the way Mark McCormack did with IMG.”); Jeanne Cummings, Wal-Mart Sets Up Shop In 
Washington to Bring Its Goals to the Counter, WALL ST. J. EUROPE,  Mar. 24, 2004, at A1 
(Wal-Mart embodied by Sam Walton’s “down-home style”).  The Chairman, however, may 
be the “unitary head” of the Commission.  See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with 
Constitutional Law:  The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
975, 1050-51 (2005) (“unitary head”). 
 282. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a). 
 283. Id. 
 284. See Deborah Solomon, Tough Tack of SEC Chief Could Relent, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
12, 2005, at C1, C5 (“[SEC Chairman Donaldson] has come under fire from fellow 
Republicans for pursuing a regulatory agenda that some say is out of sync with his party’s 
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So, one may not always be able to attribute a single view to the 
Commission. 
As mentioned, lawyers possess expertise in analogizing and 
distinguishing factual scenarios.  So, with regard to legal matters, lawyers 
may be more capable prognosticators than the populace at large.  
Nonetheless, governmental review may have less impact ex ante with 
regard to decision making when the decisions under review are subject to 
ambiguous standards that are highly fact-specific.285  Certainly, the 
government—the Commission, the U.S. Attorney—wants to further the 
public interest,286 but how the public interest is defined in a particular case 
of enforcement may not always be clear.287  Reasonable people may 
disagree.  SRO enforcement actions may present similar uncertainties.  
Should the securities violator be barred for a term of months, years, or 
permanently?  If the government sends a rebuke, the rebuke may be so 
situation specific that it may only marginally impact future decisions.  If 
governmental preferences are unclear ex ante, then the influence of 
governmental review on an SRO decision maker is lessened, weakening 
arguments of governmental compulsion, encouragement, or entwinement. 
III.  BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY & COGNITIVE BIASES 
Recent decades have brought valuable insight into the decision-making 
process.  Research reveals that individuals’ cognitive processes do not 
always proceed in perfectly rational fashion.  Cognitive “biases are 
sufficiently well-accepted in both the theoretical and empirical literature 
that we should take them seriously as behavioral risks, even if we cannot 
determine their exact role in any given setting or estimate how often they 
                                                          
pro-business stance.  He has pushed through significant proposals on mutual-fund 
governance and hedge-fund regulation wit the backing of only the SEC’s two Democrats.  
He has also clashed with his two fellow Republican commissioners on some enforcement 
issues.”). 
 285. Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring:  The Behavioral Economics of Corporate 
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 95-96 (2002). 
 286. COX ET AL., supra note 129, at 779 (“A common feature of most of the provisions 
under which the Commission derives its authority to discipline certain persons is that any 
resulting sanction must be ‘in the public interest.’”); id. at 790-92 (considering whether the 
public interest is sufficiently at stake to merit a formal enforcement proceeding). 
 287. See John R. Emshwiller & Kara Scannell, Enron Prosecutors Find No One Case Is 
Like Another, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2004, at C1 ( 
Six people are on trial here for helping to strike a deal between Enron Corp. and 
Merrill Lynch & Co. that federal prosecutors say was a blatant attempt to 
manipulate earnings . . . . Yet a strikingly similar transaction between Enron and 
Citigroup Inc. has yet to produce criminal charges.  The fact that one transaction 
produced felony counts and a like one didn’t demonstrates the vagaries of criminal 
investigations and the difficulties prosecutors face when deciding whether laws 
have been broken rather than just bent in corporate suites. 
). 
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will apply in general.”288  Some of these cognitive biases may enhance any 
influence that the government may have on the behavior of a private 
actor—bolstering the argument that the actions of an SRO should be 
attributed to the government—and other cognitive biases may lessen any 
influence that the government may have on the behavior of private actors—
undermining the argument that the actions of an SRO should be attributed 
to the government.  Several cognitive biases are examined below. 
A.  Risk & Loss Aversion 
A rational decision maker might be expected to take action after 
weighing the “pros” and “cons.”  In weighing those pros and cons, the 
decision maker would not simply tabulate the number of pros against the 
number of cons.  Instead, before making the comparison, the decision 
maker would assign some weight or value to each of those pros and the 
cons.  Although one might expect the comparison to be made rationally, 
research indicates that cognitive biases arise and undermine the premise of 
a perfectly rational decision maker.  Risk aversion and loss aversion 
seemingly enhance the accountability effect of governmental review on the 
decision-making processes of SRO enforcement officials.  Generally, 
people are averse to risks and losses.289  A loss deflates more than a gain of 
equal magnitude elates.290 
In effect, the government will either approve or disapprove of 
conclusions attendant to an SRO’s enforcement actions.  Approval may 
yield benefits to SRO staffers—”boost [their] egos, their esteem, their 
praise by colleagues, and their prospects for promotion and career 
advancement.”291  Disapproval may draw the wrath of supervisors and the 
                                                          
 288. Langevoort, supra note 271, at 134. 
 289. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the 
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1326 (1990); Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, 
Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 752 
(1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 
(1997).  People are not only loss averse but also risk averse—preferring a sure thing to a 
gamble that offers an equal expected value.  Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid 
Choices and Bold Forecasts:  A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 
22 (1993) (“Decision makers become more risk averse when they expect their choices to be 
reviewed by others . . . .” ).  There are exceptions to the general preference for risk aversion.  
Buying lottery tickets is a prime example.  Id. at 18. 
 290. See Kahneman et al., supra note 289, at 1326; Sunstein, supra note 289, at 1179; 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 454 (1981) (“The displeasure associated with losing a sum of money 
is generally greater than the pleasure associated with winning the same amount, as is 
reflected in people’s reluctance to accept fair bets on a toss of a coin.”); Jennifer Arlen, 
Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 
1771 (1998) (“[T]he disutility associated with giving up an object is greater than the utility 
gained by acquiring it . . .”); Bibas, supra note 248, at 2508 (quoting tennis great Jimmy 
Connors:  “I hate to lose more than I like to win.”). 
 291. Bibas, supra note 248, at 2471. 
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public; personal embarrassment may unduly favor a route involving less 
risk.292  And to the extent that the preferences of the government are 
identifiable, an SRO decision maker may follow the path of least resistance 
so as to avoid rebuke and professional embarrassment.  Such an incentive 
structure may pressure one to ensure that the job is done well as recognized 
by those to whom one is accountable.  “The evidence indicates that the 
pressures of accountability and personal responsibility increase . . . 
manifestations of loss aversion.”293 
Moreover, people generally are risk averse to small probabilities of 
loss.294  As mentioned above, there is only a small probability that the 
government will review an SRO enforcement action, and thus only a small 
probability for the government to rebuke the decisions of an SRO 
enforcement official, and thus only a small risk of rebuke or 
embarrassment.295  Because people generally are risk averse to small 
probabilities of loss, one would expect SRO enforcement officials to 
behave in a manner to avert risk, which would be consistent with the 
preferences of the government.  Such behavior would enhance the impact 
of governmental review. 
It may be that a job well done will yield rewards; on the other hand, 
expectations may exist such that a job well done is expected.  In a setting 
with high expectations, the only result that may garner attention is 
performance that fails to meet those expectations.296  Success may not be 
rewarded, but failure may result in punishment.  Facing those choices, one 
may take excessive or irrational risks.297  In the enforcement arena, 
expectations may be high.  The Commission obtains favorable settlements 
in over ninety percent of its enforcement proceedings.298  U.S. Attorneys 
obtain convictions in approximately ninety percent of criminal charges 
brought in court.299  If NYSE enforcement officials confront similar 
                                                          
 292. See id. at 2471-72. 
 293. Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 289, at 22. 
 294. Bibas, supra note 248, at 2508 n.189. 
 295. See Part II.D.2.a. 
 296. See generally David Diehl, Editorial, Solich Deserves the Boot After 9-3 Regular 
Season, DAILY NEBRASKAN, Dec. 3, 2003, available at http://www.dailynebraskan.com/v 
news/display.v/ART/2003/12/03/3fcd7e12df400 (stating that the termination of Nebraska 
football coach Frank Solich, after a season in which his team won seventy-five percent of its 
games, “reinforced the mantra of ‘meet expectations, or get out.’”).  Solich followed Hall of 
Fame coach Tom Osbourne who whose teams, between 1993 and 1997, went 60-3 and won 
two national championships.  Big Shoes to Fill, CNN SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 27, 1998, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/footb 
all/college/1998/bowls/holiday/news/1998/12/27/nebraska_solich. 
 297. See Noll & Krier, supra note 289, at 752 (“[P]eople are risk averse as to gains but 
risk taking as to losses.”); id. at 758 (“[W]hen faced with the certainty of some loss, they 
may be excessively prone to take actions involving a reasonably large chance of a 
catastrophic outcome.”). 
 298. COX ET AL., supra note 129, at 773. 
 299. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL 
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expectations, then those officials may become risk-seekers.  Risk may be 
sought in different forms, but risk-seeking would be consistent with a lack 
of concern of the results of review by the Commission.  If true, 
governmental review would have little impact on SRO decision making.  
Although this spin on risk and loss aversion may “cut the other way,” risk 
and loss aversion seemingly enhance the impact of governmental review on 
SRO decision making. 
Just as certain cognitive biases seemingly enhance the influence of 
governmental review on the behavior of a private actor, there are cognitive 
biases that may lessen the influence of the government on a private actor.  
Such behavioral biases include the availability bias, overconfidence bias, 
and the fairness bias.  Groups may perpetuate or magnify or minimize these 
individual biases.300 
B.  Availability Bias 
A rational decision-making process typically is described as involving 
the consideration of the likelihood and magnitude of each of the benefits 
and costs related to (in)actions.  Consideration of the magnitude of a certain 
consequence isolated from its likelihood of occurrence would be 
irrational.301  Individuals may not accurately assess the likelihood of events.  
Individuals’ estimation of the likelihood of the occurrence of a particular 
event is tainted by their ability to recall the occurrence of such an event.  If 
the actual occurrence of an event is “available” to their memory, then they 
tend to overestimate the likelihood of the occurrence of such an event in the 
future. 
For example, one study indicated that people believe that a page of text 
                                                          
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2002 2 (2002), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs02.pdf (“The proportion of defendants convicted 
in the Federal courts increased from 81% during 1990 to 89% during 2002. . . . The 
conviction rate was . . . 91% [for] property defendants . . . and 88% [for] public-order 
defendants.”); Bibas, supra note 248, at 2471 (“[E]very plea bargain counts as a win but 
trials risk being losses.  The statistic of conviction, in other words, matters much more than 
the sentence.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 300. See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Available? Social Influences and Behavioral 
Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1295, 1305-08 (2003) (discussing the evidence and reasons 
for increased risk taking by individuals when they are grouped together); Chip Heath et al., 
Cognitive Repairs:  How Organizational Practices Can Compensate for Individual 
Shortcomings, 20 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 1 (1998) (describing the various biases common to 
individuals and ways of correcting them through group interaction). 
 301. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 290, at 454 (“In expected utility theory the 
utility of an uncertain outcome is weighted by its probability; in prospect theory the value of 
an uncertain outcome is multiplied by a decision weight π(p), which is a monotonic function 
of p but is not a probability.”).  For example, take rain.  No one wants to be doused by rain.  
One might consider the idea of spending time in wet clothing to be unbearable.  The costs of 
failing to carry an umbrella may be high, but if Al Roker estimates the likelihood of rain to 
be negligible, then one might not carry an umbrella to work.  High costs may be diminished 
by their likelihood of occurrence. 
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will include more words ending with the letters “ing” than words that have 
“n” as the second to last letter.302  Gerunds and words that rhyme with 
“sing” are readily available for the mind to recall.  Typically, one’s brain 
does not categorize words by the second to last letter, leaving words that 
have “n” as the second to last letter less available for recall.  Researchers 
conclude that one’s estimation of the likelihood of the appearance of such 
words is affected by one’s ability to recall similar words.  The more 
available, the higher the estimated likelihood—even if one’s estimates do 
not withstand scrutiny.  The number of words that have “n” as the second 
to last letter must equal or exceed (but never be less than) the number of 
words that end with “ing.” 
Relatedly, individuals place excessive emphasis on extreme or vivid 
evidence.303  People overestimate the likelihood of tornados—vivid media 
coverage accompanies tornados and their extreme power for devastation—
and underestimate the likelihood of less vivid events—such as heart 
disease.304  Perhaps, the extreme or vivid nature of the evidence enhances 
the mind’s ability to recall events like tornados; such evidence enhances 
their availability. 
The availability bias suggests that people may tend to overestimate the 
likelihood of fraudulent conduct by corporations.305  Recent instances of 
corporate misconduct are readily available to the minds of the populace.  
Enron repeatedly appeared on newspapers’ A1 top fold and received 
extended coverage by television networks.  The public’s exposure to 
misconduct by Enron, Global Crossing, and WorldCom leave such 
behavior readily available to the public’s recall.  Additionally, Enron, for 
example, provided extreme, vivid evidence of the consequences of large-
scale misconduct as its stock price fell precipitously towards zero in the 
span of less than a year.306  The precipitous fall resulted in a loss of billions 
                                                          
 302. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning:  The 
Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293, 295 (1983). 
 303. Heath et al., supra note 300, at 17-18. 
 304. JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 218 (2d ed. 1994). 
 305. In recent years, there may in fact, have been an increase in corporate fraud.  There 
have been increases in disciplinary actions brought by the NYSE & SEC.  See generally 
NYSE.com, Enforcement, http://www.nyse.com/regulation/howregworks/1 
022221394131.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2005) (stating that the NYSE set a new record for 
number of proceedings against member firms in 2003 more than double the preceding year 
and that total monetary sanctions in 2004 were double those of 2003); see also id. (noting 
that a “significant number of actions were brought jointly . . . [with] other regulators, 
including the SEC . . . .”).  Nonetheless, an increase in disciplinary actions is not a perfect 
measure for an increase in the underlying conduct. 
 306. Complaint of Plaintiff, SEC v. Causey, Civil Action No. H-04-0284 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 
22, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18551.htm (“In early 1998, 
Enron’s stock traded at approximately $30 per share. By January 2001, even after a stock 
split in August 1999, Enron’s stock was trading at over $80 per share . . . . On December 2, 
2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy, making its stock, which less than a year earlier had been 
trading at over $80 per share, virtually worthless.”). 
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of dollars in shareholder wealth.307  Other companies experienced 
tremendous losses of value.308  Such extreme and vivid examples may 
cause the public to overestimate the likelihood of future events.309 
In response to readily available instances of extreme, vivid corporate 
misconduct, the public may demand more vigorous enforcement of existing 
regulation or new regulation to combat misconduct.310  A stock exchange 
cannot be oblivious to the public’s demand.311  If the public loses 
confidence in the quality of the companies traded on an exchange, then the 
public may channel its investment dollars to other than companies listed on 
that exchange.  Fewer invested dollars correlates with fewer stock trades.  
NYSE members earn money on executed trades.312  So as the number of 
trades decreases, the exchange members earn less income.313  
Consequently, the exchange members will encourage the exchange to 
enforce existing rules or create new rules to combat misconduct, consistent 
with investor demand.  There appears to be an incentive for the exchange to 
                                                          
 307. According to the cover page of Enron’s Form 10-K for fiscal 2000, filed with the 
Commission on April 2, 2001, Enron had a market capitalization of over $60 billion.  See 
Enron Corp., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2000 (Form 10-K), at Cover Page, 
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024401/0001024401015 
00010/ene10-k.txt (“Aggregate market value of the voting stock held by non-affiliates of the 
registrant, based on closing prices in the daily composite list for transactions on the New 
York Stock Exchange on February 15, 2001, was approximately $60,207,479,342.”). 
 308. Jonathan Weil, WorldCom’s Ex-Directors Pony Up:  Agreement in Principle to Pay 
Out Personal Funds Creates Liability Precedent, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2005, at A3 (reporting 
that WorldCom overstated earnings by $11 billion, contributing to the company’s collapse 
and eventual bankruptcy.); Milt Freudenheim, McKesson Agrees to Settle an Accounting 
Fraud Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at C2 (“McKesson shareholders lost $8.6 billion in 
one day, April 28, 1999, nearly half the value of their holdings.”). 
 309. Although estimates of the frequency of corporate misconduct on a large scale may 
have been low prior to the downfall of, for example, Enron, it would seem that post-Enron 
estimates of the likelihood of large scale misconduct may be high. 
 310. See Noll & Krier, supra note 289, at 771 (“The intensity of demand for policies to 
ameliorate risks will tend to be higher for low-probability risks and lower for high-
probability risks than is predicted by conventional decision theory.”). 
 311. Arlen, supra note 290, at 1785 (“[R]egulators may respond to public pressure for 
protection from certain well-publicized risks by imposing excessive regulations.”). 
 312. In 2003, Goldman Sachs reported revenues of over $8 billion dollars with regard to 
its trading and principal investments. GOLDMAN SACHS, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2003 68 
(2004), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our_firm/investor_relati 
ons/financial_reports/annual_reports/2003/pdf/GS03AR_completeannual.pdf.  Some portion 
of that $8 billion in revenue is attributable to “floor-based and electronic market making as a 
specialist on U.S. equities and options exchanges and [the] clear[ance of] customer 
transactions on major stock, options and futures exchanges worldwide.”  Id. at 73.  The 
mention of those services in Goldman Sachs’ annual report suggests that their contribution 
to the company’s revenue stream is non-trivial. 
 313. James D. Cox, Brands v. Generics:  Self-Regulation by Competitors, 2000 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 15, 16-17 (2000) (“[L]isting fees . . . are surpassed by the amounts . . . 
[received] in trading fees and revenues related to the sale of market trading 
information . . . .”). 
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address the investing public’s demands, irrespective of any demands by the 
government.314 
C.  Overconfidence 
While the NYSE may respond to the investing public’s demand for 
enhanced enforcement of existing rules or the creation of new rules, 
thereby lessening the impact of governmental review, NYSE decision 
makers may be overconfident in their assessments, believing their decisions 
to be the right ones, such that the impact of any subsequent governmental 
review would have less effect.  Studies indicate that individuals tend to be 
overconfident in their assessments with regard to risk.  For example, ninety 
percent of a polled group believed that, relative to the others in the group, 
they were above-average automobile drivers.315  “Overconfidence 
is . . . exceptionally strong when people have some control:  they are overly 
optimistic about how well they can exercise that control to avoid bad 
outcomes.”316  Staying with the theme of automobile drivers, studies also 
                                                          
 314. Exchange members preference for regulation and enforcement is not without limit.  
Langevoort, supra note 271, at 115 (“[I]t would not be surprising to find situations in which 
trading off credibility with (perhaps even the risk of liability to) investors for some profit-
enhancing gain in some other area could be a rational choice.”) (footnotes omitted).  As the 
demands on those companies listed on an exchange increase, the costs of listing on the 
exchange increase.  Companies voluntarily list with exchanges; and alternatives to listing 
exist.  Exchange members cannot require “too much” in terms of regulation and 
enforcement or companies will de-list.  See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., THE SECURITY 
MARKETS 236 (1935) (“[I]f [an exchange] makes its requirements too high, corporations 
simply will not list their securities there, but list them on other exchanges where less 
information is required, or will not list them at all.”); see also J. EDWARD MEEKER, THE 
WORK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 97 (1930) (“If its regulations with regard to listing should 
become excessive and inequitable, they would soon prove valueless, since the corporations 
would refuse to list their securities there.”); Silvia Ascarelli, Citing Sarbanes, Foreign 
Companies Flee U.S. Exchanges, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at C1, C16 (“Many European 
companies are disenchanted by the cost of listing shares in the U.S. . . . [A]s a result of the 
2002 law [Sarbanes-Oxley] . . . [German e-commerce software firm] Intershop was faced 
with an extra . . . $600,000 annually in extra accounting and lawyers’ fees.  To escape, 
Intershop announced plans . . . not just to withdraw share trading in the U.S. but to . . .  
deregister[] with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission . . . .”); id. (charting number 
of voluntary listings versus number of voluntary de-listings—2001:  51 versus 1; 2002:  33 
versus 1; 2003:  16 versus 2; 2004:  8 versus 1).  If a company is de-listed, then members 
will lose a source of income for trades of that company’s shares.  There may be an overall 
decrease in the number of trades, with a diminishment in income for exchange members.  
Related to a company’s decision to de-list, another company may never elect to list on the 
exchange in the first instance.  In such circumstances, exchange members lose out on the 
prospect of income on trades of the company’s securities.  It is possible that the de-listing of 
a company constitutes a signal of quality to the market, resulting in increased trades in other 
companies that offset lost trades in the de-listed company.  See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, 
INC., supra, at 236-37; RUDOLPH L. WEISSMAN, THE NEW WALL STREET 105 (1939) (“[T]he 
Exchange, on its own initiative, took steps to delist the stock of an investment trust[, 
which] . . . had no asset value . . . . The volume of trading is reduced by delisting and 
possible commissions are likewise reduced.  In the long run the confidence of the public will 
be gained by these sacrifices.”). 
 315. Sunstein, supra note 289, at 1183. 
 316. Bibas, supra note 248, at 2501. 
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indicate that people tend to underestimate the likelihood that they will be 
involved in an auto accident when they perceive themselves as having 
some control over the situation.317  The perception of control itself may be 
one of overconfidence.  Many accidents occur when the driver is not at 
fault; additionally, many passengers are injured in auto accidents and 
passengers clearly are not in control.318  An individual’s perception of 
control may be misplaced, heightening the degree of overconfidence. 
Decision makers may be overconfident in their assessments and may 
improperly view themselves as in control.  Securities enforcement may 
appear to be a controllable event.  Although the SROs lack subpoena 
power, the SROs may impose sanctions against exchange members and 
those associated with exchange members for failure to comply with SRO 
investigators, such that SROs have tremendous control over certain aspects 
of the investigatory process.319  Additionally, a trial may look like a 
controllable event, one can:  (a) choose one’s witnesses; (b) select the 
evidence to be submitted; (c) cross-examine the other party’s witnesses; 
and (d) emphasize favorable facts, arguments, and case law.320  The sense 
of control, however, may be illusory.321  Even if one is assumed to have 
influence over the input received by a judge or jury, one does not control 
their output.322  Trials provide plenty of opportunity to overestimate oneself 
and underestimate the other party; the more complex the case, the more 
room for overconfidence.323 
NYSE decision makers may be overconfident in their handling of 
enforcement actions.  Overconfidence may arise in numerous settings, 
including the identification of individuals against which to pursue 
disciplinary actions (and those not to pursue),324 the causes of action to 
pursue (and not to pursue),325 and the sanctions to seek (and not seek).326  If 
                                                          
 317. David M. DeJoy, The Optimism Bias and Traffic Accidents Risk Perception, 21 
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 333, 336-37 & tbl.2 (1989); id. at 336 tbl.1. 
 318. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 
1081 (2000). 
 319. See NYSE, Inc., Rule 476(a)(11) (“[R]efusing or failing to comply with a request 
by the Exchange to submit his or its books and records . . . or to furnish information to or to 
appear or testify before the Exchange . . .” may result in disciplinary sanctions).  Courts 
generally have concluded that an SRO is not the government, so the protections afforded by 
the Fifth Amendment are inapplicable—speak or suffer negative consequences.  See supra 
Part I. 
 320. Bibas, supra note 248, at 2501. 
 321. Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 289, at 27 (“[A] pervasive optimistic bias 
[is] . . . an illusion of control . . . . People . . . exaggerate their control over events . . . .”). 
 322. Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 289, at 17 (“[I]dealized self-image is . . . a 
prudent and determined agent, who is in control of both people and events”); id. (“optimistic 
denial of uncontrollable uncertainty”). 
 323. See Bibas, supra note 248, at 2501. 
 324. See Sunstein, supra note 252, at 2273 (detailing that technical violations of the law 
are not always subject to investigation or prosecution). 
 325. See id. at 2282 (“[A]n ordinary prosecutor has a menu of possible crimes to 
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the NYSE decision makers are overconfident in their conclusions about 
those factors, then it would seem that those conclusions generally are less 
likely to be altered to any great degree by their considerations of the 
government and its review of their conclusions.  If the government does not 
impact to any great degree the NYSE decision maker’s conclusions, then 
the government hardly compels the NYSE’s decision and such 
governmental review does not seem to entwine the government with the 
NYSE decision-making process.327 
D.  Fairness 
A preference to be viewed as acting fairly may mute some of the 
influence on SROs that may otherwise follow from governmental review.  
In certain circumstances, one may sacrifice economic gain to be perceived 
as behaving fairly.328 
A study involving a game provides anecdotal evidence that people make 
financial sacrifices to be viewed as acting fairly.329  The ultimatum game 
involves two players, one of whom is given a sum of money and must offer 
some portion of that sum to the second player.  If the second player accepts 
the offered sum, the second player keeps that sum and the first player 
retains the residual amount.  If the second player rejects the offered sum, 
neither player collects any of the original amount.  The players cannot 
negotiate; the second player simply accepts or rejects the first player’s 
offer.  If the second player were a rational actor that desired to maximize 
her economic welfare, then she would accept the offered amount, no matter 
how small.  Such is the case because if the second player rejected the 
offered amount, she would collect nothing.  A rational, profit-maximizing 
actor would prefer a small amount of money to none at all.  Knowing this, 
the first player—if also a rational, profit-maximizing actor—should offer 
no more than the smallest amount. 
                                                          
pursue.”). 
 326. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Rule 476(a) (noting that sanctions may include “expulsion; 
suspension; limitation as to activities, functions, and operations, including the suspension or 
cancellation of a registration in, or assignment of, one or more stocks; fine; censure; 
suspension or bar from being associated with any member or member organization; or any 
other fitting sanction”). 
 327. Consideration of other cases may minimize the cognitive bias of overconfidence.  
See Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 289, at 25 (identifying greater bias from the “inside 
view” than from the “outside view”). 
 328. The appearance of fairness, rather than actual fairness, appears to be the key.  Colin 
Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies:  Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 209, 212 (1995).  Pursuit of the appearance of fairness mutes actions of self-interest 
to some degree, but because actual fairness does not appear to be the goal, “self-interested 
behavior is alive and well, even in ultimatum games.”  Id.; see Amar Bhide & Howard H. 
Stevenson, Why Be Honest if Honesty Doesn’t Pay, HARV. BUS. REV. 121 (Sept.-Oct. 1990). 
 329. See Camerer & Thaler, supra note 328, at 210; Sunstein, supra note 289, at 1186-
87. 
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Studies suggest that reality does not reflect such rational, profit-
maximizing behavior.  Studies indicate that offerors participating in the 
ultimatum game tend to offer between thirty and forty percent of the 
original amount, and offerees tend to reject offers of less than twenty 
percent of the original amount.330  Frequently the parties divide the original 
amount in half.331  Studies further suggest that the desire to be perceived as 
fair, even at one’s financial expense, becomes stronger when the first party 
knows that the game will be repeated.332 
Some suggest that the government compels the SRO to act due to 
governmental review of SRO enforcement actions.333  An SRO’s desire to 
be perceived as fair when making enforcement decisions may minimize the 
influence of governmental review, muting any influence from 
governmental review. 
The SRO may consider the perception of various constituencies:  the 
party being disciplined, other members (and persons associated with 
members), the government, and the public.  From the perspective of the 
party being disciplined, a “fair” level of enforcement may be less vigorous 
than the ideal (whatever that ideal happens to be).334  If, from the 
perspective of the disciplined party, the SRO acts fairly, then the 
disciplined party is less likely to seek governmental review of the 
disciplinary action.335  If the disciplined party does not seek governmental 
review, then one means by which the government may be spurred to act 
goes by the wayside.336 
From the perspective of the other members of the SRO, a “fair” level of 
enforcement may constitute more vigorous enforcement than is preferred 
by the party being disciplined.  Although, to a certain extent, members 
generally may prefer more limited rules and enforcement, once the 
members have been complying with the rules, those members do not want 
                                                          
 330. Camerer & Thaler, supra note 328, at 210. 
 331. A 50-50 split is often the mode.  Id.  There are exceptions to the outcomes discussed 
above.  Although the “results cut across the level of the stakes,” Sunstein, supra note 289, at 
1186, at some point, the amount at stake reaches a magnitude at which point an offeree 
accepts the offered amount, even if only a small fraction of the original sum.  Camerer & 
Thaler, supra note 328, at 211 n.2. 
 332. See Camerer & Thaler, supra note 328, at 213-14 (commenting that, in the context 
of the dictator game, offers shrink as the “social distance” between the parties increases). 
 333. Stone & Perino, supra note 204, at 460; Friedman, supra note 204, at 743-44; 
Metzger, supra note 232, at 1423 & n.198. 
 334. Jennifer Arlen, Comment:  The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1776 (1998) (“[P]eople tend to have a self-serving assessment of what 
is fair.”). 
 335. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (2000) (describing the procedure for seeking governmental 
review of an enforcement action). 
 336. Maremont & Solomon, supra note 230, at A1 (“In the 1980s, says Mercer Bullard, a 
former staffer in SEC’s Investment Management unit, the attitude was, ‘Show me an abuse, 
and I’ll put a stop to it.’”); id. at A1 (noting that the SEC generates only a third of the cases 
it handles (referencing a report authored by consultants McKinsey & Co.)). 
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other members (or persons associated with members) to break those rules.  
The members agreed to the rules in the first place in order to send a signal 
of quality to counter the lemon effect.337  The members that are complying 
with the rules are bearing the costs.338  Moreover, the members do not want 
others to achieve the benefit of appearing to have complied with the rules 
without bearing the costs of compliance as well.339  Third, the members do 
not want others to free ride on their efforts.340  Similarly, the members do 
not want others to achieve a competitive advantage through 
noncompliance.  Hence, once a rule is in force, complying members want 
that rule enforced.  Thus, the SRO faces pressures to enforce existing rules 
with which other members have complied.341 
Undoubtedly, there is some truth to the belief that SROs consider, among 
other things, the reaction by the government (or the public) in making 
decisions regarding enforcement actions, as espoused by those that believe 
that SROs constitute the government.  However, it seems that the influence 
of governmental review may be overstated.  The SRO may strive to treat 
disciplined parties fairly, despite the existence of governmental statutes 
requiring fairness and despite governmental review to ensure that such 
fairness is attained in SRO enforcement actions.342  As the influence of 
governmental review wanes, arguments of coercion, encouragement, and 
entanglement become weaker, as does the argument that the SRO is a 
                                                          
 337. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:  Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL 
R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 280-83 (1991) (applying 
Akerlof’s theories to securities markets); James D. Cox, Brands v. Generics:  Self-
Regulation by Competitors, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 15, 19 (2000) (“If the NYSE and 
NASDAQ wish to preserve their brands, they can do so through self-regulatory efforts so 
that issuers who list their shares on the NYSE or NASDAQ further signal to the investment 
community their commitment to ensure transparency, fair treatment of shareholders, and 
efficient execution of securities trades.  That is, the NYSE and NASDAQ can preserve their 
franchises through strong self-regulatory efforts that preserve, and even enhance, the 
reputational gains of their listed companies.”). 
 338. See generally Kip Betz, NYSE’s Thain Sees No Need for Added Reporting, 
Governance Reforms, 36 FED. SEC. & L. REP. 1024 (2004) (“Sarbanes-Oxley Act rules and 
other new disclosure requirements, including those of the NYSE . . . come at a cost—both in 
the expenses companies must incur and in senior management time and effort to comply 
with the new rules.”). 
 339. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 407 (5th ed. 1998) (“An 
individual margarine producer may be reluctant to advertise the low cholesterol content of 
his product because his advertising will benefit his competitors, who have not helped defray 
its expense.”). 
 340. Cox, supra note 337, at 18 (“Perhaps [electronic communication networks] may 
even enjoy a competitive advantage if, as a result of not being burdened by a fair share of 
the costs for regulatory oversight, they have more funds to invest in technology to enhance 
their efficiency than the NYSE or NASDAQ.”). 
 341. Members may prefer non-enforcement of a rule, even a rule with which they have 
already borne costs of compliance, in situations when the benefits of future non-
enforcement are large enough. 
 342. See supra Part I.A.1.c. 
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governmental actor. 
The fairness bias exemplified by the ultimatum game—a bias away from 
the outcome predicted under a rational, profit-maximizing theory—may not 
translate perfectly to the SRO enforcement arena.  In the ultimatum game, 
the second party receives unambiguous, immediate feedback on the first 
party’s decision; and the first party knows that such is the case.  In the 
ultimatum game, the perception of fairness (or lack thereof) occurs 
immediately after a single transaction; there may be no subsequent 
transactions.  By contrast, an SRO handles hundreds of enforcement 
actions each year.  In those enforcement actions, SROs presumably strive 
to be perceived as fair across the board.  An SRO could achieve such a 
perception of fairness across-the-board by being fair in every instance of 
enforcement, but achieving that across-the-board perception allows for 
deviations in individual enforcement actions.343  Therefore, although an 
SRO may strive for fairness in every enforcement action, deviations in 
individual enforcement actions may not preclude others’ perceptions of that 
SRO as treating disciplined parties fairly.  The fairness bias may mute the 
influence of governmental review on SRO decision making. 
E.  Cognitive Cures 
Individual biases may be minimized or eliminated by learning and by 
competition.  Additionally, an organization may take steps to minimize or 
eliminate the cognitive biases of individual decision makers through the 
adoption of cultural norms and a decision-review process. 
                                                          
 343. See Camerer & Thaler, supra note 328, at 215 (discussing Rabin’s “fairness 
equilibrium” and his 1993 study in which intentional acts of meanness are punished but 
inadvertent acts of meanness are tolerated (citing Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness 
into Game Theory, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993))).  An across-the-board view may 
conflict with another cognitive bias—narrow framing, which suggests that “people tend to 
make decisions one at a time, and in particular that they are prone to neglect the relevance of 
future decision opportunities.”  Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 289, at 23. 
Of course, a decision maker might account for certain cognitive biases.  If others’ 
perceptions are susceptible to the availability bias, then one might “go the extra mile” to 
ensure that a vivid, extreme case is handled fairly.  If the vivid, extreme case is handled 
fairly, then others might extrapolate from such anecdotal evidence. 
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 Expertise may mute cognitive biases.344  “Counsel, as repeat players, can 
spot and offset some of these psychological biases and heuristics . . . . 
Skillful lawyers may largely neutralize them, while poor or overburdened 
ones may not.”345  Additionally, favorable conditions for learning—
conditions that allow for feedback that is “clear, frequent, and quick”346—
“rarely apply in business settings.”347  One scholar compares 
weathermen—who get clear, frequent, and quick feedback and thus learn to 
make good forecasts that are less likely subject to cognitive biases—against 
CEOs and policy makers who do not enjoy the same quality of feedback.348  
NYSE decision makers do not always enjoy frequent, quick, and clear 
feedback, at least from the government.349 
One might also argue that the market will adapt to weed out those 
individual decision makers that suffer from cognitive biases.350  Such 
biases, however, are not easily eliminated.  For example, when playing the 
ponies, the market that a favorite will “win” is efficient, but the market that 
the favorite will “place” or “show” is inefficient as bettors underestimate 
the likelihood of such outcomes.351  One would expect, given the level of 
expertise at the tracks and given the arbitrage opportunity for profits, that 
                                                          
 344. Arlen, supra note 334, at 1768-69; Bibas, supra note 248, at 2502 (“[K]nowledge 
and experience[] may limit . . . overconfidence.” (citing Douglas A. Hershey & Jo A. 
Wilson, Age Differences in Performance Awareness on a Complex Financial Decision-
Making Task, 23 EXPERIMENTAL AGING RES. 257, 268-69 (1997))); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & 
Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. 
REV. 549, 579 (2002) (“[C]areer staff provide an ongoing repository not only of substantive 
knowledge but also of decision-making experience, so that agencies . . . need not reinvent 
the wheel . . . .”). 
Nonetheless, even experts are potentially subject to the same biases as lay people.  Arlen, 
supra note 334, at 1784.  In one study, seven internationally renowned civil engineers 
predicted (and set a fifty percent confidence interval around) the height at which a structure 
would cause its foundation to fail.  “The results were quite sobering:  not one engineer 
correctly predicted the true failure height within his or her confidence interval.  Evidently, 
the civil engineers thought that they knew more than they did . . . .”  Heath et al., supra note 
300, at 4 (discussing the overconfidence bias). 
 345. Bibas, supra note 248, at 2498.  Skill, however, may only come with time.  As 
referenced above, see generally Langevoort supra note 271, high turnover rates at SROs 
may inhibit the acquisition of the relevant expertise. 
 346. Colin Camerer, Comment on Noll and Krier, “Some Implications of Cognitive 
Psychology for Risk Regulation,” 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 791, 794 (1990). 
 347. Langevoort, supra note 271, at 133-34 n.111 (collecting sources). 
 348. Camerer, supra note 346, at 794. 
 349. See supra Part II.C. 
 350. See Langevoort, supra note 271, at 148 (“[S]hould we not expect those firms with 
unrealistic belief systems that do not learn from their errors to disappear, leaving only those 
that have successfully countered the problem of cognitive bias?”); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. 251, 275 (1986) (“[I]t 
is sometimes argued that failures of rationality in individual decision making are 
inconsequential because of the corrective effects of the market.”). 
 351. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 350, at 275; see Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Market Efficiency and Rationality:  The Peculiar Case of Baseball, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 1390 (2004). 
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the market would move toward efficiency, but it has not done so.352  Even 
though irrational decision making by individuals may have large economic 
effects, the market may not weed out such irrationality (1) if the decision 
errors have little effect on the individual, and (2) if there is no opportunity 
for arbitrage.353  In the SRO enforcement arena, the effect on the individual 
of an irrational decision may be small.  Certainly the impact of irrational 
decisions could be large—termination may result.  If, however, the 
challenged decision is anomalous, which would be expected given minimal 
intervention by the federal government, the effect may be small.  
Decisiveness and aggressiveness may be viewed as positives, with 
confidence and optimism evident of persuasiveness,354 an important 
characteristic for enforcement officials.  Moreover, in the enforcement 
arena, there seems to be little opportunity for arbitrage.  “The claim that the 
market can be trusted to correct the effect of individual irrationalities 
cannot be made without supporting evidence, and the burden of specifying 
a plausible corrective mechanism should rest on those who make this 
claim.”355 
Organizations may cure the cognitive biases of individual decision 
makers.356  Although “low-level” individuals—who lack experience and 
thus may be more subject to cognitive biases—may make initial decisions 
regarding enforcement matters, the organization within which those 
individuals operate may institute mechanisms to minimize or cure those 
cognitive biases.  First, the organization may institute cultural norms that 
lead to better decision making.357  An organization may hire people that 
behave consistent with the norm.358  If an organization signals that a certain 
                                                          
 352. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 350, at 275; see also Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock 
Markets Costly Casinos?  Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. 
L. REV. 611, 639-40 (1995) (arguing that some portion of new participants in the market are 
overconfident). 
 353. George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make 
Significant Differences in Economic Equilibria?, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 708, 719 (1985); 
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 350, at 275. 
 354. Langevoort, supra note 271, at 153-54. 
 355. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 350, at 275. 
 356. Arlen, supra note 334, at 1769. 
 357. Langevoort, supra note 285, at 132 (“But few doubt that, on average . . . , these 
belief systems are powerful normative influences once a coherent culture evolves.”); id. at 
152 (“Put simply, there is reason to suspect that firms that inculcate certain types of belief 
systems may in many settings be competitively superior to those that are more doggedly 
‘realistic.’”); id. at 104 (“Recent years have brought an explosion of interest in so-called 
ethics or integrity based systems that seek to persuade rather than command employees to 
act in a manner consistent with the firm’s best interests, without introducing a strong dose of 
costly and intrusive monitoring.”). 
 358. Id. at 83 (“Supervisors should, by all accounts, hire agents carefully . . . . There is a 
crudely accurate assumption that good compliance starts with good hiring.”).  Those doing 
the hiring may have difficulty discerning the characteristics tied to the exercise of discretion.  
E.g., id.  Screening devices may aid the hiring process, but such devices are not foolproof.  
Moreover, once applicants are aware of the characteristic, applicants may feign that trait.  
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trait is valued, employees will take the cue.  If co-workers signal adherence 
to a particular policy, then others, who otherwise might have deviated from 
the policy, sense pressure to conform and, ultimately, do conform.359 
Second, the organization may have a review process for those initial or 
preliminary decisions of low-level individuals.  Organizations may acquire, 
retain, and retrieve information better than an individual; organizations 
may learn.360  Although governmental review of enforcement decisions by 
individual SRO officials may be infrequent, slow, and unclear (minimizing 
the ex ante influence of the government on those decisions), review of such 
decisions within the organization may provide a disciplining force.  
Organizational review may provide more fertile ground for learning, as 
such review would be more frequent, quicker, and clearer. 
The opportunity for dialogue regarding individual enforcement matters 
between an initial decision maker and an experienced supervisor seems 
better suited to provide meaningful feedback that would facilitate learning 
than governmental review.  Unlike governmental review, such internal 
dialogues may occur with frequency.  Unlike governmental review, internal 
feedback may be quick; a supervisor may offer on-the-spot advice or 
commentary.  Unlike governmental review, the feedback from an internal 
review may be clear.  The confidential nature of an internal review may 
allow for direct feedback that is more honest than feedback that becomes 
known publicly.  To protect the target of criticism, public reprimands may 
obscure any criticism, such that clarity is lost.  Additionally, internal 
review may allow for consideration of the relevant information at one time, 
such that feedback does not trickle-in over a lengthy period of time, 
jeopardizing clarity.361 
While organizational review may mute some cognitive biases that arise 
in individual decision making, it may not eliminate such biases, as 
organizations themselves are also subject to cognitive biases.362  
“Information is highly decentralized in business organizations.”363  Low-
level decision makers have the bulk of the information and must report 
information upward for review at the next level.  Some investigations may 
generate mountains of information, not all of which can be communicated 
to a supervisor.364  In certain respects, the upward flow of selected 
                                                          
Id. at 84 (“[It is] not hard for clever people to mimic.”). 
 359. Id. at 104. 
 360. James P. Walsh, Managerial and Organizational Cognition:  Notes from a Trip 
Down Memory Lane, 6 ORG. SCI. 280, 292, 295 (1995). 
 361. Langevoort, supra note 285, at 136.  Information regarding extended investigations 
and enforcement proceedings, however, may trickle in over time. 
 362. Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 289, at 22 (“Loss aversion is not mitigated when 
decisions are made in an organizational context.”). 
 363. Langevoort, supra note 271, at 119. 
 364. See Edward J. Joyce & Gary C. Biddle, Anchoring and Adjustment in Probabilistic 
CLEVELAND OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  1:17:23 PM 
66 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1 
information may inhibit effective decision making.365  The information in 
the hands of the low-level decision maker may not be quantifiable,366 and 
thus may be malleable.  The  investigators and enforcement officials job is 
to knit together facts and arguments—mold the malleable to suit one’s 
view—that compel hearing panels to reach favorable conclusions while 
eliminating doubts.  As these individuals present information upward to 
superiors, they may present their cases using such skills.367  In so doing, the 
initial decision maker may, without any nefarious intent, unduly emphasize 
the good (the facts, law and policies that are favorable to the position 
adopted by the initial decision maker) and de-emphasize the bad (the facts, 
law and policies that are unfavorable to the position adopted by the initial 
decision maker).368  True, superiors—who presumably have more 
experience—should be amply qualified to identify decisions that do not 
further the pursuit of idealized goals.  Nonetheless, subjective judgments 
must be made with regard to enforcement matters.  Superiors may 
recognize that they lack familiarity with information regarding the 
particular enforcement matter under review.369  In addition, because they 
                                                          
Inference in Auditing, 19 J. ACCT. RES. 120, 120 (1981) (Auditors “use their professional 
judgment to determine the type and amount of information to collect . . . .”). 
 365. Langevoort, supra note 271, at 119 & n.60.  In other respects, the upward flow of 
selected information may encourage effective decision-making.  For example, top officials 
cannot be saddled with every decision or else paralysis may result, so some discretion may 
be delegated downward, with only selected information percolating upward.  See generally 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2005) (“The business and affairs of every corporation 
organized under this chapter shall be shall be managed by or under the direction of a board 
of directors . . . .”) (emphasis added).   
 366. The number of units sold may be quantified but quantification comes less easy for 
“customer reactions to new products [or] how well products are proceeding through the 
research and development pipeline.”  See Langevoort, supra note 271, at 119.  Even where 
information may be quantified, such reviewable information is not fool-proof.  Financial 
statements reflect quantifiable concepts but those figures may be malleable.  See LEOPOLD 
A. BERNSTEIN & JOHN J. WILD, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS:  THEORY, APPLICATION, 
AND INTERPRETATION 63 (6th ed. 1998) ( 
Preparation of financial statements requires judgment.  Judgment is imperfect, 
yielding variability in the quality and reliability of accounting numbers.  Since 
financial statements are general-purpose presentations, preparers’ judgments are 
affected by the their view of a typical user’s requirements and expectations.  These 
requirements and expectations do not necessarily coincide with those of a user with 
a specific task in mind.  Accounting is also a social science and, therefore, is at 
least partially determined by human factors, including incentives. 
). 
 367. See Martha S. Feldman & James G. March, Information in Organizations as Signal 
and Symbol, 26 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 171, 176 (1981) (“Often, information is produced in order to 
persuade someone . . . .”). 
 368. See Langevoort, supra note 271, at 122 (individual incentives and quest for 
advancement may lead one to “accentuate the positive and to distort bad news”). 
 369. See id. at 121 (“The employees with the most immediate access to basic information 
are almost always line personnel . . . .”); see Walsh, supra note 360, at 280  (“The most 
fundamental challenge faced by managers, however, is that their information worlds are 
extremely complex, ambiguous, and munificent.”). 
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may have operational as well as monitoring responsibilities,370 those 
superiors may defer to the reasoned judgment of those most intimately 
familiar with that information—the lower-level individuals that made the 
initial decision.371   
Furthermore, supervisors’ perceptions may be colored by the initial 
conclusions of lower-level decision makers.  The initial conclusion of a 
lower-level decision maker may serve as an anchor which a supervisor 
experiences difficulty overcoming.  Experiments indicate that “an original 
‘anchor’ . . . may be hard to dislodge.”372  For example, in one experiment, 
one group of accountants was asked two questions:  (1) does the incidence 
of significant management fraud exceed one percent? and (2) what is your 
estimate of the percentage of firms that have significant management 
fraud?373  A second group of accountants was asked the same questions 
except that the first question set the anchor at twenty percent.374  In 
response to the second question, the first group placed the estimate at 1.6 
%; the second group placed the estimate at 4.3 %.375 
Just as supervisors may be slow to question the initial decisions of 
lower-level officials, when challenged, those lower-level officials may 
defend their decisions in sub-optimal fashion.  “When there is 
accountability for decisions, people tend to construe information in ways 
that bolster their prior commitments . . . . [W]hen a decision has been made 
and the decision-maker has to answer for it, there tends to be a shift toward 
rationalization, both to oneself and others.”376  Because of a commitment 
                                                          
 370. See Langevoort, supra note 285, at 93 (“[I]t is possible to get inadequate monitoring 
from even professional auditors.  Particularly if the monitors are given too much 
work . . . .”); Langevoort, supra note 271, at 137-39 (“[G]roups can attend to even less 
information than individuals . . . . [E]ven if a group member privately wonders whether 
some bit of information is troubling, the very fact that other group members do not appear to 
be concerned is a reason to let the matter drop—groupthink . . . to preserve internal 
solidarity . . . .”). 
 371. See Langevoort, supra note 285, at 88 (“A supervisor with many team members and 
a host of other line responsibilities can readily fall prey to [a bias in favor of the status quo] 
even if not inclined toward wishful thinking.”); id. at 87-88 (“Once an impression is gained, 
it is insufficiently revised to reflect new information.”). 
 372. Sunstein, supra note 289, at 1188 (“Often people make probability judgments on 
the basis of an initial value, or ‘anchor,’ from which they make insufficient adjustments.  
The initial value may have an arbitrary or irrational source.”) (note omitted). 
 373. Joyce & Biddle, supra note 364, at 123. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. at 125. 
 376. Langevoort, supra note 285, at 87.  When reviewing a prior decision, one tends to 
review evidence asymmetrically.  One attributes positive consequences to one’s skill; one 
attributes negative consequences to outside circumstances.  See Langevoort, supra note 271, 
at 139.  After committing to a course of action, one tends to resist evidence that the chosen 
course of action was worse than alternatives.  See id. at 142; Langevoort, supra note 285, at 
87; Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 344, at 605  (“People find it difficult to come to believe 
that their initial decisions were mistaken.”).  “Self-confidence and external image are 
threatened both by introducing a troubling awareness of the possibility of mistake and by 
raising the need to consider a reversal of one’s position, which, in turn, calls into question 
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bias,377 the low-level, initial decision maker may resist a change in, or an 
adaptation of, her original position. 
Intermediate superiors may also recognize that there are levels of 
monitoring beyond them.  Those lower-level officers will present 
enforcement actions to hearing panels, and decisions by hearing panels are 
subject to review by the NYSE and the Commission.378  Superiors may not 
scrutinize (at the idealized level) the decisions of low-level officials in light 
of the additional levels of review, which can correct any wrongs not 
identified by the supervisors.  Any such correction by a hearing panel, the 
NYSE or the Commission arguably reflects negatively on the intermediate 
supervisor, who should be incented to conduct the internal review 
appropriately.  Nonetheless, such rebuke may be a reflection more of the 
lower-level advocate than the advocate’s intermediate supervisor.  Even in 
the presence of an appropriate internal review, an individual will exercise 
discretion post-review,379 such that a supervisor may distance herself from 
those post-review actions of the lower-level official. 
To protect the morale of the supervised, a supervisor may face incentives 
against intrusive review.380  The quest for a favorable working environment 
and the avoidance of confrontations may impede the flow of information 
and cause the decision-making process to suffer.381  Moreover, supervisors 
                                                          
one’s reputation for consistency.”  Langevoort, supra note 271, at 142.  Relatedly, given 
ambiguity, one interprets the ambiguity consistent with one’s self-interest, as opposed to a 
challenge to one’s exercise of discretion.  See id. at 144; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. 
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:  Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1094 (2000) (“[P]laintiffs (and defendants) will 
systematically anticipate their trial prospects as being better than defendants (and plaintiffs) 
believe.”).  Of course, these biases operate at the fringe; unambiguous evidence will not be 
ignored. 
 377. Langevoort, supra note 271, at 142 n.142 (“[O]ne cannot be sure that commitment 
is necessarily a bias; a rational actor might remain committed to a course of action if she 
fears that discovery of the mistake will lead to termination.”). 
 378. See Appendix A (Hearing Panel, Commission, U.S. Court of Appeals, U.S. 
Supreme Court). 
 379. See Langevoort, supra note 285, at 86 (stating that “apart from the simple 
unobservability of many of the agent’s actions” there are other psychological tendencies that 
make the supervisor ignorant of the employee’s actions). 
 380. See Langevoort, supra note 271, at 123 (describing the moral hazard problem where 
a supervisor may want to avoid responsibility by asking others not to share certain 
information); see also Langevoort, supra note 285, at 86 (“people tend to interpret data in a 
way that avoids aversive inference, subconsciously giving the agent an excessive benefit of 
the doubt”); Langevoort, supra note 271, 138-39 (noting that a “group of senior managers 
[may] unconsciously deflect[] threatening information [in order] to preserve internal 
solidarity”); Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 289, at 26 (“[F]acing the facts [of the 
potential for failure] can be intolerably demoralizing . . . . [T]he [unfavorable] forecast was 
quietly dropped from active debate . . . .”); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 270, at 274 
(“Incentives do not operate by magic:  they work by focusing attention and by prolonging 
deliberation.  Consequently, they are more likely to prevent errors that arise from 
insufficient attention and effort than errors that arise from misperception or faulty 
intuition.”). 
 381. CHRIS ARGYRIS, OVERCOMING ORGANIZATIONAL DEFENSES 14-31 (1990); 
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themselves are accountable to those senior to them.  Poor decisions by low-
level officers may reflect negatively on their immediate supervisors.  A 
supervisor’s ignorance of poor decisions by low-level officers may be 
preferred because it allows those supervisors to deny plausibly 
responsibility for those poor decisions.382  Perhaps, a supervisor could be 
compensated in a manner that leads to the idealized level of supervision. 
Designing such a compensation scheme would prove difficult.  
Somehow, one must identify the appropriate level of enforcement, which 
would not be easy.  Penalties for judgments of “not liable” may lead 
supervisors to recommend that line officials be less aggressive383 and 
under-enforcement may result.  Rewards for judgments of “liable” may 
lead supervisors to recommend that line officials proceed to trial on slam-
dunk cases.  Precious judicial and administrative resources may be 
squandered.  More significant enforcement actions—where victory is not 
assured—may receive inadequate attention or may be settled in non-
deterrent fashion.  Any compensation system tied to outcome may skew 
results away from the ideal. 
IV.  JOINT INVESTIGATIONS 
Based on the foregoing, in the vast majority of the situations in which 
one is investigated, subjected to proceedings, or disciplined by the NYSE, 
the actions of the NYSE should not be attributed to the government.384  
                                                          
Langevoort, supra note 271 (desiring “internal solidarity,” managers may distribute 
inaccurate information). 
 382. See Langevoort, supra note 271, at 123 (arguing that a supervisor’s initial failure to 
probe a subordinate’s position preserves a supervisor’s subsequent claim of ignorance 
regarding the subordinate’s position). 
 383. Compare Bibas, supra note 248, at 2471 (“Self-interest, in short, may discourage 
prosecutors from investing enough work in plea-bargained cases, in which more work might 
lead to heavier sentences . . . . They may further their careers by racking up good win-loss 
records, in which every plea bargain counts as a win but trials risk being losses.”), with 
Langevoort, supra note 285, at 85-86 (“[I]n the securities [trading] business, this problem is 
sufficiently well recognized that it is often dealt with explicitly in the supervisor’s contract:  
there are penalties for agent misconduct charged to the supervisor.”). 
 384. The result may seem anomalous, as courts typically have found SROs immune from 
civil liability because the enforcement function that they provide is governmental in nature.  
E.g., Barbara v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1996) (collecting 
cases for the proposition that individuals acting as public enforcers are immune from civil 
liability); Nagy, supra note 226, at 978 (noting that Congress granted the PCAOB immunity 
from civil liability); Friedman, supra note 197, at 762-67. 
Even if, in joint investigations, private actions seemingly should be attributed to the 
government, attribution may be inappropriate in certain situations.  Brentwood Acad. v. 
Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 303 (2001) (“Even facts that 
suffice to show public action . . . may be outweighed in the name of some value at odds with 
finding public accountability in the circumstances.”).  An epidemic of federal litigation 
resulting from attribution “might” counsel against attribution.  Id. at 304 (concluding that no 
such epidemic would occur under the facts presented without addressing the broad 
argument). 
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Nonetheless, courts should not rely blindly on a stream of other courts’ 
decisions concluding that the NYSE is not a governmental actor, 
particularly because the issue of attributing the actions of a private actor to 
the government is fact intensive.385  Joint investigations involving an SRO 
and the government merit close attention. 
As the general public channels more of its investment dollars into the 
securities markets, the general public becomes more concerned with 
securities fraud.386  In the wake of the dramatic incidents of corporate fraud 
of late, the general public cried for remedial action and Congress responded 
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.387  Congress, however, painted with 
a broad brush and, in certain respects, deferred to the expertise of the 
relevant administrative agency, the Commission.388  Greater enforcement is 
expected of the Commission.  Having placed greater demands on the 
Commission, Congress allocated greater resources to the Commission.389  
Despite increased resources, the Commission cannot investigate and 
prosecute every alleged bad actor.390 
Congress and the Commission are not the only ones responding to the 
public’s concern about integrity in the securities markets.  The SROs did 
and will continue to respond.391  In response to pressures, the Commission 
                                                          
 385. Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 298 (finding that such decisions necessitate a fact-
based investigation). 
 386. CHOPER ET AL., supra note 134, at 15 (“As of 1998, some 84 million U.S. citizens 
owned stocks (either directly or through ownership of mutual funds), and . . . the median 
U.S. shareholder . . . had a family income of $57,000 . . . . [T]his extensive participation by 
the middle class in the stock market in the United States . . . explains why issues of market 
fairness make it on to the national political agenda (and may also explain why the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 passed both Houses of Congress by overwhelming majorities.”) (notes 
omitted). 
 387. Id.; see CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 196, at 1 (“Many believe that the 
decline of Enron and other instances of financial statement earnings restatements and 
bankruptcies have resulted in a general decline in investor confidence in our financial 
markets . . . .”). 
 388. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2000) (“The Commission shall, by rule, require . . . .”); 
id. § 7242(a) (“It shall be unlawful, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission shall prescribe . . . .”); see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:  STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 59 (3d ed. 
2001) (“Distributed benefits/concentrated costs:  Because the proposal will be opposed by 
organized interests, the best legislative solution is to draft an ambiguous bill and delegate to 
agency regulation . . . .”). 
 389. Rachel McTague, SEC Clear Winner in Spending Bill, With 47 Percent Funding 
Increase, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 307 (2003).  One might, however, want to consider change 
over a longer time period, instead of, for example, year over year.  Maremont & Solomon, 
supra note 232, at A1 (“The SEC, once a premier employer, began losing staff as pay fell 
behind soaring private-sector salaries. . . . About 14% of the SEC’s staff left in 1999 and a 
like number in 2000, double the federal government average.”). 
 390. See COX ET AL., supra note 129, at 641 (“By all accounts, the SEC does not have the 
resources to police the securities markets comprehensively; private rights of action have 
long been seen as a necessary adjunct to the public enforcement effort.”); GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SEC OPERATIONS:  INCREASED WORKLOAD CREATES CHALLENGES 19 
(2002) (“SEC Officials said that they cannot prosecute every case . . . .”). 
 391. Aaron Lucchetti, Investors Get Shortchanged On Interest, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 
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and SROs will emphasize enforcement to discipline bad actors and to deter 
others from so acting.  Coordination among public and private regulators, 
which may be on the rise,392 is advisable to prevent public regulators from 
duplicating the efforts of private regulators, and vice versa.393  Such 
coordination has given rise to joint investigations involving both private 
and public regulators.394 
Such coordination and joint investigations presents questions regarding 
whether the government and private actors are “jointly participating” or 
“entwined” in their enforcement efforts in a manner that private actions 
should be attributed to the government.  Encouragement, coercion, and 
entwinement may occur at the policy-making level or at the foot-soldier 
level and convert private conduct into state action.395 
In some situations, however, private actors may facilitate governmental 
enforcement actions in ways that do not arouse suspicion.  Brief attention is 
                                                          
2005, at D2 (“To avoid conflicts of interest, the exchange separated Mr. Ketchum and the 
regulatory unit from the rest of the NYSE executives.  Mr. Ketchum, the exchange’s chief 
regulatory officer, reports directly to an independent committee of the NYSE board.”); id. 
(“The warning is part of an effort [by the NYSE] to become more aggressive in the face of 
criticism about its policing efforts in recent years.”).  See generally CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 196, at 9 (“Many entities today are taking a closer look at their 
own governance and risks in light of recent high profile business failures.”).  See Report of 
Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement 
Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 34,44969, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001) 
(refusing to take action against parent company despite misconduct by an officer of a 
subsidiary because of parent’s response to the misconduct); id. (“When businesses seek out, 
self-report and rectify illegal conduct, and otherwise cooperate with Commission staff, large 
expenditures of government and shareholder resources can be avoided and investors can 
benefit more promptly.”). 
 392. See generally Tom Gilroy, Companies Still Have Work to Do on MD&A, Senior 
SEC Official Says, 36 FED. SEC. & L. REP. 1049, 1050 (2004) (“While the number of actual 
financial reporting fraud cases the SEC has brought has risen steadily over the past five or 
six years, so too has the trend toward coordinating prosecution with federal and/or state 
criminal authorities, [Susan G.] Markel [Chief Accountant, Division of Enforcement, SEC] 
told the audience.”). 
 393. See United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he government 
has not used a private party to circumvent anything except, perhaps, work.”); U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 1997 CONFERENCE ON FEDERAL-STATE SECURITIES 
REGULATION:  FINAL REPORT (1997), http://www.sec.gov/info/small 
bus/ffedst97.htm (“encourage information-sharing and avoid unnecessary duplication of 
examinations”); id. (“The SEC seeks to share its surveillance efforts with state and SRO 
officials.”); id. (“attempt to coordinate and divide the respective [SEC & NASD] 
enforcement workloads”). 
 394. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Release 
No. 2004-103, SEC and NYSE File Settled Action Charging Fidelity Brokerage Services for 
Violating Federal Securities Laws and NYSE Rules in Connection with Document 
Alteration and Destruction (Aug. 3, 2004) (on file with American University Law Review, 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-103.htm (“In a joint investigation, the SEC and the 
NYSE found that between January 2001 and July 2002, Fidelity Brokerage violated the 
broker-dealer record-keeping requirements of the federal securities laws . . . .”). 
 395. See generally Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 
288, 300 (2001) (referencing entwinement from the “top down” and the “bottom up”). 
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given to these situations.  For example, cross training may evidence 
coordination of the sort that should not be troubling.  The federal 
government and SROs may coordinate their training to develop 
overlapping expertise.  The government may recognize that SRO officials 
possess expertise that may be lacking in government officials and those 
government officials may be trained by SRO representatives.396 Similarly, 
the SROs may recognize that government officials possess expertise that 
may be lacking in SRO personnel.  To make up for such shortcomings, 
SRO enforcement officials may seek federal training.  That each may 
attempt to learn from the other, including the other’s investigative 
techniques, may amount to coordination of skill sets.  The requisite 
encouragement, coercion, or entwinement, however, seems lacking.  The 
federal government does not compel such coordination; the SROs seek to 
expand their expertise in pursuit of their self-interest—elimination of fraud 
and the like. 
Additionally, the enforcement powers of an SRO are lacking relative to 
the federal government.  The jurisdiction of an SRO is more limited than 
that of the federal government.397  Unlike an SRO, the Commission may 
issue subpoenas in formal enforcement actions.  In addition to investigative 
tools like wiretaps, search warrants, and subpoenas, the U.S. Attorney, 
unlike an SRO, may seek criminal sanctions.398  An SRO may commence 
                                                          
 396. Organized Crime in the Securities Markets:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. On 
Finance and Hazardous Materials of the House Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. 259 (Sept. 
13, 2000) [hereinafter Organized Crime Hearings]  (statement of Barry R. Goldsmith, 
Executive Vice President, NASD Regulation, Inc.) (“NASD Regulation has also been very 
active in providing training on securities issues to prosecutors and investigating agencies.  In 
each of the last three years, the FBI has held a weeklong training program on securities 
cases at its facility in Quantico, Virginia; CPAG and NASDR’s Market Regulation 
Department have taught agents as part of this program every year . . . . Representatives of 
NASDR’s Enforcement Department frequently provide training to prosecutors and agents, 
including recent sessions in Boston, Miami, and San Francisco.  NASDR’s New York 
district office regularly provides various levels of training to agents and prosecutors . . . .”); 
id. (“[NASD] Market Regulation staff regularly take part in SEC training to develop 
investigative techniques . . . .” ).  The government’s purchase of private contract services 
does not convert the service providers into governmental actors.  Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. 
at 299; Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982). 
 397. See generally NYSE, Inc., NYSE Constitution art. IX, § 1,  http://rules.nyse.com 
/NYSE/Constitution/ (“The Board shall adopt such rules as it deems necessary or 
appropriate for the discipline of members, member organizations, allied members, approved 
persons, and registered and non-registered employees of members and member 
organizations for the violation of the Act, the rules of the Exchange and for such other 
offenses as may be set forth in the rules of the Exchange.”); 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000) (“It shall 
be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce . . . .”); id. § 78c(a)(17) (defining “interstate 
commerce”). 
 398. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT:  2003 CONFERENCE 
ON FEDERAL-STATE SECURITIES REGULATION (2003), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus 
/ffedst2003.htm (“In a growing number of instances, available civil remedies do not stop 
some of the people behind today’s frauds.  Criminal prosecution and resulting jail time 
does. . . . The SEC representatives noted an increase in the number of U.S. Attorney’s 
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an investigation and, recognizing (1) a lack of jurisdiction, (2) the severity 
of the conduct at issue, or (3) the lack of investigative tools at its disposal, 
refer the matter to the federal government.399  While the investigation may 
be termed “joint,” in that each of the SRO and federal government 
participated, the participation may not have overlapped.  Absent such 
overlap, there seems little reason to suspect federal encouragement, 
coercion, or entwinement.  The SRO acts in its own self-interest by 
recommending federal intervention. 
Even simple overlapping of governmental and SRO enforcement actions 
need not result in the attribution of private actions to the government.  The 
federal government and an SRO may agree to share independently 
developed information regarding their respective investigations.400  
Certainly, there should be no attribution if an SRO, of its own volition, 
shared independently developed information from one of its completed 
investigations with the federal government.  In those circumstances, 
arguments of encouragement, coercion or entwinement would miss the 
mark.  Even an ex ante agreement to share independently developed 
information should not be troubling.  If the agreement deals only with 
information sharing, then the federal government and the SRO undertake 
investigations independently along different tracks.401  Those tracks may 
run parallel to one another,402 but the federal government does not 
                                                          
Offices around the country that were actively seeking to prosecute securities fraud cases.”). 
 399. See Organized Crime Hearings, supra note 396 (statement of Barry R. Goldsmith, 
Executive Vice President, NASD Regulation, Inc.) (“There are . . . a very small number of 
violations that are so pernicious or are committed by such hardened securities law 
recidivists that they can only be dealt with criminally.”).  “[W]e . . . refer the most serious of 
these matters to criminal law enforcement officials.  It is the criminal authorities who are 
best positioned to fully prosecute those involved in these cases.”  Id.  But see COX ET AL., 
supra 129, at 774 (“When the subjects are members of self-regulatory organizations, such as 
an exchange or the NASD, the Commission may forward the information it has gathered to 
the appropriate SRO, if the information suggests that the SRO’s rules have been violated, so 
that the SRO can take appropriate disciplinary action.”). 
 400. The Privacy Act of 1974 permits disclosure of information obtained by federal 
agencies for “routine use,” such as the coordination of enforcement activities conducted by 
federal law enforcement and SROs.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (2000).  See generally id. § 552a; 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Form No. 1662, Supplemental Information 
for Persons Requested to Supply Information Voluntarily or Directed to Supply Information 
Pursuant to a Commission Subpoena (2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/sec1662.pdf.  There are limits on the government’s ability 
to share information with an SRO.  See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (noting a general 
prohibition on disclosing matters occurring before the grand jury). 
 401. D.L. Cromwell Invs., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 
2002) (refusing to attribute private actions to the government despite the SRO providing 
documents to the government and the government providing to the SRO information 
regarding witness interviews and progress reports of its investigative efforts); see United 
States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[The telephone company] and the FBI 
were conducting separate investigations.”). 
 402. Cromwell, 279 F.3d at 162-63 (refusing to attribute private actions to the 
government when the SRO and the government “pursued similar evidentiary trails because 
their independent investigations were proceeding in the same direction”).  Regarding 
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encourage or coerce the SRO to take any particular action in carrying out 
its investigation and its own enforcement actions, nor can it be said that the 
federal government has become entwined with the SRO’s exercise of 
discretion regarding investigative or enforcement decisions.403 The 
information sharing allows each entity to conserve resources.  And, in some 
situations, the SRO may investigate less and depend more on the federal 
government for information. 
Coordinated investigations, however, may present situations for which 
actions of an SRO should be attributed to the government.  Coordination 
may occur in designing the investigative strategy—coordination at the 
policy-making level.  Such coordination would seem to amount to 
significant encouragement or entwinement, resulting in state action in the 
execution of such strategies or policies.  For example, the facts of 
Brentwood Academy indicate that representatives of the state government 
dominated the policy-making positions of the entity-in-question, 
contributing to the Court’s holding that actions of that entity should be 
attributed to the state.404  By way of contrast, in Tarkanian,405 where the 
NCAA was the alleged state actor whose rulings led the State of Nevada to 
take the disputed action, the actions of the NCAA were not attributable to 
Nevada, in part, because most of the members of the NCAA had no 
                                                          
parallel proceedings, see Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1183 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive governmental criminal prosecutions and 
successive governmental punishments for the same conduct and that it is doubtful that 
NASD is a governmental agency). 
 403. Cromwell, 279 F.3d at 163 (“demands [of the accused] issued directly from [SRO] 
as a product of its private investigation, and that none of its demands were generated by 
governmental persuasion or collusion”); see Clegg, 509 F.2d at 609 (refusing to attribute 
private actions to the government when “[the telephone company] kept [the FBI] informed 
of the status and to some degree the results of [its] investigation, [because] there [was] no 
indication. . . that [the telephone company] acted at the behest or suggestion, with the aid, 
advice or encouragement, or under the direction or influence of the FBI”). 
Such joint investigations arguably implicate the Supreme Court’s Burton decision in 
which the Court attributed private actions to the government.  See supra note 47 and 
accompanying text.  As noted above, however, Burton involved racial discrimination and 
was a decision of the 1960s that pre-dated federal civil rights legislation.  Subsequently, 
Burton’s reach has been limited and the decision criticized.  See supra note 47. 
 404. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 300 
(2001) (“[P]ublic school officials . . . control [and] overwhelmingly perform all but the 
purely ministerial acts” of the purported private entity in question; “State Board 
members . . . serve as members of the board of control and legislative council” of the 
purported private entity in question); see also Desiderio v. NASD, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 206 
(2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the NASD is not a governmental actor, in part, because the 
government does not serve on any NASD board or committee); United States v. Shvarts, 90 
F. Supp. 2d 219, 222 (2000) (holding that the NASD is not a governmental actor, in part, 
because no governmental official or appointee serves as a director of NASD); Nagy, supra 
note 226, at 2 (arguing that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which was 
created under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, is a state actor based, in part, on the fact that 
the SEC appoints the Chairperson and its four other members). 
 405. 488 U.S. 179 (1988). 
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connection to Nevada.406  An absence of such entwinement at the strategic 
or policy-making level counsels against attributing the actions of the SRO 
to the federal government.  Such absence was seen in Cromwell where one 
SRO enforcement officer may have been an agent of the federal 
government, but, from the get-go, that SRO officer was “walled off”407 
from other SRO enforcement officials,408 counseling against attribution of 
the actions of those other SRO enforcement officials to the government.409  
Because those other SRO enforcement officials were not in contact with the 
government, the government did not coerce or encourage them to take any 
action, nor did the government become entwined in their exercise of 
discretion. 
Thus, courts should consider the identities of those making strategic 
decisions in a joint investigation.  One federal governmental official 
coupled with numerous SRO officials may counsel against attributing the 
disputed actions to the government.  If, however, one or a few federal 
officials control the investigation, despite the presence of numerous SRO 
officials, then attribution seems more likely to be appropriate.410  
Regardless of the power of numbers, federal leadership may be expected 
as, relative to the SROs, the Commission is viewed as having the final 
word regarding securities regulation.411  Moreover, in criminal 
                                                          
 406. See id. at 193 (“Those institutions, the vast majority of which were located in States 
other than Nevada, did not act under color of Nevada law.  It necessarily follows that the 
source of the legislation adopted by the NCAA is not Nevada but the collective 
membership, speaking through an organization that is independent of any particular State.”). 
 407. Cromwell, 279 F.3d at 163. 
 408. See id. (dealing with an SRO officer who worked for NASDR’s CPAG).  “CPAG is 
the first unit within a self-regulatory organization to be devoted to working directly and 
exclusively on criminal investigations and prosecutions involving securities-related crimes.”  
Organized Crime Hearings, supra note 396 (Statement of Barry R. Goldsmith, Executive 
Vice President, NASD Regulation, Inc.). 
 409. Cromwell, 279 F.3d at 163. 
 410. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 
300 (2001) (referencing control of an entity by public officials as counseling in favor of 
attributing resulting actions to the government); id. at 301 n.4 (same).  Perhaps other caveats 
are in order—pretext, United States v. Szur, 1998 WL 661484 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 24, 1998), and 
collusion, Marchiano v. NASD, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 90, 95 (D.D.C. 2001), may result in 
attribution.  Pretext and collusion, however, suggest bad faith on the part of federal officials, 
who may be acting to circumvent wrongfully constitutional protections.  Presumably, such 
wrongful behavior by federal officials occurs in a small set of cases, and, thus, is not a focus 
of this Article. 
 411. Testifying before a congressional committee regarding the residual role to be played 
by the Commission in light of self-regulation of the stock market, Chairman Douglas said, 
“Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, 
cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be used.”  JOEL SELIGMAN, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET:  A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 185-86 (Aspen Pub. 3d ed. 2003); see 
Richard Hill, Senate Banking Leadership Lauds State Securities Regulators at Hearing, 36 
FED. SEC. & L. REP. 1035 (2004) (“[T]he [SEC] is the primary securities regulator . . . .” 
(quoting Richard Shelby, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee Hearing of the Senate 
Banking Committee) (internal quotations omitted)). 
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prosecutions, SRO officials may be more even likely to defer to federal 
prosecutors as SROs lack the power to proceed criminally. 
Generally, little or no public information is available regarding the 
allocation of decision-making authority in joint investigations.  More 
information would guard against speculation.  Even in the absence of cause 
to attribute private actions to the government because of an absence of top-
down coercion, encouragement, or entwinement, the necessary coercion, 
encouragement, or entwinement may occur from the bottom-up.  Federal 
investigators may coerce or encourage SRO investigators, or otherwise 
become entwined in SRO investigations, such that attribution to the 
government is appropriate.412 
Federal involvement that leads private actors to take action that 
otherwise would not have occurred may justify attributing private actions 
to the government, so long as those private actions were reasonably 
foreseeable.413  In joint investigations, federal concerns may deviate from 
an SRO’s concerns.  In a joint investigation, NYSE investigators and 
federal investigators may seek different information given different 
evidentiary burdens in connection with their respective enforcement 
proceedings.  For example, although the NYSE is to enforce federal laws 
and rules in addition to its own comparable rules, the NYSE may focus 
upon the enforcement of its own rules.  The necessary proof to enforce its 
own rules may be less demanding than that required to enforce federal 
rules. 
The NYSE may elect to enforce NYSE Rule 476(a)(6) or Rule 
476(a)(7)—which do not appear to require proof of scienter—instead of 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act or Rule 10b-5 promulgated by the 
Commission—which do require proof of scienter.414  Leaders of the NYSE 
                                                          
 412. Harvey L. Pitt et al., SEC Enforcement Actions:  an Overview of SEC Enforcement 
Proceedings and Priorities, C700 ALI-ABA 167, 268 (1991) (“If, however, a federal 
official actively participates in the unlawful seizure of a document, . . . the federal 
government is implicated and cannot accept the benefits of the document.”); see LAFAVE, 
supra note 121, at 178-98. 
 413. Comment, Police Bulletins and Private Searches, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 163, 170 
(1970); LAFAVE, supra note 121, at 198 (“This approach has considerable appeal.  It 
certainly would product more rational results in those cases where the assumption seems to 
be that a [governmental] request is operative only if explicit and specific rather than implicit 
and general.”); see id. at 211 (“Many [courts] take an unduly limited view of what will 
suffice as the requisite government encouragement.”). 
 414. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 generally prohibit fraud and the complaining party 
must establish that the defendant acted with scienter.  SEC v. Aaron, 446 U.S. 680, 680-81 
(1980) (governmental action for injunction); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 
(1976) (private action for damages).  Instead of proceeding under NYSE Rule 476(a)(5) 
which prohibits fraud, the Exchange may proceed under Rule 476(a)(6), which prohibits 
“conduct . . . inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade,” or Rule 476(a)(7), 
which prohibits “acts detrimental to the interest or welfare of the Exchange.”  NYSE Rule 
476 (Dec. 13, 1978). 
A recent search of the NYSE’s webpage yielded twelve hits for “scienter.”  See 
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acknowledge the disparity of proof.  In comments delivered at Fordham, 
Richard G. Ketchum, Chief Regulatory Officer of the NYSE, referenced 
one of the benefits of self-regulation:  “the ability to impose non-scienter-
based ethical standards that would be inappropriate to be imposed by 
Federal Government.”415  In a joint investigation, might federal influence 
alter the normal course of an SRO’s investigation such that attribution of 
private actions to the government is appropriate? 
As discussed above, outside the realm of joint investigations, the 
possibility of federal review of SRO enforcement actions generally would 
not seem to color the discretion exercised by SRO officials because, among 
other things, such federal review is unlikely and slow, and any message 
conveyed thereby may be unclear.  In joint investigations, however, such 
review appears to be more likely and quick, and the message conveyed 
thereby more clear. 
Likely:  In a joint investigation, an SRO official will work closely with 
federal officials.  SRO officials seem to be playing an increasingly larger 
role in federal enforcement actions.  In United States v. Gangi, the 
NASDR’s Criminal Prosecution Assistance Group (“CPAG”) provided 
hundreds of hours of assistance to the Commission and prosecutors.416  In 
United States v. Coppa, CPAG provided “extensive”417 assistance over an 
eighteen-month period.418  In June 2000, federal officials and the NASDR 
                                                          
http://www.nyse.com.  One hit was the Ketchem quote cited in the following footnote; 
references of “scienter” appeared in ten NYSE hearing panel decisions:  one in 1983, one in 
1986, one in 1996, and seven in 2004.  Each of those seven enforcement actions in 2004 
resulted from joint investigations involving the Commission and the Exchange.  See SEC 
Press Release No. 2004-99, Settlement Reached With Two Specialist Firms For Violating 
Federal Securities Laws And NYSE Regulations (July 26, 2004) (on file with American 
University Law Review); SEC Press Release No. 2004-42, Settlement Reached With Five 
Specialist Firms For Violating Federal Securities Laws and NYSE Regulations (Mar. 30, 
2004) (on file with American University Law Review).  Even in those actions, the member 
firms were not alleged to have acted with scienter; instead, those firms settled allegations 
that they violated, among other rules, NYSE Rule 342 by failing to establish adequate 
policies that would be expected to detect fraudulent conduct and by failing to supervise 
specialists with a view to preventing violations of federal securities laws.  See, e.g., NYSE, 
Inc., Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-49 (Mar. 29, 2004), 
available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/04-049.pdf. 
 415. NYSE, Inc., Public Statement, The Self Regulatory Compact—Remarks of Richard 
G. Ketchum, Chief Regulatory Officer, The New York Stock Exchange from the Sommer 
Lecture at Fordham University Law School (Nov. 9, 2004), 
http://www.nyse.com/content/articles/1100303421648.html. 
 416. Organized Crime Hearings, supra note 396, (Statement of Barry R. Goldsmith, 
Executive Vice President, NASD Regulation, Inc.). 
 417. Id.; Organized Crime on Wall Street:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Finance 
and Hazardous Materials of the House Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. 124 (Sept. 13, 
2000) [hereinafter Crime on Wall Street Hearings] (Statement of Richard H. Walker, 
Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission) (“The charges 
stemmed from a year-long investigation by the SEC the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the FBI, and 
the New York Police Department with assistance of NASD Regulation.”). 
 418. Organized Crime Hearings, supra note 396 (Statement of Barry R. Goldsmith, 
Executive Vice President, NASD Regulation, Inc.). 
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jointly announced the results of a one-year undercover operation:  the U.S. 
Attorney indicted 120 individuals involving fraud in connection with the 
trading of the securities of nineteen companies; the Commission sued sixty-
three individuals; and the NASD previously had filed a complaint against 
eighteen individuals and an entity.419  Given the apparent close-working 
relationship in such investigations, an SRO official is likely to receive 
feedback—whether explicit or by raised eyebrow.  With greater likelihood 
of federal feedback, SRO officials are more likely to color their decisions 
and actions to appease federal officials.420 
Quick:  Outside the realm of joint investigations, federal feedback may 
be delayed for months or years as is the norm in the Commission’s review 
of SRO enforcement actions.  In a joint investigation, however, feedback 
may come much more quickly.  In light of the “extensive” assistance and 
the witness interviews conducted by CPAG in United States v. Coppa,421 
one would expect that the federal prosecutors were offering feedback on an 
on-going basis.  In a joint investigation that spanned many months, one 
might expect direction and feedback to be on-going. 
Clear:  And if feedback is offered quickly, the message is more likely to 
be clear.  If feedback is quickly offered, the message is less likely to 
become garbled by intervening events or other white noise.  Clear feedback 
may accentuate the effects of accountability and risk aversion. 
Frequent, quick, and clear feedback lessens the effect of self-criticism 
and leads actors to color their decisions and actions toward the audience’s 
preferences.422  Frequent, quick, and clear feedback would influence the 
decision making of a rational actor; the rational actor may attempt to 
appease the audience and avoid negative repercussions from displeasing the 
audience.  Moreover, such feedback enhances risk aversion.423  SRO 
enforcement officials may be more likely to effect the will of those running 
the joint investigation—which, given Congress’ allocation of authority, 
may more likely be federal officials.  The actions of SRO enforcement 
officials, who may deviate from the normal course to appease federal 
                                                          
 419. Crime on Wall Street Hearings, supra note 417 (Statement of Richard H. Walker, 
Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission). 
 420. Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 289, at 17, 22 (“Decision makers become more 
risk averse when they expect their choices to be reviewed by others . . . .” ). 
 421. Organized Crime Hearings, supra note 396 (Statement of Barry R. Goldsmith, 
Executive Vice President, NASD Regulation, Inc.). 
 422. Seidenfeld, supra note 203, at 1066 (“When individuals are accountable to an 
audience whose preferences are known, these individuals . . . alter the outcome of their 
decisions to come closer to an outcome that would satisfy their audience . . . . Individuals 
who are accountable to an audience with unknown views are significantly more self-critical 
while making their decisions.”). 
 423. Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 289, at 22 (claiming that decision makers are 
more risk averse when their choices will be reviewed and do not want to accept 
responsibility for any failures that result). 
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officials to whom they are accountable and whose reaction to such review 
is reasonably foreseeable, should be attributable to the government. 424 
CONCLUSION 
Generally, when creating, policing, and enforcing rules, SROs do not 
constitute governmental actors because, even absent federal compulsion or 
encouragement, SROs would take such actions.  SROs act in their self-
interest by creating, policing, and enforcing rules that protect investors’ 
interests; actions taken in self-interest cleanse those actions of federal 
influence.  Research suggests that decision makers do not always act 
rationally, but several of these cognitive biases seemingly lessen the 
influence of the federal government on the decision-making processes of 
SRO enforcement officials, muting the impact of federal influence and 
undermining arguments of state action.  When federal and SRO officials 
jointly investigate bad actors, however, attribution of private actions to the 
government may be appropriate. 
                                                          
 424. See Comment, supra note 413, at 170 (arguing that police should only be 
responsible for foreseeable consequences based on their requests).  LAFAVE, supra note 121, 
at 198 (“This approach has appeal . . . .”). 
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APPENDIX A425 
                                                          
 425.   http://www.nyse.com/regulation/howregworks/1022221392411.html 
 
